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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the relationship between particular tactics and strategies of 
two case studies, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-
1979). Two chapters illuminate the experiences of two Rhodesian units that served in Malaya 
as part of the Commonwealth Forces: ‘C’ Squadron (Rhodesia) 22nd SAS Regiment (1951-
1953), and 1
st
 Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (1956-1958). In order to assess their impact 
on the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATOPS) manual is 
compared with the British Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) manual. The final 
part of the dissertation comprises of an in-depth comparative study of a pivotal stratagem that 
the governments of Malaya and Rhodesia employed in their respective conflicts, namely their 
resettlement programs.  
The two case studies were chosen primarily due to a paucity of comparative research 
involving the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War, and because the military 
link between the two conflicts has been largely unexplored. A combination of written primary 
sources and secondary sources were used to conduct the research. The primary sources 
consisted mainly of state documents, NGO reports, newspaper articles and press briefings 
from a number of national and public archives. The secondary sources comprised a variety of 
professional and amateur historical texts, and a selection of journal articles. 
The study concluded that while the Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency 
may have been relatively minor, the military link was crucial in developing an understanding 
of the Rhodesian Civil War. A number of the Rhodesians, who served in ‘C’ Squadron 22nd 
SAS, continued their military careers and their experiences shaped the conduct of the 
Rhodesian Civil War. The comparative study on resettlement illustrates how the Rhodesian 
government attempted to replicate the Malayan resettlement program. Findings indicated that 
while the relationship between political, economic and military tactics and strategy were 
importance, the two conflicts were essentially political wars, and so every type of strategy 
and tactic had a political significance. Nevertheless, the study concluded that a variety of 
historical contexts and structural factors were more decisive in determining the outcome of 
resettlement. 
 
This research has far reaching implications, particularly for counter-insurgent theorists. 
One cannot wage today’s wars from doctrine based solely on the lessons of wars from the 
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past. It is rare that the political, social, cultural, military, geographical, international and 
economic factors unique to a certain conflict and time period, are reproduced exactly in 
another theatre of war. The Rhodesian conflict illustrates the dangers of using a previous 
conflict (due to a shared Imperial consciousness) as tactical and strategic guidelines.  
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there are grounds for further comparative 
research on the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis het ten doel om die verhouding tussen die spesifieke taktieke en stratigieë 
van die twee gevallestudies onder bespreking, naamlik die sogenoemde “Malayan 
Emergency” (1948-1960) en die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog (1964-1979) Twee hoofstukke 
belig die ervaringe van twee Rhodesiese eeneede wat diens gelewer het in Britse Maleisië as 
deel van die Gemenebes Magte (Commonwealth Forces), naamlik ‘C’ Eskader  (Rhodesia 
22
nd
 SAS Regiment, 1951-1953) en die 1
st
 Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (1956-1958). 
Ten einde hul impak op die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog te bepaal, word die Rhodesian Anti 
Terrorist Operations (ATOPS) met die Britse Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) 
handleiding vergelyk. (Gebrek aan) Die finale deel van die tesis bestaan uit ‘n diepgaande 
vergelykende studie van die deurslaggewende oorbruggende strategie wat die regerings in 
beide Rhodesië en in Britse Maleisië gebruik het in hul respektiewe konflikte, naamlik hulle 
hervestigings programme. 
Die twee gevallestudies was hoofsaaklik gekies weens die gebrek aan vergelykende 
navorsing met betrekking tot die Malayan Emergency en die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog en 
omdat die verband tussen die twee oorloë  grotendeels nie behoorlik ondersoek is nie. Om die 
navorsing te onderneem was ‘n kombinasie van geskrewe primêre bronne and sekondêre 
bronne was gebruik. Die primêre bronne bestaan hoofsaaklik uit staatsargiewe, NGO verslae, 
koerant artikelsen perskonferensies van verskeie staatlike en openbare argiewe. Die 
sekondêre bronne bestaan uit ‘n verskeidenheid professionele en amateur historiese tekste 
sowel as uit joernaal artikels. 
Dié studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die Rhodesiese bydrae tot die 
Malayan Emergency relatief gering was, was die militêre verband deurslaggewend ten einde 
‘n begrip can die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog te win. ’n Aantal van die Rhodesiesiers wat in ‘C 
Eskader 22ste SAS diens gelwere het, het hul militêre loopbane voortgesit en hulle ervaringe 
in Britse Maleisië het die gang van die Rhodesiese Burger oorlog bepaal/ Die vergelykende 
studie t.o.v. hervestiging toon hoe die Rhodesiese regering probeer het om die hervestigings 
program van Britise Maleisië te herhaal. Bevindinge toon aan dat ofskoon die verhouding 
tussen die politieke, ekonomiese en militêre taktieke en strategieë belangrik was, was die  
teen-insurgensie oorloë in beide lande in wese politieke oorloë. Dus het elke tipe strategie en 
taktiek ‘n polieke beduidenis. Desnieteenstaande kom dié studie tot die gevolgtrekking dat ‘n 
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verskeidenheid historiese kontekste en en strukturele faktore meer deurslaggewend was t.o.v. 
die gevolge van hervestiging. 
 
Hierdie navorsing het breedvoerige implikasies, veral vir deskundiges op die gebied van 
teen-insurgensie Dit is nie haalbaar om vandag se oorloë te meet bloot in terme van vorige 
oorloë nie. Selde gebeur dit dat die politieke, sosiale, kulturele, militêre, geografiese, 
internasionale en ekonomiese faktore eie aan een konklik presies herhaal word in ‘n ander 
konflik situasie nie. Die konflik in die destydse Rhodesië toon  hoe gevaarlik dit kan wees om  
dieselfde taktiese en strategiese metodes van ‘n vorige konflik (binne ‘n gedeelde imperial 
bewussyn) te herhaal. 
Die bevindinge van hierdie tesis dui daarop aan dat die Malayan Emergency en die 
Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog verdere vergelykende navorsing verg. 
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1
  http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images4/malaya1955map.jpg (28 October 2015) 
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Figure 33 
                                                 
3 A. Binda: Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native 
Regiment, p. 126. 
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In the body of this dissertation within quotations, there are terms that are offensive. 
These terms have remained to retain historical accuracy; 'the past is a foreign country; they 
do things differently there.'
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 L.P. Hartley: The go-between, p. 17. 
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Introduction 
 
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the 
noise before defeat.”11 
  The phrase asserts that one cannot win a war by focusing on one while excluding the 
other. In the successful and timeous pursuit of victory; tactics and strategies must be 
employed in concert. That is to say, the relationship between strategy and tactics is of 
paramount importance and should not be ignored. This thesis aims to be an exploration of the 
relationship between the counterinsurgency tactics and strategies of resettlement. This shall 
be facilitated by a comparative methodology and structure concerning two specific case 
studies. The two case studies that have been selected are the Malayan Emergency (1948 to 
1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979) (also known as the 2
nd
 Chimurenga, the 
Liberation Struggle and the Bush War). These conflicts are generally deemed to be internal 
civil wars. The Malayan Emergency has often been compared with conflicts such as the 
Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960), the Algerian War (1952-1962) and the Vietnam War (1955-
1975). While the Malayan Emergency has been compared to various conflicts, a specific 
comparison between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War is unprecedented. 
This particular study does not follow the comparative methodology found in comparisons 
between the Malayan Emergency and post-World War Two conflicts. The reasoning is that 
the Rhodesian Civil War lacks certain characteristics of wars that have been compared with 
the Malayan Emergency.  Firstly, conflicts compared with the Malayan Emergency often 
have similar climatic conditions such as the Vietnam War. Secondly and more significantly 
insurgents are usually pitted against a major Western power, such as the Algerian War. 
Thirdly, they are often internal colonial conflicts stemming from the West’s retreat from 
colonialism as in the case of the Kenya Emergency. That is to say that the Rhodesian War 
lacks certain similarities that have facilitated prior comparisons. Rhodesia’s climate while 
also tropical is vastly different to that of the Malayan jungle. The counter insurgency 
campaign was waged by the national forces of Rhodesia and not a Western power. The 
Rhodesian War is more aptly defined as a civil war as opposed to a colonial war.  It follows 
that this study cannot follow a conventional comparative methodology.  
                                                 
11 Attributed to Sun Tzu. 
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A military link between the respective Malayan and Rhodesian conflicts has been 
referred to in texts on the Rhodesian Civil War but has remained largely unexplored by 
academic scholars. The study will explore and prove the link and illustrate the value of a 
comparison. While the impact of the Malayan Scouts C Squadron (1951-1953) and 1
st
 
Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (RhAR) (1956-1958) on the Malayan Emergency may not 
seem significant, these experiences were indispensable in shaping the Rhodesian military’s 
and government’s approach to counterinsurgency on their own soil. Crucial to tracing the 
extent of this influence will be a comparison of Malayan and Rhodesian military doctrinal 
manuals.  
La guerre sans frontière is a form of total war where the outcome is not decided by just 
military tactics and strategies. There are all manner of military, political, economic, 
diplomatic, local and international factors at play. Subsequently, a common stratagem of the 
two conflicts that encapsulates these many factors has been selected for a comparison: i.e. the 
respective resettlement programmes of the Malayan and Rhodesian governments. The 
strategy and implementation of Protected Villages (PV) comprises a variety of factors with 
military considerations one among many. This will enable a more balanced historical 
exploration that is not hindered by the overt military focus that would be found in comparing 
other aspects of the two conflicts, e.g. the use of air power. 
Chapter One is essentially the provision of background material on the two respective 
conflicts. A facet such as resettlement cannot be studied in complete isolation to the greater 
whole of a conflict. Neither can it be isolated from the origins of the conflicts as Malaya’s 
resettlement problem predates the Emergency; while the origins of the Rhodesian Civil War 
are highly relevant to the Protected Villages (PV) program. Hence these two rather pragmatic 
accounts serve to illustrate the significance of resettlement and provides a context for the 
Rhodesian military expeditions to Malaya.  
This study is written in the spirit of David French’s sentiments as quoted below from his 
treatise on British counter-insurgency: 
But here it is appropriate to enter a warning. Anyone who hopes that this book will 
provide easy answers about how to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the 
early twenty first century should stop reading now. This is not a ‘how-to-do-it’ 
manual. It is not an attempt to serve up pre-digested answers based upon historical 
precedents for those whose task it is to grapple with modern insurgencies. History 
cannot serve that purpose. The past and present are different, for, as one recent 
commentator has noted, ‘it is rare for the prevailing strategic, political and cultural 
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conditions of one era to be replicated in another.’ Nor does it try to use the past as a 
body of examples that observers can plunder to support whatever theories they want 
to espouse. What it will try to do is to bring some historical rigour to the study of an 
area of the recent past that has sometimes lacked it.
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 D. French: The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967,  p. 8. 
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Literature Review 
 
The Origins of the Malayan Emergency that forms part of Chapter One, has been 
constructed using predominantly two secondary sources: C. Hale’s Massacre in Malaya 
Exposing Britain’s Mai Lai and J. Bastin’s & R. W. Winks’ Malaysia Selected Historical 
Readings. Bastin’s collection is a vast selection of treatises on Malaya’s pre-colonial and 
colonial past. Hale’s exposition on the Malayan Emergency is a highly unbalanced work that 
focuses mainly on the origins of the Emergency rather than the actual course of the conflict. 
It will be asserted that these sources are best suited for understanding the long standing 
causes and origins of the Emergency. The combination allows for vitalisation from recent 
research, strengthened by scholarly input that while dated is no less relevant. The majority of 
other academic works on the Malayan Emergency focus chiefly on the course of the 
Emergency as opposed to its origins and were deemed less suitable for look at the origins. 
The Rhodesian War Origins counterpart is constructed in a similar manner but for 
different reasons. P. Kiss’s Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric 
Warfare was chosen because his definition of the conflict is better suited to the purposes of 
military history research. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin’s The Rhodesian War A Military 
History was specifically selected from a vast array of literature. Moorcraft’s text is the closest 
any writer has come to a balanced definitive military history of the Rhodesian War. A text 
that is more empirical than work influenced by the ideological bias of the Rhodesian Front, 
ZANU PF, and other perspectives. The use of Moorcraft’s work has helped avoid reflecting 
the myriad ideological bias that is prevalent in much of the Rhodesian War’s historical 
discourse. For this reason Moorcraft was used almost exclusively to provide an empirical 
account of the Rhodesian War for the purposes of the overview section of Chapter One. An 
original definitive exposition of the Rhodesian War was considered beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The overview section on the Malayan Emergency was assembled through the integration 
of four secondary sources where M. R. Postgate’s Operation Firedog Air Support In The 
Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 dominates. Postgate’s exposition contains excellent 
summaries of the course of the Malayan Emergency based on a wide range of British state 
documents. Many of these primary sources no longer exist and survive only through 
Postgate’s research. References from E. O’Balance’s Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 
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1948-60, and R. W. Komer’s The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 
Successful  Counterinsurgency Effort, were used to add further nuance to statistics regarding 
respective strengths of British and MCP forces. The fourth source that was integrated, K. 
Ramakrishna’s Emergency Propaganda The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-
1958, helped emphasise the role of propaganda in the conflict. A salient feature of any 
account of the Malayan Emergency is the Brigg’s Plan and a report by Sir Harold Briggs 
from The National Archives in Kew, on the Emergency, contained a breadth of information 
on his plan not equalled by any secondary source. 
Finding references for the Rhodesian Squadron of the Malayan Scouts was highly 
problematic. Very few texts on the Malayan Emergency have references on the Malayan 
Scouts and much less individual squadrons. One text that did have a reference was R. 
Jackson’s The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. This encouraged the 
perusal of texts that focused on the history of the British 22
nd
 SAS Regiment. However the 
references uncovered from the expositions of T. Jones: SAS The First Secret Wars The 
Unknown Years of Combat and Insurgency A. Hoe & E Morris: Re-Enter the SAS The 
Special Air Service and the Malayan and A. Mackenzie: Special Force The Untold Story of 
22
nd
 Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) were sparse, extremely brief. A far more substantial 
reference was discovered Cole’s text The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air 
Service. Cole’s laudatory remarks on the Rhodesian C Squadron are at odds with the more 
critical appraisals of Jones, Hoe & Morris, and Mackenzie. 
Due the lack of information in the historical discourse, research trips to three national 
archives were undertaken to locate primary sources on the Malayan Scouts. The first of these 
was the National Archives of Zimbabwe situated in Harare. A priceless historical manuscript 
and a collection of press reports and newsletters are held by the archive. As these documents 
predate the Rhodesian War, they survived document purges initiated by the Rhodesian Front 
government on the eve of Zimbabwe’s independence. The manuscript is in fact the official 
scrap book of the Rhodesian Squadron, while the press reports were sent by the Rhodesian 
Squadron to Rhodesia’s military headquarters in Salisbury. All the newspaper cuttings in this 
manuscript were based on the press reports sent from Malaya. A decision was taken to focus 
primarily on those reports as they provided a more complete picture than the news articles 
that were based upon them. A considerable number of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(aka Central African Republic)  newspaper articles were discovered in the UNISA archives in 
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Pretoria. They were not explored as the UNISA research trip’s objective was to find primary 
sources on resettlement during the Rhodesian War. 
The scarcity of Malayan Scout documents in The National Archives in London required 
two research trips to the National Archives of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, and another to the 
National Archives of Singapore. While the Malaysian National Archives did not have 
Malayan Scout documents in its holdings, the National Archives of Singapore held a 
collection of British Colonial Office documents on the Malayan Scouts and the Rhodesian 
Squadron, as well as a number of local newspaper articles on the Rhodesian Squadron. This 
array of sources has facilitated a revisionist account of the Rhodesian Squadron’s service in 
Malaya. A. Finlan’s exposition Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror, and an 
article by B. Grob-Fitzgibbon: “Those Who Dared: A Reappraisal of Britain’s Special Air 
Service,” in conjunction with the Briggs report, were used to assert the significance the 
Malayan Scouts’ contribution to the Malayan Emergency and that of the Rhodesian 
Squadron. 
The fourth chapter on the Rhodesian African Rifles tour to Malaya faced similar 
challenges to the Chapter which dealt with the Rhodesian squadron. There are very few 
references to British colonial African regiments that served in Malaya, much less the 
Rhodesian African Rifles in the historical discourse of the Malayan Emergency. A. Hoe & E 
Morris: Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency, contains 
several negative remarks on the Rhodesian African troops. Further references on the RAR 
were discovered through a careful reading of R. Miers: Shoot to Kill. The work is essentially 
a narrative of the Commanding Officer (CO) of the South Wales Borderers. The National 
Archives in London has a meagre War Office file on a military alliance between the RAR and 
the South Wales Borderer stemming from their shared experiences during the Malayan 
Emergency. Miers’ text touches on his personal perspective of the RAR and proved useful in 
balancing the more negative assessments of Morris and Hoe. Two promising sources were T. 
Stapleton’s African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-1980 and M. P. 
Stewart’s The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural 
Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980. However, they too lacked substantial 
specific references to the RAR’s tour in Malaya. Fortunately, A. Binda’s Masodja the history 
of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment contains a 
single chapter on the RAR’s tour to Malaya.  
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A distinctive feature of the Chapter 3 is the acute scarcity of documentation, as is the 
case of Chapter 2 unlike the Malayan Scout Chapter. The National Archives of Zimbabwe 
holds the Colonel Well’s Collection on RAR history although it does not deal with Malayan 
tour at great length. Aside from the War Office file on the RAR’s and the South Wales 
Borderers’ alliance, the National Archives in London holds a War Office file on Operation 
Eve The file details the redeployment of 1
st
 Bn. Northern Rhodesian Regiment to Malaya and 
was of some use to Chapter 3. Debates from the House of Commons in the late 1950s proved 
instrumental in challenging negative perceptions of Rhodesian African troops in Malaya. The 
research trip to Singapore facilitated the retrieval of newspaper articles on the Rhodesian 
African Rifles tour and these proved to be valuable sources, not necessarily due to the quality 
but more due to the lack of other publicly available primary sources. The conclusion of the 
Chapter asserts that there is a small window of opportunity to investigate oral history sources 
from the perspective of Rhodesian African troops.  
Chapter Five, on the link between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War uses a 
comparative analysis of two military doctrinal manuals from each of the conflicts. The Malayan one 
is a 1958 edition of the Malayan Anti-Terrorist Operation Manual, ATOM, while the Rhodesian one 
is a 1975 edition of the Rhodesian Army manual Anti-Terrorist Operations, ATOPS. References to 
ATOM are to be found in D. French’s The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967. This led 
to the acquisition of a print-on-demand copy of ATOM through the services of a South African book 
order company. ATOPS was located through a thorough internet search in PDF format. While the 
internet source is missing several of the last chapters, it is relatively complete. No copy of the 
ATOPS manual could be found in the Zimbabwe National Archives. It is conceivable that the 
Zimbabwe Defence Force Archives may hold a copy; however, civilian researchers are discouraged 
for reasons of national security. Pittaway and C. Fourie’s SAS Rhodesia: Rhodesians and the 
Special Air Service asserts that Rhodesian officers brought back among other articles of war, copies 
of ATOM to Rhodesia. The comparative analysis of Chapter Five supports Pittaway’s assertion and 
the argument of this thesis that the Rhodesians’ Malayan experience influenced the tactics and 
strategies of the Rhodesian Civil War. The team that authored ATOPS very clearly copied and 
incorporated significant portions of ATOM. 
The final Chapters on Malaya and Rhodesia’s resettlement programs, unlike the prior chapters, 
benefit from a wealth of secondary texts, articles and primary sources. Hale’s Massacre in Malaya 
provides a concise introduction to the concept of resettlement. Kiss’s Winning Wars amongst the 
People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare, and Blaufarb and Tanham’s Who Will Win, A Key to 
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the Puzzle of Revolutionary War lucidly conceptualises ‘People’s War’ and how resettlement forms 
a part of counterinsurgency theory. Through the body of the Chapters, earlier research on Malaya 
such as A. Short’s Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 and R. Stubbs’s Hearts and 
Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, are integrated with more recent 
research such as Hale’s Massacre in Malaya and French’s The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 
1945-1967.As there is a problem with texts that have a wider focus than a specialist one, namely 
that they inevitably lack the depth that highly specific journal articles can provide. Many of the 
Malayan secondary texts cover the Malayan Emergency in its entirety thus reducing the offering on 
Malayan Resettlement. Therefore a selection of journal articles was incorporated to provide insight 
into Malayan Resettlement. The most important of these was K. S. Sandhu’s “The Saga of the 
“Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the 
Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” K. J. King’s 
“Malaya’s Resettlement Problem,” though shorter also proved helpful. K. Hack’s ‘"Iron Claws on 
Malaya": The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency’, has proved essential in developing an 
historical criticism of resettlement in Malaya. 
In the case of the Rhodesian Civil War, the choices made on using particular secondary texts 
are a direct result of the nature of much of the historical discourse. The selection criteria were such 
that the texts had to be works of military history that as far as possible kept extreme and ideological 
bias to a minimum. This made much of the material on the Rhodesian Civil War unsuitable for the 
purposes of this research. Two of the selected texts were written in the 1980s although Moorcraft 
The Rhodesian War published a revised edition in 2008. Dr. J. Cilliers’ Counter Insurgency in 
Rhodesia had a significant and well researched section on Rhodesia’s resettlement strategy. Cilliers’ 
exposition contains several valuable references to Rhodesian officers’ Malaya experiences and how 
that affected aspects other than resettlement during the Rhodesian War. D. Richards and G. Mils 
Victory Among People Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States contains 
an excellent case study analysis of the Rhodesian War that emphasises the importance of the 
relationship between strategy and tactics. Like the case of the Malayan secondary sources, the 
Rhodesian sources were insufficient to the task and several resettlement specific articles were 
required. The Journal of Southern African Studies has published several articles the focus primarily 
on resettlement. A. Weinrich’s “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia,” could be considered a 
foundational source on resettlement. Weinrich commenced research during the Rhodesian War 
despite censorship and associated risks. This however limited her access to research material. E. 
Msindo’s “‘Winning Hearts and Minds’: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1962-
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1970’, proved instrumental in analysing the Rhodesian attempt at a ‘hearts and minds’ approach 
through resettlement. M. Kesby’s “Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla 
Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980,” facilitated the development of 
a cultural-and-gender-studies understanding of Rhodesian resettlement. 
The Resettlement chapters comprise primary sources from the Zimbabwe National Archives, 
The National Archives in London, the UNISA archives in Pretoria and the Singapore National 
Archives. Weinrich bases her research on a number of reports that resulted in a thorough search for 
copies of these reports in the National Archives of Zimbabwe. An incomplete collection of these 
reports were found among fragments of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 
(CCJPR) documents. With the help of an archivist, a research trip to Pretoria uncovered the UNISA 
CCJPR collection that provided ample documents pertaining to resettlement in Rhodesia. These 
documents detail how the humanitarian disaster of resettlement in Rhodesia unfolded. An extensive 
research trip to the National Archives in London unearthed a number of Colonial Office documents 
on resettlement in Malaya. The National Archives of Singapore had a catalogue that was easier to 
navigate and facilitated the retrieval of more Colonial Office papers. The files focus on distinct 
aspects of resettlement in Malaya, such as education, the supply of stores, protection of the New 
Villages, law and order, economic effects of resettlement, studies of the squatter problem, and the 
process and progress of resettlement. The majority of these files were relevant to the research aims 
of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1  
The Roots and Course of the Malayan Emergency (1948-
1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979) 
 
The Origins of the Malayan Emergency 
 
The Dutch presence in what became known as Malaya was challenged by the British in 
the years following their occupation of Penang after the Sultan of Kedah had granted them 
occupancy rights in 1786. Malacca fell to British forces in 1795 and in 1819, Singapore was 
occupied by Sir Stamford Raffles courtesy of a claimant of the Empire of Johore.
13
 Dutch 
sovereignty of Malacca was officially transferred to the British by the treaty of London in 
1824. Tin had been mined in Malaya on a small scale for centuries and with the rise in the use 
of tin cans and the manufacture of tin plate in the 19
th
 century, tin mining expanding rapidly. 
The alluvial deposits while profitable were soon exhausted and the remaining tin deposits 
required an influx of capital. The Malay Sultans and Chiefs who were less than judicious with 
much of the tin revenue turned to Malayan-born Chinese merchants from Malacca and 
Penang for capital outlay. The Malay ruling classes were in direct competition with Chinese 
entrepreneurs from Singapore. The Kongsi cooperative systems undermined the Malay 
Chiefs mining efforts. ‘As the power of the chiefs eroded, the Kongsis began to take direct 
control of tin mining operations. In a very short period of time the Kongsis tightened their 
grip on the tin mines and plantations, to the dismay of many anxious Malays.’14  
While ‘tin mining reconfigured social and ethnic relations and transformed the physical 
landscape of Malaya’15, this process was far from peaceful. Business competition gave way 
to civil unrest and small scale wars as the Chinese and their Malay allies fought each other.
16
 
This led to a massive decline in profits and prompted the British to use the internecine 
conflict as the basis for establishing their authority on the Malay Peninsula. In the guise of 
the Pangkor Conference in 1874 to bring an end to the fighting, British indirect rule was 
                                                 
13 J. Bastin & R. W. Winks: Malaysia Selected Historical Readings, p. 119. 
14 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 63. 
15 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 63. 
16 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 67. 
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introduced to Malaya by treaty with Sultan of Perak that led to the appointment a British 
Resident. The residential system while portrayed as advisory was on a fundamental level, a 
system of control. The British Residential System was adopted by the remaining sultans 
through treaties and also by military persuasion if required. ‘After the signing of the Pangkor 
Treaty in 1874 it took nearly half a century for the British to erect that curious and 
ramshackle edifice of Crown Colonies and protectorates that came to be known as ‘British 
Malaya’. By the end of the First World war, British Malaya comprised the old Straits 
Settlements and a federation of Malay states governed from Kuala Lumpur.’17 In the process 
of constituting this system of indirect and direct rule, the Sultans had a large degree of their 
political power leached away.  
Tin was superseded by rubber as Malaya’s primary export in the early 20th century. 
Rubber production had taken off by 1908; it started with small holding plantations and 
progressed to large scale corporate plantations. The tin mining industry and the boom in 
rubber production led to a massive influx of labour from China, India and Java. During the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, the demographics shifted so much that the Chinese minority 
increased significantly. 
During the Second World War the British forces in Malaya were taken by surprise by the 
Japanese invasion. British Malaya was not adequately garrisoned and the army fought a 
fighting retreat down the Peninsula, until their final unconditional surrender to the Japanese 
in Singapore 15
th
 February 1942. The British were quickly defeated and seen to abandon the 
peoples of Malaya to the Japanese and this resulted in a considerable loss of prestige for the 
British Empire; in that Britain was defeated by the troops of an Asian power with its 
protected persons as witnesses. Before the British surrendered, the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP) was approached to form a resistance against the coming Japanese occupation. 
Consequently the MCP formed the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).  
In the course of a brutal Japanese occupation, the British supported MPAJA and dropped 
weapons and supplies and operatives to aid them. The MPAJA fought a guerrilla war against 
the Japanese military authorities in Malaya that did not conclusively challenge them but was 
indeed a thorn in their sides. The Second World War came to an end in August 1945 before 
an Allied Expedition set out to retake Malaya. The MCP and MPAJA used the end of the war 
to consolidate their position and portray themselves as the liberators of the Malayan peoples. 
                                                 
17 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 73. 
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The British Military Administration (BMA) was established in Malaya 12 September 
1945, ten days after the Japanese surrendered. The BMA attempted to restore some degree of 
order and disarm the MPAJA, Kuomintang Chinese supporters, and the Malay Wataniah. Sir 
Edward Gent and the Malayan Planning Unit developed a Malayan Union plan to be 
implemented after the end of the BMA.  
The three key elements of the ‘Malayan Union’ plan were: 
1. A centrally governed peninsula union comprising the nine Malay states,            
Penang and Malacca, but not Singapore. 
2. A common citizenship scheme for all who regard Malaya as their home. 
3. The nine Malay states abrogate their powers to the crown.18 
 
The plan led to the rise of the Malayan Nationalist Party (UMNO), established to resist 
Malayan Union. UMNO pressured the Malay Sultans to boycott Edward Gents’ inauguration 
ceremony of the intended union of Malaya. The Sultans and UMNO proved obdurate in their 
opposition to the Union although they opened up the possibility of a federation. After a set of 
secret talks, ‘the British agreed to reaffirm their commitment to the rulers’ sovereignty and 
the special position and rights of Malays.’19 This ultimately led to the creation of the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948. 
Defining the Rhodesian Conflict 
 
The Rhodesian War has been generally categorised in two contradictory ways. The 
conflict has been defined by part of the historical discourse as an anti-colonial national 
liberation war and by another stratum as a war against communist sponsored ‘terrorists.’ 
These two conflicting definitions are representative of the bipolar characteristics of a 
significant swathe of the historical discourse. These two definitions correlate to the divergent 
propaganda of the opposing belligerents of those times. The first definition conforms to the 
liberation struggle paradigm espoused by ZAPU and ZANU while the other stems from the 
paradigm advocated by the Rhodesian Front. These definitions do not correspond to the true 
nature of the war. The majority of Europeans, who resided in Rhodesia, were Rhodesian 
citizens, either by birth or granted after relocating to Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Security 
Forces were on the whole manned by Rhodesians and were therefore national forces, not 
                                                 
18 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 216. 
19 C. Hale: Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai, p. 237. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 26 
 
officially soldiers of a European colonial power. ZANU and ZAPU were political parties 
formed by Rhodesian citizens and their respective armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA were 
for the most part Rhodesian citizens. Despite being banned by the Rhodesian government and 
supported by foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, China, Britain and America, they 
and their soldiers could not be legitimately labelled illegal ‘terrorists’ nor do they 
satisfactorily fit the mould of freedom fighter. ZAPU and ZANU can be better defined as 
African nationalist movements as opposed to simply liberation movements. These armed 
cadres better fit the term guerrilla soldier. It follows that ‘it was not a war of national 
liberation but a civil war between groups of citizens who had different views of the future of 
their common homeland.’20 
The Origins of the Rhodesian Civil War 
 
The genesis of white settlement in Northern and Southern Rhodesia began with Cecil J. 
Rhodes’ procurement of a mining concession from the Ndebele king Lobengula. This 
concession facilitated the grant of a Royal Charter from the British Crown. The charter was 
used as a legal basis for the establishment of a settler state in Mashonaland by the British 
South African Company (BSAC) with Salisbury as the first town.
21
 In 1893 a war against the 
Ndebele Kingdom was instigated where the casus belli was portrayed as Ndebele aggression. 
The Kingdom was defeated and subsumed into the settle state. The settlers ‘built a new 
frontier town Bulawayo, on the site of Lobengula’s razed capital.’22 In 1895 Rhodes secretly 
attempted to orchestrate a military coup that was intended to topple the Afrikaner dominated 
South African Republic led by Paul Kruger. The BSAC troops were pivotal to this plan and 
embarked on what became called the Jameson Raid. The raid ended in abject failure and 
Rhodes lost his position as Prime minister of the Cape Colony, there were also major internal 
repercussions in Rhodesia.  
The reduction of the BSAC garrison due to the external operation helped precipitate an 
uprising by the Shona and the Ndebele tribesman. The war was called a Chimurenga and is 
known popularly as the first Chimurenga. The First Chimurenga lasted about 18 months and 
was only brought to an end through scorched earth tactics and the destruction of the African 
                                                 
20 P. A. Kiss: Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare, p. 51. 
21 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 19. 
22 Ibid. p.  20. 
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strongholds with dynamite.
23
 Both the settlers and the Africans suffered losses and the war 
‘bequeathed a legacy of bitterness to both racial groups.’24 During the South Africa War, also 
known as the Boer War (1899-1902), Rhodesian troops served with British forces against the 
Afrikaners. This military support set a precedent for Rhodesian involvement in wars that 
Britain fought in for much of the Twentieth century. Rhodesians both black and white 
enlisted to fight for Britain during the Great War (1914-1918). ‘Several thousand Africans 
enlisted in an all-volunteer force, the Rhodesian Native Regiment (RNR). The Regiment saw 
action in German East Africa.’25 Aside from forming the officer corps of the RNR, white 
Rhodesians formed two Rhodesia Regiments, one serving in German South West Africa and 
the other in German East Africa. White Rhodesians also enlisted in British and South African 
units.  
After the First World War, ‘the Twenties and the Depression years saw a widening of 
racial divisions in Rhodesia. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 formally divided the 
country’s land between the races; the whites reserved to themselves the more fertile areas 
with higher rainfall and ‘gave’ Africans the poorer, more arid areas.’26 The pressure on the 
environment in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) was further exacerbated by the rising 
population and corresponding numbers of livestock. ‘Labour, agricultural, industrial, 
educational and health legislation of the late Twenties and Thirties was aimed at creating a 
secure and prosperous society for the whites at the expense of the blacks, and largely 
succeeded, despite the hard times of the Depression.’27 These policies were facilitated by the 
successful of efforts by the settlers to wrest control of their affairs from the BSAC. ‘The 
referendum of 1922 delivered self-government into the hands of the settlers, and the African 
population’s welfare with it.’28 
A defence force was brought into being in the 1920s though it remained somewhat of a 
skeleton structure until the late 1930s. With the rise of fascism in Europe during the 1930s, 
came the diversification of the Rhodesian armed forces. An artillery regiment and a 
reconnaissance company were formed, as was a nascent Air Force. During the Second World 
War, the following squadrons in the Royal Air Force (RAF) were Rhodesian, 44, 237 and 
                                                 
23 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 20. 
24 Ibid. p. 20.  
25 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 21. 
26 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 21. 
27 Ibid. p. 21. 
28 Ibid. p. 21. 
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266.
29
 Due to the high casualties during the Great War, no all-white Rhodesian ground units 
were formed and consequently white Rhodesians enlisted in British and South African armies 
and served in many theatres, notably North Africa and Italy. A multi-racial unit called the 
Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) was raised in 1940. Like its forerunner, the Rhodesian 
Native Regiment, it was led by a white officer corps. The regiment fought in Burma as part of 
Field Marshall William Slim’s army.30 ‘The armed forces immediately after the war 
comprised a permanent staff of European officers and NCOs to command and administer the 
RAR as the regular core, the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regiment as the 
European reserve component, and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force, which became a unit of the 
Permanent Force from 1947. In 1953, Southern Rhodesia joined Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia in the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Southern 
Rhodesian defence forces were subsequently incorporated into the Federation’s military 
structures. The Federal defence force ‘fitted into Britain’s Imperial defence policy under the 
umbrella of the Central African Military Command.’31 Southern Rhodesia dominated the 
Federation both militarily and politically. This dominance was buttressed by the way the 
British government considered Southern Rhodesia a crucial part of its policy for regional 
defence. ‘Detachments of the police force, which had never lost its paramilitary functions, 
were sent to help in quelling disturbances in Bechuanaland in 1950-2, and to Kenya and 
Nyasaland in 1953. A Rhodesian Far East Volunteer Unit served in Malaya in the early 
1950s, and the RAR was deployed there during the Emergency in 1956-58. From 1958-61 
detachments served in Kuwait and at Aden in support of British operations in the Middle 
East.’32 During the Federal years, the Rhodesian Air Force grew in size and was modernized 
by the introduction of jet fighters and bombers.  
African nationalism had been on the rise since the Shamva miners’ strike of 1927.33 This 
rise was accelerated by the Bulawayo general strike in 1948. ‘Legislation such as the Native 
Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which introduced specific restrictions on African land use and 
compulsory de-stocking of overgrazed pastures, merely provided a focus for the African 
discontent in the colony.’34  The first African nationalist party to be formed was the Southern 
Rhodesian African National Congress. With the growth of African nationalism came with 
                                                 
29 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 22. 
30 NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African 
Rifles, 1975. 
31 P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: The Rhodesian War A Military History, p. 24. 
32 Ibid. p. 24. 
33 Ibid. p. 24. 
34 Ibid. p. 24. 
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radicalisation of white politics, the diversion away from reformist policies was heralded by 
the fall of liberal Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd from power in 1958. As argued by 
this study, the experiences of Rhodesian units in Malaya were used to instruct the Rhodesian 
Armed forces in counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques in preparation for internal security 
operations. ‘In 1961 all European males aged 18 to 50 were registered for emergency call-up 
in the Territorial Force if necessary.  The political and financial neglect of the armed forces 
of the 1950s was swept away by the winds of change in Africa, and rearmament was stepped 
up to a feverish pace.’35 Aside from the establishment of three more reserve European 
Territorial battalions, it was decided that the regular Rhodesian forces required balancing 
with the creation of all white regular units, such as the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Special 
Air Service (SAS) and the Selous Scouts armoured car unit. The South Rhodesian ANC was 
banned and reformed as the National Democratic Party, banned once more and was renamed 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1961. The crystallization of white Rhodesian 
intransigence to the political aspirations of African nationalists was embodied by ‘the Law 
and Order Maintenance Act (1960), which gave the government sweeping powers for the 
control of political opposition and laid down draconian penalties for politically motivated 
crimes,’36 and the electoral victory of the Rhodesian Front in December of 1962.37 
The Belgian Congo Crisis from 1960 to 1964 was seen by many white Rhodesians as the 
potential fate of Rhodesia should they accede to majority rule rapidly and served to simply 
intensify their obduracy. The Federation, which had been brought into being in 1953, as a 
more liberal counter-balance to Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, was dissolved in 1963. 
The dissolution was a result of the wave of decolonization that was sweeping Africa, and 
pressure from African Nationalists within and without the Federation. Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland emerged as the independent states Zambia and Malawi respectively, while 
Southern Rhodesian remained a self -governing colony. In 1964 ZAPU split with the 
formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Due to the British refusal to 
grant Rhodesian independence without majority rule, and the Rhodesian Front refusing those 
terms, the Rhodesian Front and the African Nationalists sought to realise their political goals 
through extra constitutional means. The Rhodesian Front made an illegal Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) on the 11
th
 of November 1965, coinciding with Armistice 
Day. The African nationalists had already begun to mobilise the international community in 
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their favour and sent cadres to Communist bloc countries to train in preparation for a guerrilla 
war. The repressive policies of the Rhodesian government in conjunction with an illegal 
severance of ties with Britain left no legal political avenue that could be considered 
practicable for the aspirations of the African Nationalist Parties in Rhodesia. This in effect 
helped push African Rhodesians down the path of armed insurrection towards a ‘people’s 
war.’ 
The  Malayan Emergency 1948-1960  
 
The MCP initiated a series of attacks and sabotage attempts in the first half of 1948, 
allegedly as part of a strategy to overthrow the government of the Federation of Malaya. This 
strategy while Maoist in design was allegedly implemented at the behest of the Soviet Union. 
The British federal government of Malaya accused the Soviet Union of instigating the MCP 
terror campaign. This accusation had been hotly debated in the historical discourse. In 
response to the violence the Federal government declared a State of Emergency 16 June 
1948. ‘Having openly committed itself to armed resistance against the Government the MCP 
adopted a three-stage strategic plan; firstly to cause terror and economic chaos in rural areas 
by a programme of assassination and sabotage with the aim of under-mining confidence in 
the administration, secondly to ‘liberate’ selected rural areas and establish local Communist 
administration there to serve as the nucleus for the third and final phase of the rebellion 
during which the urban areas would be ‘liberated’ and a Communist republic declared.’38 At 
the start of the Emergency the balance of forces was as follows.  
The armed wing of the MCP was titled the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) 
numbering 3,000 guerrillas. The MRLA was supported by a group known is the Min Yuen. 
The Min Yuen was an underground clandestine organisation with members in the rural and 
urban areas that acted as a logistical network, a pool of recruits and a source of intelligence. 
‘At no time in the Emergency were the MRLA able to organize external supply lines for their 
replenishment of arms or recruits, partly as a result of the Security Forces’ blockade of the 
borders and partly because the Chinese Communists were involved in the Korean War during 
the period when the terrorists held the initiative in Malaya and were thus in no position to 
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help.’39 As such the MCP was entirely dependent on the Min Yuen and internal support. The 
exact numbers of the Min Yuen were not known, and while there are wild estimates of up to 
400,000 members; Edgar O’Balance has a conservative estimate of somewhere between 
30,000 and 40,000 members.
40
 
The Security Force levels stood at 9,000 men in the Police Force and ten infantry 
battalions that were under strength,
 41
 making up approximately 5,800 combat troops.
42
  The 
Federal government was inadequately prepared to effectively deal with the communist 
insurgency at a number of levels. The previously mentioned Security Forces were too small 
to fulfil both a static defensive and aggressive offensive role against the guerrillas. A 
weakness in the formation of the Federation’s constitution was that it did not make provision 
for Chinese to become full Malayan citizens. Furthermore, MRLA supporters in the rural 
areas, particularly illegal squatters were not under government administration. Efforts were 
made in the early years of the Emergency to rectify these and other deficiencies. However, 
the government lacked strategic direction.  This came with the appointment of the first 
Director of Operations Lieutenant –General Sir Harold Briggs 1 April 1950, who formulated 
what was known as the Briggs Plan. Briggs identified the MCP’s Achilles’s heel, as being the 
MCP’s dependence on the support of Min Yuen and on support of the population of Malaya, 
primarily the illegal squatters, and proceeded to craft a strategy that would target that 
weakness. The strategy had a civil focus with the military in support. Essentially rural 
villagers deemed susceptible to the MCP would be resettled wholesale to cut them off from 
the MCP. The military effect was to deny the MCP of all the advantages conferred by the 
support of Chinese squatters. However, this was merely one facet; the plan laid out how the 
resettled villagers would be brought into the government administration and benefit from 
civil projects and new amenities. The ‘New Villages’ would also slowly develop political 
structures and take control of their own defence.
43
  
The Malayan government passed an inordinate amount of legislation during the 
Emergency as part of their ‘legal’ counter measures, most of these measure fell under the 
Emergency Regulations Bill, passed 5 July 1948. One counter-measure was National 
                                                 
39 M. R. Postgate: Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency 1948-196, p. 4. 
40 E. O’Ballance: Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 1948-60, p. 92. 
41 M. R. Postgate: Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency `1948-1960, p. 4. 
42 R. W. Komer: The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful  Counterinsurgency 
Effort, p. 11. 
43 AIR 20-7777. Lieut.- General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to 
November, 1951. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32 
 
Registration in 1949 that further extended government administration and hampered MCP 
movement. Combined with resettlement were operations that disrupted food and medical 
supplies. These operations were designed to starve the guerrillas and increase their rates of 
attrition and also provide intelligence on the Min Yuen members who were supplying them. 
Propaganda played a major role in the course of the Emergency, persuading MCP members 
to surrender and providing a conceptual framework to counter communist propaganda among 
the general populace.
44
  
The MRLA’s advance was halted in the period June 1948 to October 1949. As they fell 
back to their jungle bases, they launched another offensive from October 1949 to August 
1951.
45
 Before resettlement was adopted on a large scale, the Federal government used 
detention and forced deportations as a deterrent. Detention continued to feature during the 
course of the Emergency. However, deportations to China came to end when the Chinese 
Communists seized power from the Kuomintang in 1949. The regroupment of labour formed 
another part of the resettlement scheme as the MRLA turned to preying on workers in the 
mines and on plantations. Briggs laid the groundwork for jungle operations and encouraged 
the formation of units such the Malayan Scouts for penetrating the jungle. A low point for the 
British authorities was in 1951 when communist attacks were on the rise resulting in the 
assassination of the High Commissioner Henry Gurney 6 October 1951. It has been argued 
the arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer marked a turning point in the Malayan Emergency. 
He was appointed both Director of Operations and High Commissioner on 5 February 1952; 
thus combining civil and military leadership. Templer certainly injected fresh energy and 
vigour into the government administration and the security forces as he implemented the 
plans that Briggs and Gurney had laid down. ‘The marked improvement in the Emergency 
situation that was evident in 1952 continued throughout 1953, which was a year of steady 
progress against the background of increasing security and the improved moral of the civilian 
population.’46 From August 1951 to July 1954 the MRLA suffered a prolonged reverse with 
more than half the guerrillas being killed, captured or surrendered. The MRLA were forced to 
flee deep into the Malayan Jungle.  
The improving security situation facilitated the devolvement of static duties, such a 
guarding installations and ‘New Villages’ to the Police and the Home Guard. This enabled 
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the Army to focus on the MRLA. Templer was replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Geofrey 
Bourne in 1954, who used the release of soldiers from fixed positions to good effect by 
planning long deep jungle combined operations to hunt down the MRLA. ‘Such protracted 
operations relied heavily on air support, especially that of the troop-carrying helicopter force 
that had recently arrived in the theatre, and reflected the degree of confidence that the Army 
had developed in the air forces by this time.’47 The period from July 1954 to the end of the 
Emergency in July 1960 was from a military point of view, a series of mopping up 
operations. The Federal government through the Briggs Plan and resettlement had seized the 
initiative from the MCP. The fostering of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
creation of UMNO due to the botched Malayan Union plan, combined with the promise of 
independence for Malaya, constituted a political outflanking of the MCP. With Merderka 
(Independence) on 31 August 1957, the MCP largely lost their raison d’être for armed 
insurrection. The strategy of clearing the MRLA out of Malaya from the centre was largely 
successful as in the course of the Emergency ‘White’ Areas were created, where the 
promising security situation allowed a relaxation of restrictions. After 12 long years, the 
remnants of the MRLA were driven back across the Thailand border in Northern Malaya and 
the Emergency was declared over 31 July 1960. 
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The Rhodesian Civil War 1964-1979  
 
Phase 1 
 
The Rhodesian Civil War has been demarcated by military historians into three phases or 
periods. The first of these phases ran from 1964 to 1972.  During the early 1960s there was an 
upsurge of politically motivated violence, particularly in the African townships as African 
nationalists fought for dominance. On occasion whites were attacked such as Petrus 
Oberholzer who was murdered by the Crocodile Gang in 1964.
48
 Before UDI small groups of 
guerrillas were already being trained in Tanzania, China and Eastern European countries.
49
 
ZANU followed by ZAPU only constituted an armed response some five months after UDI, 
once it was clear that there would be no British military intervention to end the Smith regime. 
The commencement of the 2
nd
 Chimurenga was signalled by the battle of Sinoi. ‘In April 
1966, a group of 21 ZANU insurgents infiltrated from Zambia into Rhodesia and they split up 
into three teams. Their aim was to cut power lines and attack white farmsteads.’50 One of the 
splinter groups, a 7 man team titled Armageddon staged an assault on a white owned farm 
called Hunyani located near Sinoia. The attack failed and the guerrillas were defeated 
emphatically by the Rhodesian Security Forces who counted no losses. A second splinter 
group during the night of 16 May and into the early morning of the 17
th
 attacked Nevada farm 
and murdered Johannes Viljoen and his wife, yet their children, were spared.
51
  
The armed wings of ZANU and ZAPU made some attempts at urban warfare but focused 
primarily on conventional penetrations by significant bodies of men. ‘Large scale incursions 
proved futile against highly trained mobile troops, backed by total air supremacy.’52 ZAPU 
formed an alliance with the South African African National Congress (ANC) and embarked 
on joint operations within Rhodesia. ANC involvement led to the provision of direct military 
aid by the South African National Party government to the government of Rhodesia. South 
African Police units were deployed to Rhodesia to assist in anti-terrorist operations. The label 
‘police-unit’ was a propaganda ploy to disguise what was in fact the deployment of troops 
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and the secondment of pilots and helicopters to the Rhodesian Air Force. Inclusive of this aid 
were military supplies and ammunition. The fact that the SA ANC was helping ZAPU meant 
that the South African government would assist the Rhodesian government; in so much that it 
would prevent ANC infiltration of South Africa.  
Politically for the South Africans, a police label was essential to give their intervention a 
veneer of acceptability to the international community. An overtly military presence would 
have been diplomatically embarrassing for South Africa. Particularly considering that South 
African did not officially recognise the Rhodesian Front government after UDI. Certainly a 
direct military intervention may not have been favoured by a white electorate that was 60 
percent Afrikaans. While the guerrillas may have been soundly defeated in engagements 
during the first phases, the RSF casualties mounted up. Severe guerrilla losses led to a 
winding down of offensive operations from 1969 to 1972 with sporadic attacks becoming the 
norm. The Rhodesian Front and the military were lulled into a false sense of security. The 
leadership of ZANU negotiated an alliance with the African Nationalist movement in 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), FRELIMO. The alliance with FRELIMO was tenuous 
at first but would pay major dividends when they wrested power from the Portuguese. 
FRELIMO gave ZANU leave to use their bases and material in Mozambique, and they began 
launching operations from Tete province. These operations were clandestine and were 
comprised of infiltrations into North Eastern Rhodesia. The aims and objectives of these 
operations were to politicise the rural populations and lay logistical foundations for the next 
phase of the war. Crucial to bringing the rural Africans on side, was the co-option of African 
spirit mediums. Allegedly, the Rhodesian government was taken completely by surprise by 
the extent of infiltration in that part of Rhodesia.  
Phase 2 
The 2
nd
 Phase of the Rhodesian War ran from 1972 to 1976. With their logistical 
foundations ready ZANLA launched a widespread offensive. The onslaught was heralded by 
an attack on Altena farm 21
st
 December 1972 by ZANLA guerrillas. An 8 year old white girl 
was wounded in the attack.
53
 There were subsequent more attacks on more farms and land 
mines were laid. The RSF accrued a number of casualties not least from landmines. The 
Rhodesian military responded by opening Operation Hurricane in attempt to counter ZANLA 
guerrillas. Resettlement schemes in the spirit though perhaps not the letter of the Malayan 
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Emergency, were embarked upon. The intention was to cut the rural population off from 
ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army came up with various solutions to 
shortages of man power, the length of call ups were extended, a 2
nd
 RAR battalion was 
formed and both Asians and Coloureds were rendered eligible for conscription. ‘From 1974 
the regular army was expanded, partly by encouraging foreign recruitment.’54 Various 
repressive measures were implemented such as collective of fines and the shutting down of 
basic services.  Like Malaya, a reward system was instituted for the provision of information 
on guerrilla whereabouts or caches of arms. The repressive measures like Protected Villages 
were a well-spring of resentment for rural Africans. Despite this, the results in military terms 
were promising. ‘By the end of 1974, Rhodesian intelligence estimated that only 70 to 100 
hard-core guerrillas remained operative inside the country. The insurgents could perhaps have 
faced total elimination within a few months, if the security forces had kept up the pressure. 
But then the international factor ruptured Salisbury’s COIN campaign. It went by the name of 
detente.’55 
The collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique marked a turning point in the civil war. 
It soon opened up the entire Rhodesian-Mozambican border to infiltration by ZANLA 
guerrillas, in effect extending the front by 700 miles. Furthermore, South Africa saw that with 
Mozambique’s ‘fall’ the cordon sanitaire that she had sought to fashion out of neighbouring 
countries was starting to crumble: hence, Pretoria decided that a moderate African 
government in Rhodesian best suited the changing regional situation. Therefore, South 
African exerted pressure on Rhodesia in December 1974 to declare a ceasefure and South 
Africa then embarked on a policy of détente. ZANU and ZAPU were pressurised by their 
respective allies, Zambia and Tanzania, to accede to the ceasefire and to come to the 
negotiating table. Zambia for one was amenable to détente due to the economic impediments 
posed by the closure of the Zambia-Rhodesia border. South African pressure came by way of 
a near complete military withdrawal from Rhodesia, save for a number of pilots and 
technicians that remained as part of the secret Operation Polo. 
Political leaders of ZANU and ZAPU imprisoned by the Rhodesians were released 
including Robert Mugabe. The talks took place on the Victoria Falls Bridge, they came to 
naught and the war went on unabated. The released African nationalist leadership including 
Mugabe escaped into exile. Due to political infighting which the Zambian government 
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quelled with force, ZANU was forced to relocate to Mozambique. The relocation disrupted 
ZANU’s logistical network. Added to this, the subsequent loss of military and political 
leaders lowered the quality of ZANLA commanders and contributed to significant losses in 
the field. The Rhodesian military launched two more operations, Thrasher in Umtali (Mutare) 
Febuary 1976 and Repulse at Fort Victoria May 1976. In 1975, Prime Minister Ian Smith and 
Joshua Nkomo entered into talks behind the scenes discussing a potential settlement. On the 9 
August 1976, the Selous Scouts prosecuted Operation Eland, an external raid on Nyadzonya 
camp in Mozambique, 40 kilometres from Umtali (Mutare). The Rhodesian Security Forces 
insisted that the camp was a purely military target. ZANU disputed this and asserted that the 
camp was a refugee camp. Accordingly there was a massive international outcry. The 
majority of those killed at the camp appeared unarmed though many of them were either fully 
trained guerrillas or completing their training. One posits that the distinction between a 
military base and refugee camp cannot be satisfactorily drawn in the Rhodesian theatre. The 
reason is that ZANLA and ZIPRA camps served both a military and civilian function.   
Whatever the military benefits to Rhodesia accrued from attacking Nyadzonya, the 
international political fallout was detrimental. Pretoria immediately rescinded Operation Polo 
and South African pilots and helicopters were recalled. With the closure of the Zambian and 
Mozambican borders, Rhodesian trade was forced through South Africa. A combination of 
the congestion and artificially created choke points by South African authorities further 
pressured the Rhodesian government. South Africa promptly gave unequivocal support for 
majority rule in Rhodesia. Due to the mounting pressure, in 1976 ‘on 24 September on 
Rhodesian television, Smith conceded the principle for majority rule.’56 The Geneva Talks 
that followed this concession failed, and limited South African supplies resumed. During 
these talks major external operations against guerrilla bases continued to be mounted, and 
while a great deal of material was captured and destroyed, there were intelligence leaks that 
forewarned guerrillas and sometimes resulted in relatively few guerrilla casualties. With the 
failure of international diplomacy, Smith and Rhodesia shifted away from talks and pursued 
an internal settlement. 
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Phase 3 
The third and final phase ran from 1977 to 1979 until the cessation of hostilities. The 
civil war escalated as the Rhodesian war effort intensified. The military strategy was 
designed to buy time to negotiate for an internal settlement. As cross border raids increased, 
guerrillas became more aggressive. In 1977 Combined Operations was organised so that the 
running of the war effort could be more centralised. The Rhodesian civil-military relationship 
began to shift in favour of the military. The PV programs were enlarged considerably, severe 
curfews were extended and no go areas were expanded as more of Rhodesia was placed 
under martial law. On 23
rd
 November 1977, the RSF launched operation Dingo, an attack on 
a Camp in Chimoio based in Mozambique, over 2,000 ‘guerrillas’ were killed including 
women and children, in the initial attacks of the operation. The RSF created several more 
operational sectors, Grapple in Central Rhodesia, Salops in Salisbury and Splinter around 
Lake Kariba.
57
 In March 1978, Ian Smith negotiated a transitional government with an 
executive council comprising moderate Bishop Muzowera, Ndabaningi Sithole (ousted leader 
of ZANU and rival of R. Mugabe.) and a chief, Senator Jeremiah Chirau, and himself. 
Despite these political concessions in the executive, political and military power remained in 
white Rhodesian hands. Smith organised a war council made up of primarily service chiefs to 
oversee the war effort. On the 3
rd
 of September 1978, the Smith-Nkomo negotiations were 
scuttled with the shooting down of a civilian passenger plane, a Viscount by ZIPRA, and the 
subsequent massacre by guerrillas, of ten out of eighteen survivors, 6 of them women. This 
made any kind of rapprochement with Nkomo politically unacceptable. Retaliatory raids into 
Zambia and Mozambique ensued while the guerrilla offensive continued to be stepped up. In 
an attempt to consolidate Muzowera and Sithole’s position, militias called Pfumo re Vanhu 
translated as Spear of the People were established.  
On the 12 of February 1979, ZIPRA shot down another Viscount amid a deteriorating 
security situation. Further retaliatory raids followed and the Rhodesia Security Forces went 
so far as to strike a ZIPRA base in Angola. The transitional government culminated in 
general one-man-one-vote elections in April 1979 and Muzorewa was elected as the first 
black Prime Minister of the new state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In the last few years of the war 
segregatory legislation was repealed and the colour bar in the Security Forces was removed 
and the first African officers were commissioned. Despite Muzorewa’s rise to power, there 
was no end to the civil war as hoped or intended. The internal settlement was not 
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internationally recognised by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party government or the 
international community. ZANU and ZAPU labelled Muzorewa as a ‘sell-out.’ The lack of 
recognition pressured the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government into the Lancaster House 
conference at the behest of Thatcher. The African Frontline States who hosted ZANU and 
ZAPU, compelled them to come to the table as they had grown weary of the effect of war 
upon their countries. Hostilities continued during the conference and the Rhodesians adopted 
an all-out war that targeted military installations and economic infrastructure of the host 
nations. This all-out war was designed to intimidate the African Frontline States into exerting 
further pressure on ZAPU and ZANU to be more conciliatory. 
Resistance to the cross-border raids during the conference stiffened and Rhodesian and 
South African aircraft were shot down while Rhodesian ground forces often met heavy fire 
and stubborn opposition to their assaults. South Africa by this stage had reversed its military 
withdrawal policy and poured men and material in the Rhodesian war effort. Due to losses 
and the failure of a number of these cross-border operations, Malayan Emergency veteran and 
Commander of Combined Operations Lieut. General Walls on 22 November ‘ordered 
ComOps to stop all external raids.’58 It is conceivable as Moorcraft asserts that these raids 
kept ZANU and ZAPU at the negotiating table in a manner that was ultimately politically 
counterproductive for the Rhodesians. Lord Carrington, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary’s second option was to recognise Bishop Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
government. The continuing raids on Zambia and Mozambique compelled those two 
countries to put pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe to remain at the negotiating table. The 
paradox was that had the raids been stopped earlier, Nkomo and Mugabe may have walked 
out of the talks, and the Rhodesians would have been left with the less extreme political 
option. Carrington would have been forced to recognise Muzorewa’s government. 
Nonetheless, the conference was concluded with the Lancaster House Agreement signed 21 
December 1979. The ensuing ceasefire and the instalment of Lord Soalmes as the last British 
colonial governor of Rhodesia brought an uneasy truce. A commonwealth force and a large 
contingent of British policemen were dispatched to supervise the general elections in 
February 1980. Amid alleged intimidation and coercion by ZANLA guerrillas and political 
commissars, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was elected to power. 
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Chapter 2  
The Malayan Scouts 22 SAS Regiment Rhodesian C 
Squadron 
 
Introduction 
 
The main of objective of this chapter is to investigate ‘C’ Squadrons tour of duty in 
Malaya and present a more complete account that illustrates the significance of the Rhodesian 
involvement in the Malayan Emergency. The Rhodesian experience of Malaya was limited to 
Special Forces and to the Regimental level, while the Rhodesian experiences of their own 
war was extensive regarding the kind of units and included the highest levels of military 
command hierarchy. Significantly the Rhodesian command hierarchy was dominated by 
officers who had served in Malaya, including the commander of the Rhodesian army, Peter 
Walls. It was this group of officers that played a vital role in shaping the tactics and strategies 
of the Rhodesian Civil War.
59
 
 Inevitably the experiences of service in Rhodesia were distinct from those of service in 
Malaya. The Rhodesian Squadron of the Malayan Scouts operated far from Rhodesia in an 
alien environment; Malaya had a completely different climate and the Rhodesians were a 
Commonwealth unit, within a British Army formation. Unlike Rhodesian Army units during 
the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian Malayan Scouts squadron was detached from the 
Rhodesian Army for service abroad. Rhodesian Civil War soldiers on the other hand, were 
operating on home soil or within the borders of Rhodesia’s neighbours and were obviously 
defending their own country. They operated within the Rhodesian Army structure and against 
an enemy that was dissimilar to the Malayan Communist Party soldiers but professed similar 
ideological convictions. The ZANU/ZAPU and MCP guerrillas had similar aims in the 
capture of their respective states. Of cardinal significance to this discussion, is that the fact 
that the officer commanding the Rhodesian squadron of the Malayan Scouts, subsequently 
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became the commander of the Rhodesian Army and later of Combined Operations during the 
Rhodesian Civil War 
 
Historiographical review of the C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts 
 
For the most part the Southern Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency has 
been overlooked by the histories written on the Malayan Emergency. More often than not 
there has been no mention of this contribution at all in works by Anthony Short, Edgar 
O’Balance, John Nagl, Richard Stubbs to name but a few. It is not clear whether the omission 
is deliberate and driven by an agenda or simply due to a lack of sources or even due to the 
choices any writer must make in selecting what to include in a work of history or leave out. 
Robert Jackson’s text The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation is a notable 
exception to this trend. Unlike other texts Jackson has several excerpts on the Malayan 
Scouts and later 22 SAS Regiment. Furthermore, against the grain there are several 
references to the Rhodesian Squadron and Jackson is highly critical of their jungle worthiness 
and allegedly racist mind-set. Specific texts on the Special Air Service are often far more 
detailed sources of information on the Malayan Scouts. Combined with the increased detail 
on the Scouts is a commensurate increase in the information on the C Squadron. SAS history 
has many branches that can be broadly divided as amateur and professional. The amateur 
historians tend to write memoirs as well as historical texts that often have derogatory attitudes 
towards the C Squadron. This can usually be explained if a writer served in one of the three 
other squadrons in the Scouts, as it appears personal bias affects their portrayal of the 
Rhodesian Squadron rather than the C Squadron’s service record. Professional histories of the 
SAS tell a different story of the Rhodesian C Squadron. Their remarks are often laudatory of 
the Squadron and appreciate the Rhodesian contribution to the Emergency. This appreciation 
is not based on the grand sum of their contribution to the Emergency but rather in their 
immediate context as the Rhodesian contribution came at a time when the Malayan Scouts 
sorely needed them and were instrumental in building the unit.  
The Rhodesian Civil War historiography on the C Squadron is distinct from that of the 
Malayan Emergency. Rhodesia’s contribution to the Emergency is often alluded to though 
not at any great length. In terms of information there is considerably less in the more detailed 
Rhodesian War related texts than there are of the same on the Malayan Emergency. 
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Nonetheless, there are remarks that speak of links between Rhodesian experiences in Malaya, 
and the implementation of strategies and tactics in the Rhodesian Civil War. These links 
however, have not been developed to any significant degree. The Rhodesian Special Forces 
historiography mirrors that of the British Special Air Service. Where the British SAS had its 
roots in the Malayan Scouts, so directly the Rhodesian SAS and more indirectly the 
Rhodesian Selous Scouts had their roots in the Rhodesian C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts. 
It follows that these texts often include sections on the Malayan Scouts that focus more on the 
C Squadron. A distinctive feature of the Rhodesian military history texts is that the writers’ 
opinions of the C squadron are polar opposites to that of British and non-Rhodesian authors. 
Rhodesian narratives tend towards an enthusiastic style that extols the martial virtues of the 
Rhodesian military and this has shaped their perspective on the ‘C’ Squadron Malayan 
Scouts. A more moderate example is Barbara Cole’s The Elite The story of the Rhodesian 
Special Air Service, while more extreme one is Peter Baxter’s exposition Selous Scouts 
Rhodesian Counter-Insurgency Specialists. 
 ‘C Squadron whose men had not always found it easy to adapt themselves to the 
‘winning of hearts and minds’ aspect of the Regiment’s work and whose men had proved to 
be more susceptible to jungle diseases that those of the other squadrons, returned to 
Rhodesia.’60 This reference to C squadron succinctly captures the dominant paradigm found 
in the majority of texts on the Malayan Emergency that deign to remark on the Rhodesian C 
Squadron. The paradigm revolves around claims that the Rhodesians were not suitable for 
jungle operations as they were more vulnerable to tropical diseases, neither were they well 
trained compared to other and future squadrons in the Malayan Scouts. Jackson alludes to this 
inferior training by extolling the training of the New Zealand Squadron that replaced the 
Rhodesian one. ‘They were replaced by a New Zealand SAS Squadron, whose men had been 
well trained in SAS techniques at home before flying to Malaya for further training in jungle 
warfare.’61 It seems that the Rhodesian Squadron had difficulties with the Malayan Scouts 
hearts and minds operations, the reason being that coming from Southern Rhodesia; they 
were inherently racist by default. The implications being that the other squadrons were better 
able to adapt themselves to the unit’s ‘hearts and minds’ role, because of the distinct social 
contexts of their respective countries of origin.  
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Tim Jones author of SAS The First Secret Wars makes the following note on Malayan 
Scouts’ training. ‘By December 1950, ‘B’ and the newly drafted Rhodesian contingent of ‘C’ 
Squadron underwent jungle training.’62 The incorrect date aside (The Rhodesians only 
‘arrived in Singapore on 29 March, 1951’63) Jones does not suggest there was any difference 
in training between B and C Squadrons. Moreover, in the book’s scant references of the C 
Squadron, there is no mention of any training deficiencies or the susceptibility of jungle 
disease. This may suggest that ‘C’ Squadron was not distinct from the other squadrons as 
regards disease and training.  
Alan Hoe and Eric Morris published Re-Enter The SAS the Special Air Service and the 
Malayan Emergency in 1994. This text is an in-depth study of SAS involvement in the 
Malayan Emergency. Owing to a narrower focus distinct from general texts on the Malayan 
Emergency or specifically on the SAS, there are more detailed references to the Rhodesian 
Squadron. The text contains the following on the Rhodesian Squadron made by Major Dare 
Newell of the 22
nd
 SAS. This quote seems to be the basis for the paradigm found in much of 
the Malayan and SAS literature. Jackson and others have based their assessment of the 
Rhodesian Squadron on this statement.  
We asked Dare his opinion of ‘C’ Squadron (Rhodesian): Of course we owe them 
a debt of gratitude. Their numbers swelled our ranks at a time when we desperately 
needed them and they had some very fine soldiers. There are criticisms, of course, 
I don’t think they were as at ease with the aborigines as the Brits but that is 
understandable given the back ground and they had a lot of trouble with jungle 
diseases. The quacks have said that British resistance to disease was in no small 
way due to a more deprived way of life in childhood. I can’t say whether that is 
true but it seems a reasonable school of thought. They were disciplined and well-
trained as infantrymen when they arrived, but, like the rest of us, they had to learn 
as they went. They produced some outstandingly good individuals and they 
certainly put the Malayan experience into practise during their own war in Africa 
later on. Peter Walls, of course, was a great leader and went on to command all of 
their armed forces. Later on, of course, we had the Kiwi Squadron who performed 
magnificently.
64
 
While Dare is highly critical of the Rhodesian Squadron as a unit, he admits that the 
Rhodesian contribution came at a moment when it was urgently required, to bolster the 
numbers of the Malayan Scouts. He praises their standard infantry training and discipline, 
while alluding to limited ad-hoc jungle training. His general criticisms are tempered with 
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concessions regarding the high quality of particular soldiers in the unit. An important link is 
made between the Rhodesian experiences in Malaya and the civil war in Rhodesia, and Dare 
highlights the fact the Commanding Officer (CO) of C Squadron, Peter Walls, went on to 
command the entire Rhodesian Army. This link was not within the scope of Hoe’s treatise 
and was not developed further than the quotation. The overall message is that of mediocrity 
compared to the rest of the Malayan Scouts. The paradigm’s assertion of the Rhodesian 
Squadron’s lack of training can be linked to a statement made by a Captain John Woodhouse, 
the Malayan Scouts’ intelligence officer.  
Now once ‘B’ Squadron had arrived, within a matter of two or three months came 
‘C’ Squadron from Rhodesia who had been volunteered by the then Rhodesian 
Government to help in Malaya and the same procedures happened with them. 
They were given two or three weeks training in the jungle where an officer called 
Ted Peacock, a Sergeant Eddie Waters and myself were attached to them for this 
period, doing our best to give them some idea of what they should do; they were 
then let loose in the jungle after just that short period of elementary training.
65
 
According to Woodhouse, the Rhodesians’ jungle training was minimal and inadequate 
preparation for jungle warfare. 
This paradigm is not the unassailable fortress that it may seem despite being based on 
primary sources boasting of an SAS pedigree. Its assertions have been contested by 
alternative accounts and interpretations of the Rhodesian experience in the Malayan Scouts. 
Alastair MacKenzie argues that the Rhodesian Squadron was distinct from the other 
Squadrons due to its selection process. Major Mike Calvert, the commanding officer of the 
Malayan Scouts, ‘made time to widen his search for suitable men, visiting Rhodesia where 
his staff was able to select some 120, most of whom had wartime experience, to form C 
Squadron. As there was this opportunity to be selective, ‘C’ would prove one of the most 
professional of the SAS Squadrons, serving in Malaya from 1951 to 1953.’66 These one 
hundred or so men were winnowed down from around 1,000 applicants and as a result ‘they 
were, many of them, very big, strong and physically robust men.’67 An excerpt from a letter 
written by John Woodhouse reads as follows. 
The Rhodesian squadron in 1951 had a three weeks training exercise before 
operations advised only by me and one NCO, with perhaps nine months jungle 
experience between us – it was a case of the blind leading the blind. This squadron 
with a high percentage of potentially outstanding SAS soldiers never realised its full 
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potential in Malaya. Through no fault of its own, but because it was never properly 
trained, the same mistake was not made with the New Zealand SAS squadron, when it 
joined in 1955.
68
 
The letter written 9
th
 December 1981 bears a resemblance to a section from Hoe and 
Morris’ treatise and suggests that they paraphrased the original letter instead of quoting it 
directly. The original source explains that not only was the training minimal but the 
instructors themselves were hardly qualified and poor training could not be blamed on the 
Rhodesians. It is interesting to note that the source creates a firm context in that ‘A’ squadron 
was hardly more extensively trained and that the remaining squadrons were trained in the 
same fashion as the Rhodesians. ‘A’ squadron in particular had unruly elements and 
Woodhouse makes a general criticism of the Malayan Scouts having a reputation for ill-
discipline on and off duty.  
MacKenzie makes the point that Dare ‘Newell’s comments, which are often repeated in 
books and journals about the early days of the SAS in Malaya, are certainly at odds with the view 
the Rhodesians had, particularly regarding their ability to relate to the aboriginals, also known as 
the Orang Asli.  
Military service to the British crown was a dominant feature of Rhodesian culture and 
Rhodesians were immensely proud of their martial contributions to the Allies in both the Great 
War and the Second World War. In that vein, Cole writes that 11 years after the Second World 
War, ‘Rhodesia’s proud military tradition was maintained when the Communists began giving 
trouble in the Far East and a Commonwealth Force was needed to help the United Nations in 
Korea. Rhodesia was still part of the Empire and only too willing to send a token force to 
Korea.’69 Cole puts the number of volunteers at 1,200 and reveals that Rhodesians were not the 
only applicants, ‘South Africans living in Rhodesia, volunteered.’70 The volunteers were ‘men 
and boys, old campaigners and civilians.’71 A fact not mentioned in the Malayan and SAS 
historiography is that Peter Walls was incredibly young, 24 to be exact and was a Sandhurst 
graduate.72 Ron Reid Daly, a mere corporal is dubbed an individual of significance, not least 
because of his future role in the Rhodesian Civil War, where he went on to command the Selous 
Scouts. Out of the 1,200 volunteers, ‘ninety civilians and ten regulars, some of them with wartime 
service, were selected for the Far East Volunteer Unit and the average age was 24.’73 Cole 
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provides a summary of the situation of the Malayan Emergency in its early years and of the 
creation of the Malayan Scouts. The British Army politics involved in the creation of the 
Malayan Scouts is not mentioned, unlike the British SAS histories. Cole’s interpretation of the 
Malayan Scouts role is as follows: ‘The aim of the unit was not so much to kill the enemy in great 
numbers but to harass them and drive them on to the roads and more civilised area where other 
British Army units would do the killing.’74  
A distinctive part of the C Squadron uniform was that they ‘would wear identifying 
Rhodesian shoulder flashes.’75 According to Cole, Peter Walls was envisioned as the training 
commander, and the Squadron would be sent to Malaya under the command of a more senior and 
experienced officer.76 Instead, Walls was made a temporary Captain and led the Squadron to 
Malaya.77 Cole makes the observation that ‘the newspapers were full of stories of the lucky 100 
men, and their spirit of adventure and loyalty to the Commonwealth was greatly admired by 
all.’78 It is these newspaper articles both Rhodesian and abroad that will constitute a part of the 
primary sources used to illuminate the C Squadron further. Cole briefly sketches their journey to 
Malaya; from Salisbury to Durban by train and onto Singapore by sea.79 Cole does not just focus 
on C Squadron but mentions details of the other squadrons, in particular what the Rhodesians 
thought of them. 
“A” Sqn, they would soon learn, was made up of some “fairly interesting characters”, 
some whose discipline left much to be desired and some of whom were unwanted by 
their own regiments. “A” Squadron comprised men from units in the Far East and no 
particular criteria had been set down for selection. Such was the urgent need for men 
that to have been too discriminating would probably have meant the unit would never 
have been resurrected. Despite their shortcomings, they did have some very good 
jungle soldiers and fine officers, and the Rhodesians would be impressed with the 
way some men could use themselves around the jungle. They had some excellent 
navigators and navigating was no easy task where it was often impossible to see the 
sky.
80
 
Cole makes the point that ‘the Rhodesians clearly had much to learn about the ways of 
the jungle and the techniques of operating in the tight close undergrowth, just as men in the 
other Squadrons had. Many of the problems were unique to Malaya and the best way those 
pioneers had of finding out was to stagger into the jungle themselves and learn the hard 
                                                 
74 B. Cole: The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service, p. 9. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid. p. 10. 
80 Ibid. p. 10. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 47 
 
way.’81 In other words a training course was merely a part of being trained to operate in the 
jungle, first-hand experience was the rest of the process. 
Cole contradicts the official version of two to three weeks of rudimentary jungle training. 
‘C Sqn got its first introduction to the jungle during a six-weeks training operation where 
they learned the ropes of jungle navigation and patrolling.’82 Where Woodhouse implies that 
he was the font of knowledge with his limited jungle experience for the Rhodesian training 
course, Cole reveals that ‘The training, devised by Calvert, was directed at realism and live 
ammunition was used. Shooting fast from the hip at point-blank range was another skill that 
had to be mastered. The jungle was so dark in some places they would only be able to see a 
few paces in front of them and the undergrowth would have to be hacked away step by 
careful step . . . and all providing wonderful cover for the quick-off-the-mark ambushing 
enemy.’83 At the end of this training course constructed by Calvert’s innate knowledge of 
jungle warfare, instead of a British officer, ‘Peter Walls was called in and told he had been 
appointed Squadron Commander and promoted to Acting Major.’84 Cole outlines the 
difference in climate between the Rhodesian bush and the Malayan Jungle and how tracking 
in the jungle took the Rhodesians a while to master.  
Cole makes no mention of operations involving Orang Asli and ‘hearts and minds,’ she 
does however, assert that ‘off-duty, the Rhodesians became the best of friends with the black 
Fijians, making nonsense of some claims that the Rhodesians with their background were 
better orientated towards mixing with blacks and coloureds than the average British troopies 
who seldom associated with them.’85 More integral to the Rhodesian experience was their 
training and deployment in paratroop operations. In the first such operation, they formed part 
of the ground force sent to link up with a 50-man contingent of parachutists.
86
 ‘Most of the 
Rhodesians were parachute trained by the time their tour of duty ended, and when the second 
airborne operation was mounted in Malaya, it was the Rhodesians who made up most of the 
numbers.’87  
Cole sums up the Rhodesian efforts stating that ‘for the most part, the Rhodesians had 
been a bunch of inexperienced soldiers when they had left on their Far East adventure. They 
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were young, new soldiers in a totally foreign environment. But they developed as they went 
along, and had acquitted themselves well.’88 Cole adds that ‘Peter Walls was awarded an 
MBE for his work in Malaya but says it was definitely in recognition of the entire squadron’s 
efforts.’89 The majority of the Rhodesians went back to their civilian lives upon their return 
home after their two year tour. Cole renders the experiences of those who continued their 
careers significant by detailing some of the lessons learned. ‘For the few who did continue to 
make soldiering their career, the Malayan experience had provided a tremendous grounding. 
Malaya had been a valuable experience and they had learned the elementary principles of 
counterinsurgency warfare. They learned the techniques of tracking; had learned what it was 
like to be ambushed; what the principles were in establishing their own ambushes; the sort of 
things that would give them away.’90 Cole overtly links two concepts used in the Rhodesian 
Civil War to the Malayan experience. The first being the concept of Combined Operations, 
‘where the military and civil forces all worked together with the common purpose of 
prosecuting the war and defeating the enemy 24 hours a day, seven days a week, under one 
supreme commander.’91 The second of which was ‘the protected village idea where the 
vulnerable, unarmed local population were moved into villages to deprive the enemy of his 
target and means of support, while providing better community facilities and a more 
sophisticated infrastructure.’92 
There stands an assortment of radically different accounts of the Rhodesian squadron’s 
tour in Malaya. One is highly critical and portrays the C Squadron in a vastly unfavourable 
light that if taken at face value would create some doubts as to whether the Rhodesian 
experiences would have had any kind of reach into the Rhodesian Civil War. If other texts are 
read in isolation, it would seem that Rhodesia’s contribution has been overlooked entirely or 
merely alluded to in the appendices. Judging by Cole’s work and other Rhodesian military 
history texts, the Rhodesians thought highly of their efforts in Malaya and learned from their 
experiences. Research by the likes of Alastair Mackenzie have presented both perspectives 
and argued in favour of more balanced appraisal of the C Squadron. What is lacking in these 
accounts is a degree of depth; through a meagre selection of sources these writers have 
confined their opinions to a few paragraphs or pages at best. This Chapter is an assessment of 
the Rhodesian C Squadrons tour based on a selection of Malayan newspaper articles, British 
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Colonial Office documents and two files of reports sent by C Squadron to Rhodesian Army 
Head Quarters (HQ) in Salisbury. Many of the reports were written for the press and 
published in Rhodesian newspapers. There are a number of guiding research questions. A) 
How well trained were the Rhodesians? B) How well did the Rhodesian interact with 
Aborigines and people of colour? C) What combined operations were the Rhodesians 
involved in? D) What was the role of parachutists, ground troops and heliborne troops in 
these operations? E) Were the Rhodesians susceptible to jungle disease and was that 
exceptional compared to the other squadrons? F) What was the role of the Malayan Scouts 
and did the Rhodesians fulfil that role? G) What experiences did the Rhodesians have of 
resettlement in Malaya and the concept behind the strategy?  
Type of War 
 
The Rhodesians who fought in Malaya were faced with a ‘war’ radically distinct from 
the Second World War; a war that some of the Squadron had directly experienced as military 
men while the civilian volunteers would have been young children for its duration and spent 
their teens and early adolescence steeped in many of its stories. The ‘C’ Squadron realised 
that it had to be explained to the Rhodesian public that their conflict was unconventional. 
Denis Craggs explained, ‘there is no front line if by that is meant a clear demarcation 
between opposing armies. The enemy is seldom seen. Prisoners of war are seldom if ever 
taken.’93 The idea of un guerre sans frontières was further elaborated upon by Craggs, ‘the 
destruction of a bandit camp deep in the jungle; the bombing of a cultivated area from which 
the terrorists have been obtaining supplies; the finding of a hidden medical store; these 
constitute material successes in the war against a force which continues to inflict casualties 
and extensive damage on the forces on the Forces and civil population although hunted 
constantly by Security units.’94 A far cry from the army fronts in the Eastern and Western 
European theatres of the Second World War, where military objectives were more tangible, 
for example capturing a city or a bridge. The Malayan Emergency was also the kind of 
internal war, where the guerrillas were delegitimised by the British Authorities. Craggs 
conforms to the British mind-set of the period. ‘The terrorists generally are Chinese and are 
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therefore not, as they would have the world believe, representative of the Malayan people. 
Their aim and object is not Malayan independence but Communist domination of the 
Federation. It has long been the desire of the Chinese Communists to have the valuable 
Peninsula as a Red satellite.’95 
The Role of the Malayan Scouts 
 
A British politician made it very clear to the men of the Rhodesian Squadron the kind of 
role envisaged for them. “You will find you are not up against a genuine movement for 
national independence when you get in Malaya, but ruthless Communist organisations are 
practising murder and torture, and you will have to hunt them out. We hope it won’t be long 
before we have the trouble in Malaya in hand.”96 Hunting out the Malayan ‘communist 
terrorists’ (CTs) would require lengthy forays into the Malayan jungle. The Malayan Scouts 
(later 22
nd
 SAS) was specifically formed to patrol the jungle in search of ‘communist 
terrorists.’ ‘Serving in the emergency in Malaya are the 100 Rhodesian volunteers who 
arrived in the Federation in March 1951 and became ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron of the 22 
Special Air Service Regiment, a regiment formed for deep penetration of the jungle and 
equipped to spend, if necessary months in the trackless interior.’97 At the time of writing the 
C Squadron had yet to actually kill a member of the MRLA however, tallying kills was not 
the primary objective of the Malayan Scouts. ‘These bearded men are impatient to make their 
first kill, but the present role of the Rhodesians is to penetrate the deep jungle areas in which 
the terrorists are believed to have hospitals and training camps. The Regiments operating on 
the highways and jungles fringes are almost certain of shooting bandits; but the squadron, 
patrolling the jungle is to those who flee from the areas which have become too dangerous for 
them.’98 In short the Malayan Scouts were to harass the MRLA and drive the onto the jungle 
fringes into the guns of conventional infantry. Much in the same way beaters drive game into 
the killing zone of hunters. The Rhodesians it would seem were not exactly enthused by this 
support role when success seemed to be measured among them and others by kill counts.  
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Successful Tour 
The likes of Dare contend that the Rhodesian Squadron was not particularly successful. 
Certainly if success was defined by kill counts the Rhodesians did not make much of an 
inroad on the MRLA. The Rhodesian reports contain a keenness to come to grips with the 
enemy and what few kills were made were expounded upon and the tally would be brought 
up. A typical comment representative of other instances is as follows, ‘to the time of writing 
four bandits have been killed by ‘C’ Squadron.’99 With a hint of envy the reports would often 
mention the successes of other regiments, ‘but kills made by troops working in conjunction 
were ascribed to the Squadron’s ‘flushing’ activity.’100 In many of the operations there were 
many instances of conventional infantry units tallying contacts and kills as a direct result of 
Malayan Scout jungle penetration. The Malayan Scouts were an integral part of the 
counterinsurgency campaign and essential in bringing the elusive MRLA to battle. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office seemed confident that the Rhodesian Squadron was 
performing well though double checked with the Far Eastern Land Force (FARELF) before 
briefing a minister visiting Southern Rhodesia. ‘To the best of my knowledge both units have 
done admirable work there, though I should be interested to know whether this is confirmed 
by the Commanders in-Chief on the spot.’101 
FARELF responded with its appraisal of the Rhodesian’s performance only six months 
into their tour. ‘These operations by Rhodesian Sqn have been of very great value to the 
Emergency campaign. The Malayan Scouts penetrate into areas which cannot be patrolled by 
other troops, they exercise a constant harassing effect on the bandits, keeping them on the 
move and so obstructing their recruitment, training and supply organisation and forcing them 
to be continually on the alert. Without these troops, the bandits would be able to organise 
themselves unmolested and build up a very substantially increased threat against the 
populated areas. As information increases as a result of success in the general campaign and 
improvements in the police organisation the number of kills and captures by this unit can be 
expected to increase.’102 When the Malayan Scouts took part in a parade early 1952, it 
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received praise due to its accomplishments. ‘After the parade the High Commissioner 
congratulated the Regiment on its performance.’103 
 
‘C’ Squadron’s training 
 
Element of the literature assert that while the Rhodesians may have been well schooled 
in conventional infantry warfare, their jungle training was inferior and thus affected their 
operational capability. The Malayan press tells a rather different story. The Straits Times 
states that while in Salisbury ‘the Rhodesians have undergone a basic training course on 
jungle warfare. They are also being put through an intensive physical course to toughen them 
for the kind of warfare that lies ahead of them deep in the Malayan Jungle.’104 Not only had 
the Rhodesians received some degree of jungle training before being sent to Malaya, the CO 
of the Malayan Scouts organised this first stage of training. ‘Burly Lieut-Colonel Calvert flew 
to Cairo two weeks ago on his way to Salisbury to train the Rhodesians for the fighting in 
Malaya.’105 In other words, their preliminary jungle training was overseen by a specialist, as 
opposed to Rhodesian instructors with no jungle experience. The Malayan press emphasised 
that these Rhodesian troops were ‘hand-picked.’106 This is reflective of the selection process 
for the Rhodesian Squadron, where over 1,000 volunteers were reduced to about 100.  
Typical news articles in Malaya prior to the arrival of the Malayan Scouts stressed their 
physical prowess and the degree of training they had undergone. ‘Lt Col M Calvert “Mad 
Mike” of Wingate Expedition and Chindit fame will return to Malaya shortly with 160 tough 
specially trained Rhodesians for his Malayan Scouts – a branch of the Special Air Service 
Regiment.’107 Dare gives the length of training for the Rhodesian troops as two to three 
weeks, he also gives the distinct impression that the training was second rate. The Star has 
this to say, ‘their arduous jungle training before they go into action is expected to take two or 
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three months. Their average age is 23.’108 According to reports from ‘C’ Squadron to 
Rhodesian Army Headquarters, their initial training phase last roughly four weeks.
109
 The 
Rhodesian account concurs with the Star article as regards the arduous nature of the training; 
furthermore the training described in the C Squadron report outlines essential jungle skills 
being taught. ‘They have been weeks of hard training for everyone, weeks spent in becoming 
accustomed to the jungle, constantly wet; in learning how to move as quickly as possible with 
the least noise; learning how to handle and use explosives for demolition and defence, and 
how to navigate rafts on swift-flowing rivers.’110 Training included forays into the jungle 
almost from the very start. ‘To start with they went for single day operations, short distances 
from the camp.’111 A report from a Troop Newsletter comments on the training in more detail 
‘the first few weeks in Dusun Tua camp were spent in training for the jungle. Periodically we 
were given demonstrations on demolition work, raft building and weapons. Days were spent 
in accustoming us to the jungle, going on short operation in charge of experienced officers. 
We learned how to make the best use of our rations, how to build bivvies, and how to cut 
dropping zones for airdrops.’112  
The Troop 13 Newsletter presents a more subaltern perspective of the kind of training the 
Rhodesians underwent.  ‘The Pipeline Scheme gave us our first taste of strenuous climbing, 
clearing DZ’s, jungle cooking and preparations for a night in the jungle. Consequently some 
went hungry, others had trouble with hammocks and some were thoroughly wet. Many a head 
of hair stood on end, followed by furtive looks and glances, when the jungle creatures started 
their nocturnal noises.’113 It must be remembered that despite their infantry training, these 
men were on average 23 years old and were understandably frightened by some of their first 
jungle experiences during training, the Rhodesian bush being inadequate preparation for the 
hazards and quirks of the Malayan jungle.  
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These nerves were countered by the Rhodesian’s sense of humour that features in a 
number of the newsletters. ‘Cpl Rowlly Swift’s fascinated by rivers and takes a plunge into 
almost every one we cross. He also shared his poncho one night with a snake, and when this 
was brought to his notice, he really lived up to his name! (The snake was killed later, when 
the mirth had subsided)’114 
 
From these excerpts it would appear that the Rhodesians’ training while in Salisbury and 
upon arrival in Malaya was of a higher standard that Dare would have us believe. While Dare 
claims that he was in charge of C Squadron’s training, Colonel Calvert very clearly directed 
their training in Rhodesia and certainly his jungle doctrine was drilled into the Rhodesians in 
Malaya though he played less of a direct role in their Malaya based training. A ‘C’ squadron 
report quotes Colonel Calvert, ‘I don’t believe in teaching a soldier to swim on dry land. I 
send him out into the jungle and train him in the element in which he will have to eventually 
fight.’115 This statement reflects the way the Rhodesians were trained in the jungle and sent 
on progressively longer patrols as part of this training. This training did not stop after the 
Rhodesians’ first active operation 29 April 1951.116 The Rhodesian Squadron regularly 
underwent further training post-operations. ‘After a week in the camp we moved to Selarang 
Barracks, Singapore, where the Regiment is undergoing re-training, and making a name for 
itself in sports.’117 It is important to note that even the active operations were learning 
experiences for the Rhodesian, especially the early ones during their tour. ‘The time has been 
spent in routine training, with occasional route marches along the coast, and a short operation 
in the Federation to check on wireless operation and map reading.’118  
A significant part of the Rhodesian training was parachute specific. However, this only 
commenced in June 1952, well over a year after deployment. ‘At present the Rhodesians are 
undergoing parachute training in Singapore. In the course of the coming six months it is 
hoped to train all members of the Special Air Service Regiment as parachutists, thus enabling 
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the Security Forces to make surprise attacks on the terrorists. Thus the men will be fresh and 
untired by long marches through thick jungle into the operational areas, being able to strike 
fast and effectively and with the advantage of surprise.’119  
When Rhodesian reinforcements arrived towards the beginning of 1952, they too 
underwent significant training. ‘The reinforcements are now undergoing elementary training 
prior to jungle training, which will begin soon after the Regiment returns to Kuala Lumpur 
within the next few weeks.’120 The press reports further emphasise the need to bring the 
reinforcements up to C Squadron standard. ‘Nearby is jungle and rubber where the 
reinforcements are undergoing training to bring them up to the standard of the Rhodesians at 
present in the jungle on operations. A training expedition into the jungle is being planned to 
give the new arrivals practical experience in map and compass reading.’121 The nature of the 
Malayan Scouts operations required small patrols of men. Integrating poorly trained troops 
with jungle experienced men would essentially put lives at risk and so too the success of 
operations: hence the weight attached to the reports’ remarks regarding the reinforcements’ 
training. In focusing on the reinforcements’ retraining, the report suggests that the original 
Rhodesian contingent was by that stage well trained, jungle worthy and experienced and 
distinct from the Rhodesian reinforcements.  
 
 Allegations of Racism 
 
Dale’s assertion of the Rhodesians’ racist behaviour towards the Sakai tribesmen (Orang 
Asli) on the basis of their background, i.e. racism allegedly being a part of their society and 
culture is contradicted by ‘C’ Squadron reports to Rhodesian Army Headquarters. There 
reports contain a number of references to the Sakai. ‘Tribes of Sakai, jungle people who hunt 
with bamboo spears, blowpipes and poisoned darts, are found in most districts in which the 
Regiment operates. They are generally friendly and helpful, assisting the troops with 
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information and as porters for the heavy equipment.’122 In contrast ,the War Office in 
Whitehall cannot comment the Rhodesians relations with other races. ‘We are unable to 
comment on their relations with non Europeans as they have been operating as a self 
contained unit, and are likely to have had very little contact with the local population (sic).’123 
The reports suggest that the Rhodesians had extensive contacts with the Sakai tribesmen. The 
references comment on how welcoming the Sakai were to the Rhodesians. ‘Sakai living 
nearby welcomed the troops and reported two bandits in the neighbourhood.’124 The reports 
detail instances where Sakai tribesmen aided the Rhodesians on their marches. ‘Strung in file 
along the track, with a number of Sakai (small pigmy-like men of the jungle) carrying radio 
equipment, the squadron started its long march.’125 Not only did the Sakai welcome the 
Rhodesians but they assisted them other ways aside from being porters. ‘In the course of the 
next few days 55 Sakai, who were very friendly, were found by ‘C’ squadron. Eager to help 
the troops they assisted with the building of bashas and the clearing of a dropping zone for air 
supplies.’126 There are also references to relations with the Malayans, ‘and friendly Malayans 
helped with gifts of fish and fruit.’127 There were occasions where the Rhodesians appeared 
to have been generous too. ‘An airdrop was taken at another large kampong, and, as a 
friendly gesture, some of the food was distributed to the Malays.’128 It would seem the 
Rhodesians found a use for the much despised Heinz tinned vegetable salad referred to by B. 
A. Glass in his account on the Malayan Scouts.
129
 There are also references to the use of Iban 
trackers. The following extract is representative of the mode of Rhodesian opinion of them: 
‘the Squadron employed Iban trackers for the first time on this operation. They were found to 
be extremely useful, their ability being highly commended by all ranks.’130 
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Sporting Activities of the Malayan Scouts 
 
A considerable portion of the C Squadron reports revolve around their sporting activities 
and achievements. This information was requested by the chief editor of the Rhodesian 
Herald.  ‘Your notes may cover the Unit as a whole or the activities of individuals, and items 
of sporting interest would be welcome.’131 Owing to the volume and detail on sports one 
would be forgiven for having the impression that the South Rhodesian Far East Volunteer 
Unit (SRFEVU) was in fact no more than a glorified sports’ away team sent to Malaya. The 
Rhodesian took their sports training quite seriously. ‘The Regiment is undergoing re-training, 
and spending a portion of each day in recreational sports. The Rhodesians are to the fore in 
all sports. In the near future boxing tournaments will be organised. Some of the men are 
taking lessons in fencing, and others are playing golf and hockey.’132 Sports were taken 
seriously enough, that the C Squadron Rhodesians became relatively renowned sportsmen in 
Malaya and back in Rhodesia.  ‘The Rhodesians are rapidly building a reputation of good 
sportsmanship, and as a result are proving to be popular among the troops in Malaya.’133 The 
reports outline many notable successes of the Rhodesians seasoned with a number of losses. 
‘Sport has been the main interest while here, and the Rhodesians have done exceedingly well 
in all the sports activities.’134 One posits that there was a focus on their sporting success due 
to their apparent lack of ‘successful’ contacts in terms of kills.  
Rhodesian Relations with Fijian troops 
 
The National Archives of Zimbabwe Malayan Scouts Files have no overt mention of any 
friendship between the Fijians and the Rhodesians as Cole argued. However, there are several 
mentions of sports matches between the SAS Regiment and the Fijian Battalion. The 
Rhodesians made up the bulk of the SAS rugby team. ‘Rugger training will begin soon. The 
Fijians at present Malaya offer keen competition, and although they will only begin training 
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much later in the year, it is though necessary to start to start training the Rhodesians now.’135 
There is evidence that suggests that the Rhodesians held a great deal of respect for the 
Fijians. Certainly the Fijians appear to be one of the few teams to trounce the Rhodesians at 
Rugby. ‘The most exciting and interesting game up to now was against the Fiji Battalion 
played on the Padang at Kuala Lumpur. This game was headline news in the local papers and 
attracted the largest crowd of spectators since the War. The score, although 42 – 0 in the 
Fiji’s favour, was not an indication of the game. The Regimental side played extremely 
well.’136 The reports suggest that Rhodesians had respect for the Fijians due to their sporting 
prowess, were willing to play against them and took losing with a degree of dignity; 
friendships could conceivably have developed off the sporting field. 
South African Sportsmen in the Rhodesian Squadron 
 
It was not only Southern Rhodesians who volunteered for the Far East Volunteer Unit, 
there were South Africans among their ranks. One such South African, Trooper Howell 
featured in C Squadrons contribution to the regimental team. ‘Durban-born Trooper Howell 
took part in this week’s Combined Services rugger trail and confused opponents and team 
mates alike when he broke out in Afrikaans.’137 According to the news article, the Rhodesian 
players often made use of Afrikaans while playing rugby. ‘I’m told that the Rhodesian 
members of the side frequently use such expressions when playing among themselves so 
spectators need be alarmed if foreign cries of “huk die bal” and “veet, veet” reach them on 
the touchline today.’138 A consultant on rugby and associated Afrikaans terminology 
explained that “huk die bal” means hook the ball and refers to how the hooker in the scrum 
must kick the ball back to the rear of his team’s scrum to gain possession of the ball so it can 
be passed back. The consultant was puzzled by the phrase “veet, veet” as that is not an 
Afrikaans rugby phrase. He concluded that Howell was in fact yelling “feet, feet” at the time 
and the reporter spelt what he heard with Afrikaans phonetics. It is conceivable that Howell 
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realised that his team couldn’t understand him and yelled “feet, feet” to encourage the scrum 
to hook the ball.
139
 
The General Discipline of the Rhodesian Troops 
\ 
The reports at squadron and troop level do not seem to correlate to the Malayan Scouts’ 
reputation of ill-discipline in and out of the jungle. There is no evidence to suggest that there 
were any court-martial or punishable offences during operations. This suggests that the 
Rhodesians behaved in a professional manner on operations. For example, there was a 
casualty on one operation, who being a stretcher case, had to be carried through the jungle to 
a river in order to be evacuated. The men of the troop concerned virtually destroyed 
themselves on force marches, to try and get the man to a medical facility. Though he died 
enroute, the men went about their duty in what could be considered an exemplary manner.
140
 
The accounts of the squadron’s exploits in the jungle are however, leavened with some 
degree of humour. Indeed it would seem that on occasion some of the Rhodesians would play 
pranks on each other though they were hardly serious enough to warrant censure. One 
member may have taken things a bit too far when practising his demolition training. ‘Whilst 
stationed here, someone in the Regiment has taken his Demolitions Course very seriously, for 
he wanders around in the early hours of the morning demolishing flag poles and NAAFI 
signs with high explosive. It is thought by some that this chap has the idea he is Guy Fawkes 
II, but as the political motive seems to be lacking, no credit can be given to this theory. Of 
late he has been very quiet, and is still enjoying his freedom.’141 
 
There are a few remarks on their behaviour on leave. These were reports sent to the 
Rhodesian Army Headquarter and so the Squadron is unlikely to have reported 
misdemeanours when on leave. Analysis of several excerpts does suggest that Rhodesians 
may have had a more of a wild time on leave.  ‘After the operation everyone had seven days’ 
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leave where all […..] had a very hectic time at Penang, Singapore, and Malacca.’142 Though 
this could hardly be limited to the Rhodesian Squadron or even the Malayan Scouts; ‘An 
Airborne Re-Union dinner was held in Singapore one night last week, a few Rhodesians 
attending. From all reports received it was a riotous re-union.’143 It is typical of most Army 
units to ‘let their hair down’ when on leave particularly when returning from a long 
operation. While the Malayan Scouts had a reputation for drinking and the antisocial 
behaviour that often follows, it would seem that the Rhodesian Squadron despite their youth, 
were perhaps a trifle more mature than say ‘A’ squadron. That being said, one Rhodesian 
clearly enjoyed the delights of Singapore more than he should have: ‘Monty Thane went to 
Singapore on leave with Basil Leak and Gerald Johnston, after the operation. Monty had a 
sad tale to tell when he came back. He had been hit on the head and robbed of his money 
while walking through a park one night. (Well, that’s his story, and he’s sticking to it!)’144 
Conduct of Rhodesian troops  
 
A letter from the War Office brings to light some dissatisfaction regarding the Rhodesian 
personnels’ salaries. ‘For your Secretary of State’s private information we have been 
informed that there is dissatisfaction amongst the Rhodesians, due to the alleged non-
payment of local overseas allowance whilst serving in Malaya. Our information on this point 
however, is that the local allowances admissible to British personnel have been included in 
the basic rates of pay issued by Southern Rhodesia. FARELF are informing the Military 
Headquarters in Salisbury of this complaint.’145 In the ‘C’ Squadron reports there is nothing 
to corroborate this case of dissatisfaction. However, it has hardly something that would be put 
in the official press reports to HQ.  
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Military Operations involving the Malayan Scouts 
 
 Many of the operations that the ‘C’ Squadron participated in were combined. Often 
Scout Special Forces would work in conjunction with regular infantry and police jungle 
squads. This would have given Rhodesian officers hands on experience working with other 
components of the Security Forces. ‘Co-operating in this large-scale offensive against the 
terrorists are Commando and Police units.’146 The Rhodesians became rather familiar with 
the concept of stop groups that would cut off guerrillas’ lines of retreat. ‘This operation in 
which the squadron were taking part was a combined one, the squadron acting as a stop 
should bandits try to escape through the area, which was only a short distance from a town 
and extensive rubber plantations. The Rhodesians had come in the tortuous “back door” route 
so that the bandits should not know of their arrival.’147 Footslogging was usually the final 
stage of coming to grips with the communists. ‘Generally the men go into the jungle from a 
selected point on a road or a rubber estate, but there is no limit to the variety of ways in 
which they move to their objectives. On a recent operation they left the base camp by truck, 
then travelled by troopcarrying aircraft to an airfield in the vicinity of the operational area. 
Then they moved by train to another point from which they continued their journey by truck 
until the road deteriorated to such an extent that further movement was impossible. Then they 
walked through clinging, mud heave packs on their backs, for nine heart-breaking miles, 
which the men later said was the worst march they have ever undertaken. They had to be in 
position by a certain date and could waste no time (sic).’148 
 Supply drops by transport helicopter were of paramount importance in keeping the 
Malayan Scouts on long jungle patrols. ‘During that period the men proved their ability and 
stamina, living mainly on food supplied to them by airdrop. At times airdrops of supplies 
were delayed or lost in the jungle and the men went hungry, but they managed to survive.’149 
Silk was of course a valuable military asset and so parachutes had to be returned when 
possible. ‘Air drops were taken, and the parachutes used were carried to the road some 
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distance away.’150 While it may seem simple to ditch supplies out of plane to troops below 
this was not necessarily the case. ‘Dropping supplies to troops in the jungles is an important 
aspect of the Malayan campaign. It is not always an easy job for those in the air. The RAF 
aircrew have their hands full particularly when DZs (drop zones) are situated in hilly country, 
while the RASC (Royal Army Service Corps) air dispatchers relax only after the last chute is 
away. They slide out packages by placing them on a wooden platform near the open doorway 
and lifting this up at a signal given by the co-pilot. The Rhodesians have often taken airdrops 
from Australian air crews with whom they have struck up a firm ground-to-air friendship.’151 
Clearly the Rhodesians realised that being on more than civil terms with logistical staff was 
in their best interests, certainly considering that air supply was their main life line in the 
jungle.  
 
The Rhodesians were also deployed on operations in a ground role in conjunction with 
parachutists from the other Squadrons. This was by no means a lesser role to the airborne 
troops. ‘The parachute operation in Kelantan was one of the most successful the Squadron 
have had up to now. 13 Troop, commanded by Lieut J. T. Dill Russel, contacted 4 Chinese 
Terrorists on the march. They killed one who was the orderly to the local Platoon 
Commander and was carrying all the personal documents of the Commander. They recovered 
a carbine, a grenade and 250 rounds of ammunition. The documents, after translation were 
found to be one of the best sets captured in the State of Kelantan and since the 
Emergency.’152 The major advantage of parachute dropped troops was that they would arrive 
in the field fresh without being physically drained by traipsing through hellish terrain. ‘The 
beginning of the operation was marked by the dropping of paratroops, men of the Regiment, 
experienced parachutists, who arrived in the area in a more spectacular, if not less tiring 
manner.’153 Of the ‘C’ Squadron only one Rhodesian was a trained parachutist and took part 
in at least one of the first Malayan Scout combined paratrooper operations.  ‘Lt. Charles 
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Pavlich, BEM, of Bulawayo, an experienced parachutist of the 1939-1945 war, jumped with 
the Squadron as a troop leader.’154 
Paratroop training and operations 
 
The Rhodesians commenced parachute training in batches from June 1952. ‘The first 
group to undergo parachute training in Singapore left the camp at Klang early in June and 
will soon complete their jumps. The second group is in Singapore busy with training. Within 
the next few months it is hoped that all the Rhodesians will qualify as paratroops.’155 As the 
Malayan Scouts were not able to recruit enough para-trained men, they were forced to train 
the men they already had for all Squadrons to be available for operations that required 
insertion by parachute. A considerable part of parachute training is done on the ground before 
training jumps. ‘Since returning from the week of rest at Port Dickson the Rhodesians have 
been engaged on ground parachute training. This has occupied the most part of each morning 
for the past fortnight.’156 It would appear that the Rhodesians were trained in stages for 
mainly logistical reasons. ‘In Singapore now they have all the facilities for complete 
parachute training, but the courses are taking longer than usual because of a shortage of 
parachutes and competent packers.’157 The success rate for the Rhodesian parachute training 
was relatively high. ‘Twenty Rhodesians were awarded their parachute wings in a ceremony 
at Changi Airfield last week on completion of their parachute training course. They returned 
to Klang a few days ago and another group is now in Singapore undergoing training.’158 
There was at least one case where a Rhodesian failed parachute training due to injury. ‘A few 
weeks ago a further batch of Rhodesians qualified as parachutists in Singapore. One of the 
men, Tpr Clark, unfortunately injured himself while jumping, and failed to complete the 
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course. Another group of seventeen Rhodesians is at present undergoing training, and when 
they qualify about two thirds of the Rhodesian Squadron will have been trained.’159  
Not only were the Rhodesians being parachute trained, they also helped to pioneer 
experimental tree jumps that involved landing on the jungle canopy and abseiling to the 
ground, and search and rescue operations. ‘Since our last letter more than two-thirds of the 
Squadron have completed their Para Training. Volunteers have also taken part in 
experimental tree jumps and an experimental “Jungle Rescue Squad” Operation.’160 The 
Rhodesians were highly committed to parachute training, so much so even the squadron 
mascot was parachute trained and earned his wings. ‘At the passing out parade, at which 
General Stockwell presented the men with their wings, Sergeant-Major Mazamban, the 
Squadron mascot, who jumped eight times, was also ceremoniously presented with his wings. 
He has recently been present at rugby matches in which Rhodesians have participated, but, 
according to the scores, has not brought us much luck.’161 
‘C’ Squadron’s experiences with tropical disease 
 
Dare’s criticism that the Rhodesians were particularly susceptible to jungle diseases is 
puzzling. Certainly the Rhodesian sources are littered with references to tropical disease 
casualties. ‘During the operation, which lasted for six weeks, a number of men fell ill and 
were evacuated by helicopter, the guardian angel of jungle fighters.’ 162 There are 
however,cases where reports suggest that jungle diseases were not always prevalent. ‘This 
essential side of life has been, except for some minor ailments and skin diseases, very good. 
At the present time two members are recuperating in hospital with NYD (Not Yet Diagnosed) 
fever.’163 The illnesses described seem typical of the Malayan climate. ‘Tpr Gordon Young is 
still on excused duty, having had a spell in hospital for malaria.’164 There appears to have 
been a number of Malaria cases. ‘Tpr Nobby Clark is his old self once again. He had the 
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misfortune of contracting malaria on his first bash in the ulu.’165 Towards the end of 1951 a 
report rather forlornly read ‘Quite a number of men are in Hospital.’166 There were a number 
of accidental injuries to add to jungle illness casualties. ‘During the operation an officer, 
injured accidentally, and three troopers suffering from illness were evacuated by 
helicopter.’167  
The Rhodesians were sent on particularly long operations, sometimes spending months 
in the jungle and were not always well supplied from the air. It only seems natural that the 
troops were affected by tropical diseases. A number of Rhodesians were repatriated for a 
variety of medical reasons other than disease. Some casualties were far from accidental; ‘A 
few weeks after the start of the op Lt. Palich Cpl Soutar and Tprs Rheeders and Welensky 
were unfortunate in walking into a grenade booby trap. Rheeders had his dearest ambition 
fulfilled since he and the others had to be evacuated by helicopter. We doubt, however, 
whether he would like to re-live the same period. We know now definitely that all four have 
the utmost respect for 36 grenades.’168 This required reinforcements from Southern 
Rhodesian to make up these losses. ‘Reinforcements are due to arrive in Singapore from 
Rhodesia in the near future. These men will be most welcome, because during the past 
months the strength of the Unit has fallen far below the original number required, due to men 
being repatriated for medical reasons.’169 There seems nothing peculiar about the prevalence 
of tropical diseases amongst the Rhodesians, as all British units suffered casualties from 
tropical diseases when on jungle operations. It is unlikely that the other squadrons were in 
any way more resistant to jungle diseases than the Rhodesians. During the Second World 
War, Chindits spent a considerable amount of time in jungle conditions much the same way 
as extended operations undertaken by the Malayan Scouts. ‘Tropical infections were a 
problem in the Far East, especially among troops such as the Chindits with diseases such as 
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malaria, gastroenteritis, tropical ulcers and various forms of typhus.’170 Tropical disease was 
major concern for the British Army serving in Malaya: 
After the Second World War, infectious and tropical diseases continued to be a 
significant problem for British troops in conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency 
(1948–1960), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Borneo Confrontation (1962–1966) 
and the Aden Emergency (1963–1970). The most common problems seem to have 
been gastroenteritis, undifferentiated febrile illnesses, respiratory infections and skin 
diseases. The undifferentiated febrile illnesses included malaria, enteric fever, 
brucellosis, Q fever, leptospirosis, rickettsial infections (including typhus), various 
arboviruses (including dengue, sandfly fever, Japanese encephalitis) and hantavirus 
infection. These diseases were a particular concern because they are often clinically 
indistinguishable and diagnosis requires specialist microbiology investigations that 
are usually not available on deployments.
171
 
 
J Parhol, a medical officer in the Malaysian army contents that the Malay troops 
deployed on jungle operations had more of a natural resistance to diseases like leptosprirosis 
than Europeans in the British Army:  
 
British soldiers had the highest percentage of leptospirosis, the Americans 
12% and Malaysian soldiers only 5%. The lower incidence in Malaysian 
soldiers may be due to immunity derived from constant exposure to 
leptospirosis as shown in Table II. 12% of Malaysian soldiers had protective 
antibodies in this study.
172
 
Where does the perception come from that the Rhodesians were more susceptible than 
British troop to jungle diseases? According to medical studies, Europeans in general were 
susceptible to tropical disease. Nonetheless, while the Rhodesians may not have had a 
predisposition to towards tropical disease, reports show that there were many cases. 
Nonetheless, these cases can be linked to several factors. Firstly, the way Rhodesians were 
supplied, they did not always receive their drops timeously and reduced nutrition would have 
compromised their immune systems in conjunction with their physical exertions that required 
a high calorie intake. Secondly, they spent long operations in the jungle, Lieut. Col. T Archer 
of the Royal Army Medical Corps has pointed out a correlation between tropical diseases and 
the length of operations in the jungle.
173
 Thirdly, the Rhodesians were dealing with 
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conditions they were unfamiliar with and had to learn how to deal with cases of tropical 
disease in the jungle through training and experiencing it for themselves. Fourthly, in 
combined operations, the Rhodesians were often deployed in a ground role. ‘The difference 
between the British and the Americans is probably due to the mode of operations. The 
Americans are frequently airlifted while the British having to track on foot in the Malaysian 
jungles had greater exposure to contaminated water and a higher risk of infection.’174 The 
reports on Malayan Scout operations indicated that the other squadrons were often parachuted 
in as opposed to walking in, and this suggests that they were less exposed to the jungle in 
such operations. In such an operation, the ground troops would develop more cases of 
tropical illness than the troops that had been flown and air lifted into the operational zone. 
One should then hesitate to criticise the Rhodesian Squadron for medical casualties that 
RAMC officers would consider typical of the role and operations of the Rhodesian Squadron. 
Secondment of Rhodesians from combat duties 
 
The strength of the Rhodesian squadron was further reduced by the secondment of their 
troops for other duties. By the end of 1951 a report stated that of the Rhodesians ‘many have 
been detached to Signals, Provosts, etc.’175 Certain Rhodesians fancied themselves as military 
police; ‘Arthur Strong and Jock Laidlaw volunteered for Regimental Police duties and had 
hardly become acquainted with their duties when Jock fell out of a bus and had his eye all 
blackened! (Heard any good yarns lately?)’176 Members of the Rhodesian squadron were 
bemused by the secondment of certain comrades to the intelligence section of the Malaya 
Scouts. ‘Don Leech still had his raucous laugh and doesn’t let the trees get him down. With 
the usual Army idea of putting the wrong man in the wrong place, he had been transferred to  
the Intelligence Section.  Perhaps his sense of rumour will have a better chance to 
develop there, as it didn’t do too badly in the jungle when news was scarce.’177  
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Poor Quality Maps 
 
While the Rhodesians may have been better trained that previously asserted by other 
writers, the map writing section of the British Army certainly could have used with a trifle 
more drilling themselves. ‘The Power Line scheme was the first in which the Troop was 
employed in searching neighbouring hills for bandits, and was also the first time that a few 
members spent the night in the jungle, unintentionally. Another group had trouble with the 
little men who dash around putting hills in the wrong places, and ended by swimming in a tin 
mine water reservoir.’178 While this excerpt has a somewhat humorous tone, the little men are 
a reference to map makers. That being said a later report suggests the Rhodesians seconded to 
produce maps for the Malayan Scouts did not fare any better. ‘Basil Leak still puts down his 
portable tracks and rivers to upset our map reading.’179 
 
Concerns while on service 
 
While the reports do not mention the question of rates of pay, the Rhodesians are on 
record with one particular concern foremost in their minds.  ‘Their morale is high, and when I 
saw them as they set off for their new tour of duty their only concern was that those back 
home, not hearing from them, might cease to write. All letters that come for the men are 
dropped with their supplies, and although the men cannot answer them, the letters are always 
welcome. In fact, when retrieving parachutes in the jungle the only cry heard is: “Where is 
the Mail?”’180 While men could receive supplies and letters on patrol, there was no method 
for posting letters back until the men were at a base camp in conditions conducive to writing 
home. There was at least one Rhodesian with agricultural concerns. ‘Tpr Chris Fenton Wells 
still goes about wondering how he could possible get the ulu under his plow – there are times 
when he seems to have evil intentions on the parade ground, too!’181 
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Cultural Experiences 
 
The Rhodesian contingent was experiencing Asian culture and Malaya in particular for 
the first time and underwent a degree of culture shock and acclimatisation to the climate. 
‘Singapore is a city of extreme contrasts; a contrast between East and West, and filth and 
cleanliness. In their own homes the Chinese and Malays are very clean, although their 
sanitary system is rather primitive, but their villages bordering on Singapore itself are 
constantly enveloped in a stench of dried fish and unprocessed rubber. This conglomeration 
of smells especially on a very hot day can be pretty trying, and it is one of the things that we 
still have to get used to.’182 
Return of the Rhodesian Squadron 
 
The initial members of the Rhodesian Squadron finished their tour at the end of 1952. 
‘On November 8th G.O.C., General Stockwell inspected the Regiment. All Rhodesians 
awaiting repatriation paraded and the General spoke to each individual. He reminded them 
that everything possible was being done to speed their return. Since then December 30
th
 has 
been confirmed as the sailing date.’183 The reinforcements are believed to have stayed on 
until the end of their tour in 1953. 
‘C’ Squadron’s experiences of Resettlement 
 
It is doubtful whether the Rhodesians were involved a great deal in the resettlement of 
Chinese Squatters. However, reports suggest that they were involved in the resettlement of 
many of the Sakai tribesmen they encountered. Certainly judging from the following report, 
they were well versed in the resettlement concept of the Briggs Plan. ‘Under the Briggs Plan 
for Malaya, squatters who live in the jungle or in areas away from civilisation where they are 
able to supply the terrorists with food and clothing, are resettled in fences camps where they 
can be supervised and protected from the Communists. This is an expensive and protracted 
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undertaking, but it is showing results. Because of the strict control on food and medical 
supplied the bandits are finding it to be increasingly difficult to continue in the jungle without 
support.’184 Strategic resettlement of Malaya’s rural population was considered pivotal for the 
success of the British counterinsurgency campaign. During the Rhodesian Bush War, the 
Rhodesian government attempted to implement a resettlement program that was based on the 
Malayan example.  
 
Conclusion: 
It is evident from the sources that the ‘C’ Squadron had a highly active role within the 
22
nd
 SAS regiment (formerly Malayan Scouts). Though the Rhodesians only served with the 
SAS between 1951 and 1953, they bolstered the numbers of the Regiment when men were 
desperately needed to shore up the position of the regiment and develop its operational 
capability. The Rhodesian sources support Mackenzie’s assertion that ‘C’ Squadron would 
prove to be one of the most professional of the SAS squadrons.
185
 The British SAS left the 
title ‘C’ Squadron open after the Rhodesians left and maintained strong links with the 
Rhodesian SAS. This would suggest that the British SAS valued the Rhodesian contribution 
despite what appears largely unfounded criticism in the literature. ‘C’ Squadron was fully 
parachute trained before the first volunteers ended their tour, they also helped to pioneer 
experimental tree jumps and the development of jungle rescue operations. Jungle diseases 
were clearly a challenge for the Rhodesians. However, they were typically a challenge for 
any member of the security forces on any length of jungle operations. The evidence suggests 
that the Rhodesians suffered medical casualties due to the nature of their operations as 
opposed to having a predisposition in their constitution, as Dare Newell would have us 
believe. There has been some debate as to the effect the Malayan Scouts/22 SAS Regiment 
had on the outcome of the Emergency.  Finlan contends that ‘it was not the bedrock of British 
strategy; rather a complementary factor that accelerated the collapse of the communists.’186 
The 22
nd
 SAS facilitated this collapse through penetrating the jungle in a clandestine manner 
that conventional British units were largely incapable of. The SAS would gather intelligence 
that these more conventional forces and the RAF could act upon. ‘Thus ‘the SAS was able to 
                                                 
184 NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, The Malayan Campaign, 22 SAS ‘C’ Squadron, 
1951-1952. 
185 A. Mackenzie: Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), p. 61. 
186 A. Finlan: Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror, p. 30. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 71 
 
deny the enemy forces a safe haven, whilst providing the information and means for other 
British units to launch operations with a larger impact.’187  
Some Historians assert the Malayan Scouts had an insignificant effect on the Emergency. 
‘Historian John Newsinger has argued that the SAS contribution in Malaya was negligible, 
and points out that of the 6,398 Communist insurgents killed there, the SAS could only claim 
108.’188 Of that 108, the Rhodesians merely claimed a fraction. For Newsinger and others 
‘this demonstrates that the regiment played only a minor role.’189 This is a somewhat shallow 
and superficial judgement of the 22
nd
 SAS Regiment. The SAS played a crucial role in the 
successful contacts of the more conventional units of the British Security Forces. It follows 
that of the 6,398 communists insurgents killed, many of them could be attributed to the deeds 
of the 22
nd
 SAS Regiment. 
 Fitzgibbon states that ‘it is also true the SAS role was not central British strategy.’190 
Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations in Malaya 1950-1951, would 
beg to differ. ‘[….] 6. The primary task of the Army must be to destroy the bandits and jungle 
penetration.’191 The Malayan Scouts were formed specifically to meet this task. Briggs 
recommended that deep jungle penetration should be carried out by small groups supplied 
with actionable intelligence.
192
 The Malayan Scouts was structured specifically with this end 
in mind. Typically the Malayan Scouts patrolled the jungle in small groups often being 
guided by surrendered enemy persons. Briggs outlines the significant role of the Malayan 
Scouts and the Army in his report on the Malayan Emergency: 
5. Every Force at our disposal will be used in the offensive as under: 
A) The Army 
The Malayan Scouts and a few selected infantry companies are available for 
domination of bandit jungle haunts and courier routes. 
The Army as a whole should, I think, be used in the correct balance of 
interception on the jungle fringes and in co-operation with the Police within 
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the framework. I cannot stress too strongly with value of knowledge of the 
ground by the troop operating in the framework, that small parties are more 
effective and can cover more ground, and that positions of ambushes and 
movement of patrols should be unknown to the population as well as the 
bandits by use of surprise movement and deception.
193
 
The Army had a vital role in British strategy during the Malayan Emergency and the 
Malayan Scouts/22
nd
 SAS regiment along with other jungle worthy units were an 
indispensable cog without which the Army would not have been able to fulfil its role. 
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Chapter 3 
The Rhodesian African Rifle Tour to Malaya 1956-1958 
 
Introduction 
 
During the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian African Rifles forged a reputation as one 
of the most successful and battle hardened units. This can be attributed to their experiences 
during their Malayan Emergency tour. However, M. P. Stewart asserts that at the start of the 
Rhodesian Civil War, the RAR ‘committed a few tactical blunders that hurt its reputation.’194 
The Rhodesian military had expectations that the RAR would perform admirably against the 
Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas. Stewart outlines some of the tactical lessons from Malaya 
that proved unsuitable to Rhodesian bush warfare. Some examples were the carriage of only 
50 rounds of ammunition and the setting of weapons on fully automatic.
195
 Some ‘blunders’ 
cannot be attributed to the Malayan experience such as the use of inferior of junior leaders in 
the RAR at the start of the Rhodesian Civil War.  
One may ask what use the Malayan tour considering assertions that the tactics learnt 
were counterproductive in the Rhodesian theatre of operations: one posits that the value lay 
not in the knowledge acquired but rather the learning process that that entailed. The RAR in 
Malaya had to adapt to a novel way of war and this learning experience facilitated their 
successful adaptation to the conditions of the Rhodesian Civil War. Stewart can be 
challenged further by evidence that suggests RAR officers were instrumental in 
disseminating the Malayan Anti-Terrorist Manual (ATOM) to the Rhodesian military. A text 
that formed the basis of the Rhodesian military’s counter-insurgency tactical doctrine. It is 
most likely that an officer of the RAR brought back the 1958 3
rd
 Edition of the ATOM 
manual, featured in Jonathan Pittaway’s text on the Rhodesian SAS. Chapter 4 categorically 
confirms that this 3
rd
 edition was in fact the cornerstone of the Rhodesian Army’s ATOPS 
manual. This alone is cause enough to highlight the contribution of this small body of men to 
the Malayan Emergency that would in turn have shaped the course of the Rhodesian Civil 
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War. A more specific link to Rhodesia’s resettlement program is that the Second in 
Command of Guard Force, a unit raised to defend Protected Villages in Rhodesia, was a 
former RAR old Malaya hand, Brigadier Godwin. Godwin later became the commanding 
officer of Guard Force.  
 
Historiographical Review 
 
The RAR’s tour is conspicuous by its absence in much of the literature surveyed on the 
Malayan Emergency. However, there are some but often the RAR is missing from the orders 
of battle found in texts appendices. For the duration of its tour its abbreviation was 
provisionally altered to RhAR so not to be misperceived as the Royal Australian Rifles.
196
 
There are however, references to the King’s African Rifle Battalions and the Northern 
Rhodesian Regiment though even these too are rare. Often the references merely consist of a 
unit name and nothing more, lost in a paragraph or a list of units in the appendices.  To some 
extent the RAR’s tour has been largely forgotten or overlooked by much of the Malayan 
Emergency literature. There are a few writers who have deigned to comment on the use of 
African troops during the Emergency. Hoe and Morris have the following to say: ‘The latter, 
1
st
 (Nyasa) and 3
rd
 (Kenya) Battalions, King’s African Rifles and 1st Rhodesian Rifles, were 
normally only as good as their heavy complement of white NCOs and junior officers. The 
Fijians, by contrast, were splendid jungle troops.’197 According the Hoe, the quality of 
African troops is suspect and only made up for by its generous leavening of white junior 
leaders. Hoe implies through comparison with the Fijians that the Africans lacked fighting 
spirit and were not aggressive. One remark would be that this is a generalisation on the 
temperament of troops across many distinct African regiments; a remark that does not appear 
to be supported by any kind of solid evidence. It is curious that Hoe ignores the RAR’s 
meritorious service in Burma as part of Field Marshall William Slim’s 14th Army during 
World War 2.
198
 
That being said Richard Miers, the CO of the South Wales Borderers during their tour in 
Malaya, who worked with the RAR on a number of occasions and befriended the RAR CO Lt 
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Col Jock Anderson. Miers wrote a book detailing his and the Borderers experiences. There 
are several references to the RAR.  ‘The Rhodesian African Rifles had been operating 
alongside us for a long time. Their tough askari were eminently suitable for deep jungle 
work, and as a result they were employed almost exclusively in the more inaccessible places 
in the jungle where, but for their constant activity, the CT would have soon established a 
sanctuary for themselves.  The Rhodesians’ efforts were very valuable but unspectacular; it 
was a long time since they had actually met a CT.’ 199 Miers and his men held the RAR in  
high mutual esteem, so much so that Anderson and Miers applied for a formal military 
alliance between their respective units. This alliance was formerly approved by their 
respective Headquarters, governments and the Queen of England.
200
 In the Rhodesian Civil 
War discourse, there are references to the RAR’s service in Malaya.  
In 2011 Timothy Stapleton published the text African Police and Soldiers in Colonial 
Zimbabwe 1923-1980. Without intending to detract from Stapleton’s insightful research, 
there is a paucity of references to the RAR’s tour to Malaya. Of those few, one notable 
example was a statement by Corporal Nyasha. ‘On his way to Malaya with the RAR in 1956, 
Corporal Nyasha arrived at the port of Beira in Mozambique, where “I wondered what lofty 
buildings that were built on the water. Going closer to them I realized that they were ships. 
One which was a hundred storey building was the one we were going to sail in.”’201  
Bereft of substantial secondary sources from the Malayan Emergency literature the 
search for material was widened to the literaure of the Rhodesian Civil War. While the 
RAR’s tour to Malaya is often mentioned in a number of texts, it is rarely examined in any 
detail. However, texts that focus on the history of the RAR often have a chapter devoted to 
their Malayan tour.  
One such chapter is found in Alexander Binda’s Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian 
African Rifles and Its Forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment. The chapter has a 
chronological order, starting with the advance party of the RAR making its way to Malaya 
followed by the rest of the Battalion.  Binda’s chapter is rich in details of the operations men 
of the RAR were involved in and includes personal accounts of several of these patrols, 
focusing on those where the RAR made contact with MRLA guerrillas. These personal 
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accounts are invariably drawn from European officers who served with the RAR. Placed 
approximately in the middle and at the culmination of the chapter is a unique collection of 
photographs from the RAR Malaya Tour. The photos have detailed descriptions but are not 
convincingly integrated into the chapter. Potentially disturbing photographs are not mediated.  
Binda clearly had access to a significant collection of primary sources, the kind that were 
purged from archival collections in Zimbabwe prior to independence. Despite this rich 
collection, they are not interrogated thoroughly. There is a particular focus on the kill rates 
and successes of the RAR. Binda shows that the RAR in Malaya was deployed in deep jungle 
operations, in a similar manner the Rhodesian Squadron of the 22
nd
 SAS. While his 
introduction to the Malayan Emergency is simplistic, his explanation of the phase of the 
Emergency that the RAR found themselves in, is linked to the kind of operations in which 
they were deployed. Much like the SAS and other jungle companies of the early 1950s, the 
RAR had a harassing role designed to drive CTs into the jungle fringes for other conventional 
regiments to engage. The glaring hole in Binda’s chapter is a complete lack of sources from 
the African soldier’s perspective. This chapter and the work as a whole is very much based 
on European’s perceptions of the RAR and their perceptions of the black soldiers 
experiences. This does not invalidate the text but does mean it is a rather incomplete picture 
of the RAR. Masodja is highly reflective of the main primary source it is based upon, a 
manuscript on the history the RAR by Lieutenant-Colonel Kim Rule OBE.
202
 Rule’s 
manuscript was intended to be a short history of the RAR for new arrivals to the regiment.
203
 
Binda’s focus on kill rates, successes, patrols, decorations and the like form a counterfoil to 
Hoe and Morris’s disparaging comments on African troops in Malaya.  However, the limited 
nature of this counterfoil does little to answer the following historical questions. Why were 
the RAR relieving the Northern Rhodesian Regiment? Why were there colonial African 
Troops deployed to Malaya? From photographic evidence, the regimental band clearly went 
to Malaya, sundowners aside, what was their role in Malaya? Aside from battle lore, what did 
the African troops gain from their Malayan experience? Can Binda’s assertions be confirmed 
by independent sources? 
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The RAR and the Malayan Emergency 
 
 The RAR were notified in 1954 of their future deployment to Malaya planned for 
1956.
204
 Binda writes that once relieved by the return of the 2
nd
 Bn. KAR, the RAR began to 
train for their future deployment.
205
 The training is mentioned in passing and not developed 
further. Colonel Well’s papers are more forthcoming on details. After the RAR was informed 
of this development ‘the tempo of training stepped up and the number of volunteers 
increased. The accent was on anti-terrorist operations which included patrolling, ambush 
drills and a general toughening up.’206 This training appears to have carried on from 1954 and 
all the way through 1955. ‘The whole of 1955 was spent on vigorous exercises, forced 
marches and endless firing on the ranges.’207 The RAR trained for roughly two years before 
leaving for Malaya, this can be contrasted with the comparatively shorter time the Rhodesian 
Squadron trained for, before shipping out to join the Malayan Scouts in 1951.  Binda states 
that ‘while the advance party was being jungle-trained, the rest of the battalion embarked in 
HMT Empire Clyde at Beira and arrived in Singapore on 26 April 1956.’208 Col Well’s papers 
differ somewhat on that account ‘at the beginning of 1956 the advance party flew to Malaya 
to prepare for the battalion’s arrival whilst the main body marched to the Matopos and carried 
out its final exercise.’209 The RAR was thoroughly trained before leaving for Malaya, and the 
main contingent did more than simply climb on a ship as suggested by Binda. There was a 
farewell parade, attended by no less than the Governor General, Lord Llewellin who took 
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their farewell salute.
210
  Before leaving for the port of Beira, the RAR ‘marched through the 
streets of Bulawayo;’211 presumably with some degree of pomp and ceremony.   
Where the Rhodesian Squadron had been contributed by the Southern Rhodesian 
government, the RAR was a branch of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s Army and 
as such ‘was part of the Federation’s contribution to Commonwealth Defence.’212 This 
contribution was part of a wider operation where ‘for several years African battalions had 
been on operations in Malaya relieving each other in turn.’213 It was typical of the relief 
operations that an advance party would be sent by air to pave the way for the rest of a 
battalion. The tour of a serving battalion would overlap the relieving battalion by 
approximately two months. The serving battalion would assist her relief in jungle training and 
acclimatisation.
214
 African troops were used to reduce the need for British troops in the 
Malayan theatre and thus release the British for duty elsewhere or to form reserve 
formations.
215
 Malaya was only one of Britain’s many Cold War theatres. There were heavy 
demands at the time for man power in ‘Hong Kong, Korea, the Canal Zone, Kenya, and 
Cyprus.’216 With the bulk of the British Army deployed in Britain 244,000 out of 429,000 and 
with a forward deployment of 63,000 in West Germany to meet the Soviet threat
217
, Britain 
was ‘unable to deploy more than a small proportion of their own manpower in the counter-
insurgency role.’218 This forced a reliance on colonial troops for COIN campaigns. Over and 
above this military reason there were political and economic considerations. ‘Employing 
colonial regular soldiers to fight counter-insurgency campaigns had two advantages. If they 
became casualties the British electorate was, on the whole, indifferent, and their fate was not 
likely to generate the same level of concern in Britain as the deaths of British soldiers. They 
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were also cheaper.’219 In the course of the Malayan Emergency, East and Central African 
battalions were called upon.  
There is an implication in Binda’s work that the RAR’s jungle specific training only 
really began upon arrival in Malaya. The Singapore Free Press quotes the CO of the RAR 
‘Col Anderson said the regiment had done an intensive course in jungle warfare in 
Rhodesia.’220 It is conceivable that jungle training techniques would have been passed on by 
the Rhodesian Squadron and the men who continued to pursue a military career in the 
Rhodesian army. In the course of its two year tour the RAR was deployed in deep jungle 
operations that disrupted MRLA attempts to cultivate their own food, in conjunction with an 
on-going food denial operation. The effects of these operations were twofold: while the RAR 
rarely made contact with the enemy, MRLA fighters were invariably forced into the jungle 
fringes and ambushed by units in that patrol role. The other side was that the MRLA was 
forced to rely more on its contacts with the Min Yuen, thus creating intelligence aided the 
Special Branch (SB) in penetrating the Min Yuen. SB would then eliminate the Min Yuen in 
a manner that would force the MRLA members to rely on the SB informants for supplies. 
Consequently successful ambushes could be coordinated with the accruing information. Col 
Well’s papers note that ‘within three months of the battalion’s departure, Hou Lung, the 
South Malay Bureau chief surrendered with two hundred of his followers. Among the main 
reasons given for their surrender were the food-denial campaign combined with harassment 
in the deep jungle.’221 
Miers and Binda are in agreement on the jungle worthiness of the troops of the RAR. 
This assertion is corroborated by Col Well’s papers, ‘although only fourteen terrorists were 
eliminated the battalion’s kill to contact ratio was a good as any other unit at that time.’222 
These sources are however, more personally invested in the RAR and could be potentially 
accused of bias. This accusation can be more or less dismissed on the basis of three more 
impartial opinions. In Col Well’s papers and Binda’s appendices there is a list of decorations 
awarded to members of the RAR by the British Army and ‘approved by the Queen.’223 
OBE: Lt-Col J. Anderson  
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MBE: Maj C. B. McCullagh  
 
Military Medal: Warrant Officer II Muzerecho, Pisayi 
                            Warrant Officer II Khumalo, Alexander  
                            Corporal Lengu  
 
Mentioned in Dispatches: Maj F. S. Fitzgerald  
 Maj J. S. Salt  
 Maj W. A. Godwin 
 Capt W. T. D. de Haast  
 Capt J. R Shaw 
 Lt F. G. D. Heppenstall  
 Lt J. R. Wells-West  
 
 C in C’s Commendation: Pte Nyikavaranda224 
 
FARELF Command clearly had a degree of respect for the men and officers of the RAR. 
It is unlikely the RAR would have been decorated if its men were not thoroughly jungle 
worthy and disciplined. Hoe and Morris’s assertion that African troops were not aggressive 
does not correlate to the accounts surrounding the Military Medals awarded to three NCOs of 
the RAR. Warrant Officer Pisayi while leading a small patrol made contact with a group of 
MRLA guerrillas. He managed to shoot one man and proceeded to chase down and capture 
two guerrillas single handedly.
225
 Corporal Lengu supported by a small patrol charged a 
group of guerrillas during a patrol and managed to personally kill two.
226
 When given the 
opportunity soldiers of the RAR fought with élan. Overlooked by Binda; the story of Private 
Nyikavaranda’s commendation also shows that RAR soldiers could be cool headed under 
fire. ‘Whilst driving his truck on a re-supply run he was ambushed by terrorists. Although his 
windscreen was shattered by fire and a tyre punctured, he drove clear of the ambush and 
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whilst his escort returned the fire change the wheel and then resumed his journey.’227 In the 
course of earning the Military Medals, it does not appear white NCOs or officers were 
involved in the immediate contacts. Clearly RAR African Soldiers could use their initiative 
and were not reliant on European leadership for their martial qualities. ‘Warrant Officer 
Alexander Khumalo, broke off from a patrol he was leading with a single soldier to 
investigate some smoke shortly before nightfall. He succeeded in ambushing a minor group 
of three MRLA guerrillas.’228 Hoe’s wild charges of the Fijians, are not necessarily 
conducive to a successful engagement in the Malayan jungle.
229
 In conjunction with the 
British Military, some British politicians spoke highly of African troops that served in 
Malaya. In the House of Commons Mr Amery in a rather lengthy speech stated: ‘Opinions 
vary about the martial qualities of African troops, but experience in Malaya and Kenya in 
recent times has shown that they can be relied upon to give a very good account of 
themselves.’230 One Member of Parliament went so far as to refer to the RAR as a fine 
Regiment.
231
 
A newspaper article from the Straits Times in 1958 declares Tengku Abdul Rahmans 
appreciation for the RAR’s contribution to the Emergency. The Prime Minister ‘praised the 
1
st
 Bn. Rhodesian African Rifles, for its successes in the war against the terrorists.’232 
Rahman went on to state that ‘Troops from Central Africa have all achieved out-standing 
military successes and have also worthily gained the respect and friendship of Malaya’s 
armed forces and its people.’233 The article makes a more general comment on African troops 
counter to Hoe and Morris, ‘African troops have killed 60 terrorists and captured six since 
1951. They have been highly decorated.’ 234 
The RAR Regimental Band 
 
There is some mention of the RAR band’s activities in Malaya and several photographs 
in Masodja. There is however, more to the band’s ceremonial functions and entertainment at 
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sundowners that Binda mentions in passing. According to a set of newspaper cuttings in the 
Malayan Press, the RAR band was extensively involved in Malaya’s cultural scene. For 
example, there were band concerts that appeared to occur with some regularity. Titled 
‘Gardens Concert’ the article reads, ‘The regimental band of 1st Bn. Rhodesian African Rifles 
will play at the Singapore Botanic Gardens from 5 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. tomorrow.’235 The news 
cutting refers to a second concert some two weeks later at the exact same time and place.
 236
 
This would suggest that it may have been a regular performance slot for the RAR band. The 
band was also embraced working with charities. ‘The band of the 1st Bn., Rhodesian African 
Rifles, will arrive in Singapore from Kluang today specially to assist in a big charity function 
at the Singapore Cricket Club tonight.’237 According to this article the regimental band would 
be involved specifically as a dance band for a fund raiser in aid of SATA.
238
 SATA stands for 
The Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association. There is another article in The Singapore Free 
Press that explains that the band would also be playing music for a dress display as part of 
the function.
239
 The collation of these articles and Binda’s work shows that the RAR band 
was much more than a simple military band. That is to say that the band was versatile and 
multifunctional, and was not limited to military ceremonies. The band played at dance 
functions, evening concerts, Christmas concerts, light entertainment and sundowners, and 
adapted itself self to the needs of charity fundraising events. Something perhaps the Malayan 
public were pleasantly surprised by, as the band was initially ‘noted for the unusual way in 
which it sets Rhodesian war cries to modern rhythm.’240 
RAR Education in Malaya 
 
Stapleton’s text African Police and Soldiers, has investigated to some degree the 
education of the soldiers of the RAR. Nonetheless, there is no mention of any army education 
programs during the Malaya tour 1956-58. Binda has several references to education 
scattered through Masodja although they were not expounded upon. Binda’s only specific 
reference to education in Malaya is the mention of an education sergeant leading a patrol:  
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The battalion was in such deadly earnest that they ambushed the rail line at 
Bekok for seven successive nights. The patrols were led on the first night by 
the intelligence officer, on the second by the assistant adjutant, the medical 
officer and the regimental sergeant-major, on the third by the quartermaster 
and the ration sergeant, on the fourth by the regimental signals officer and the 
education sergeant, on the fifth by the pay sergeant and the intelligence 
sergeant, on the sixth by the orderly room warrant officer and, on the seventh, 
by the company sergeant-major of HQ company and the GD clerk. There was 
no result. Clearly the terrified CTs were not keen to try conclusions with such 
formidable opposition!
241
 
This is indicative of Masodja’s prime focus on purely combative military aspects of the 
RAR’s history. In 1957 a joint civil and military education scheme was launched to increase 
the Malayan people’s literacy. ‘Illiterate people in the Federation will soon be taught to read 
and write English – the Army way. Twelve adult education teachers from the Federation are 
now in Singapore for 13 days training in a new Army system of teaching English.’242 The 
course required practical teaching experiences in order to train these teachers, illiterate 
subjects would have been ideal and they were found within the RAR.
243
 ‘In Singapore the 
adult tutors have tough assignments as part of their training – teaching illiterate African 
soldiers.’ 244 The teaching methodology imparted to the education teachers involved a large 
degree of repetition. ‘The secret is the limited vocabulary taught to the students again and 
again till they understand fully before proceeding to other lessons.’245 The repetition 
technique was not limited to single lessons as there was a constant revision of knowledge 
imparted post the first lesson. ‘In this new method special emphasis is laid on revision and 
this helps a lot.’246 The news report reveals that originally only one African member of the 
RAR could speak English fluently. ‘They are taking an experimental course. The only one 
who speaks English is Warrant Officer E. S. Alexander Mzondo, 29, father of four.  Mzondo, 
A Matabele, joined the Army eight years ago after leaving the police. He has a fifth standard 
education.’ 247 It is not certain how many soldiers were enrolled in the ‘experimental’ course, 
there were however, plans to teach every African soldier of the RAR how to speak, read and 
write a certain level of English. ‘He will help Sgt. Peter Baker, 19, a national serviceman in 
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the RAEC, (Royal Army Education Corps) to educate the whole battalion of 800.’ 248 One 
surmises that the Malaya tour marked a watershed moment for education in the RAR, and any 
further education and training programmes after their Malayan Tour would have built upon 
the foundations laid there. A prevalent feature of any army was, and continues to be, the 
education of its recruits. 
Conclusion 
 
This short study of the RAR has provided some degree of insight into the RAR’s 
Malayan tour and illuminated aspects of their deployment that have been neglected in the 
historical literature. Of particular significance is the education program that Rhodesian 
African soldiers were enrolled in during their Malaya tour. The education of the African rank 
and file would have played an important role in the RAR’s adaption and training for modern 
bush warfare. Their improved learning capabilities would have been instrumental during 
training for helicopter and para-troop fireforce operations, and in skills related to modern 
weaponry and counter-insurgency tactics. The Malayan tour would have made RAR officers 
more amenable to other forms of counter-insurgency doctrine. As a result the RAR officers 
were opened to learning new and more appropriate tactical methods that were to be highly 
successful in the Rhodesian Civil War.  Major M Stewart author of a United States Army 
Staff College study on the RAR pointed out a flaw in his own work. ‘The critical missing 
piece of this research is the perspective of the black soldiers who served in the regiment.’249 
The same could be said of the historical literature as a whole. There has been a dearth of 
research on the RAR African soldiers’ perspective from interviews or even written sources.  
The chapter on the RAR tour in Malaya has been limited by a lack of primary source 
documents and unless access can be granted to the remaining private collections, interviews 
of RAR veterans may be the only way to gain their insight into their experiences of Malaya. 
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Chapter 4 
Malayan Link to Rhodesian Civil War 
When the Malayan Scouts returned to Southern Rhodesia, they not only brought back 
their experiences of the campaign but also several miscellaneous items. Pittaway, who was 
the ‘adjutant of the Regiment and was in charge of the last section to return to Rhodesia,’250 
took back with him: 
 The ATOM Manual 
 A J Pack (the soldier’s personal medical pack) 
 A 24-hour ration pack 
 A set of 44 pattern webbing 
 Jungle greens clothing, boots, hat, poncho and hammock251 
 
According to Pittaway, a direct result of this was that 24-hour ration packs were 
introduced in the Rhodesian Army, ‘and 44 pattern webbing and equipment came into use.’252 
As important as these improvements were, the ATOM manual was the more significant. The 
acronym refers to the ‘The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya’ manual. 
Templer, Director of Operations (1952-1954), instigated the creation of this manual to collate 
the considerable experience of jungle fighting that had been built up in the years preceding 
his appointment. ‘At the tactical level it described a series of drills that could be employed by 
units operating in the jungle to establish jungle bases, carry out silent patrols, and mount and 
avoid ambushes.’253 There were three editions, the photograph of the ATOM manual in 
Pittaway’s book is not of the manual he allegedly brought back when he left in 1953, the 
photograph is of the 1958 3
rd
 edition. It is most likely that that 3
rd
 edition was brought back 
by officers of the 1
st
 Bn. RAR ‘ATOM codified how through a policy of ‘the close control of 
populated areas such as towns, new villages, kampongs and estate lines’, implemented by 
means of population control measures and food denial operation, it was possible to produce 
an operational strategy that could employed to defeat a largely rural insurgency.’254 
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Pittaway asserts that ‘as a result of ATOM, the Rhodesian Army later published its own 
manual based on local conditions called ATOPS (Anti-Terrorist Ops).’255 This categorically 
proves the military link between the two conflicts and illuminates the extent to which the two 
Rhodesian Tours during the Malayan Emergency influenced the Rhodesian Security Forces, 
during the civil war, on matters of strategy and tactical doctrine. ‘ATOM provided a more 
detailed gloss on how the Special Branch and military intelligence should co-operate, 
recommending the establishment of joint operations rooms manned by the police and military 
intelligence officers.’256 ATOM proved instrumental in laying the doctrinal foundations for 
inter-force cooperation in the Rhodesian Security Forces. During the first phase of the war, 
the Rhodesian Army relied on the BSAP for actionable intelligence. ‘The major innovation in 
ATOM, repeated in A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations published in 1954, and in 
subsequent army-wide manuals, was to insist that what had begun as an innovation to 
harmonize day-to-day tactical policies should be employed to harmonize policy at the 
political and strategic levels.’257 The RSF system of Combined Operations (COMOPS) and 
Joint Operations Commands (JOC)
258
, were based upon the Malayan Joint Operations Centre 
model and State War Executive Committees. (SWEC) 
259
 
 
What follows, is a structural comparison and a more specific comparison of 
corresponding sections of the two manuals that will serve as evidence that the Malayan 
Manual was used to write the Rhodesian one.  
Structural Comparison of ATOM and ATOPS 
 
The Rhodesian manual is divided into chapters without requisite page numbers, in much 
the same way as the Malayan. The difference being that the Malaya has separate page 
numbers for each chapter. For example chapter I, page one to eight and chapter three, page 
one to sixteen, while the Rhodesian manual lacks any kind of page numbering system. The 
Rhodesian manual has a short preface followed by a set of definitions. The Malayan manual 
has three forewords, followed by a set of abbreviations and then definitions. Where the 
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Malayan has 23 chapters, the Rhodesian has 17. The body of the text of the Rhodesian 
Manual is formatted in an almost identical manner to the Malayan. The main difference is the 
use of italics in the Rhodesian one for sub headings.  Five of the Rhodesian chapters correlate 
directly to the chapter headings of the Malayan one in terms of title. This however, is 
deceiving as content from multiple Malayan chapters can be found within these specific 
chapters and within chapters with titles that do not bear resemblance to ATOM Chapter titles. 
It follows that the Rhodesian Army copied much of the structure and format of the ATOM 
manual in the creation of their ATOPS manual.  
It is interesting to note that the writers of ATOPS were not only inspired by ATOM, but 
they copied ATOM liberally. Initial analysis indicates that entire paragraphs and sentences 
were lifted verbatim from ATOM and inserted in the ATOPS manual. The ATOM manual was 
essentially pruned to suit the Rhodesian context and the military’s approach to COIN. Once 
pruned, it formed a skeleton structure for ATOPS and was expanded upon using the 
Rhodesian Army experiences of the Rhodesian Civil War, suiting a rural African context as 
opposed to that of the Malayan Jungle. Excerpts from ATOM were not always used 
sequentially presenting a slight challenge in tracing parts of the Rhodesian manual to ATOM. 
The methodology used by the writers of ATOPS is alien to that of the historical discipline. 
None of the verbatim ATOM excerpts are referenced. However, ATOPS has gone well 
beyond simply copying ATOM. ATOM formed the foundation of ATOPS and many sections 
that are not lifted directly, are paraphrased or written in the spirit of ATOM. Many of the 
pruned chapters involve information specific to Malaya, the Emergency, the climate and 
British Security Force operating procedure. Other chapters such as the one on Tracking Dogs 
have been copied liberally but then expanded upon using Rhodesian Security Force 
experiences. The end result is a synthesis of the respective doctrines of the Malayan 
Emergency and Rhodesian Civil War Security Forces. This doctrinal link is grounds for 
further study in comparing SANDF anti-terrorist manuals, and the Kenyan Emergency (1952-
1960) manuals with that of the Rhodesians to identify influences in their respective military 
doctrines. Rhodesian troops served in Kenya while South Africa had a strong if clandestine 
military presence in Rhodesia for much of the Civil War. 
The manual is a pdf download of the Rhodesian Security Forces ATOPS manual circa 
1975. It is missing the last three chapters, Chapters 15, 16 and 17; Land/Air Operations, 
Miscellaneous, and Logistics in COIN respectively. The following analysis is on Chapter 7 
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on the use of dogs Section. The section has been focused exclusively to facilitate an 
investigation as to the extent of the influence of ATOM upon the ATOPS manual.  
        
Comparative Analysis of Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in 
ATOPS 
 
This section of the manual is aimed at the infantry commander. It is essentially a 
summary on the use of dogs in the rural Rhodesian theatre of operations. This summary is 
intended as a guide for commanding officers (COs) as opposed to detailed instructions on all 
aspects of the use of dogs in anti-terrorist operations. The ATOPS writers with this aim in 
mind pruned sections from Chapter XX specifically relevant to dog handlers such as 
instructions on how handlers should advise his commander and their responsibilities towards 
the war dogs, for example kennel management,
260
 feeding on patrol
261
 and veterinary notes 
including first aid.
262
 The ATOPS terminology has a distinctive feature to the ATOM manual. 
Where the ATOM reads CT i.e. Communist Terrorist, ATOPS will either read ‘the enemy’ or 
‘terrorist.’ All of the ATOM appendices have been omitted; these being Appendix A for 
Chapter XX on ‘Advice to Dog Handlers.’263 This advice is literally a Don’ts and Do’s list on 
how to handle a military dog.
264
 The ATOPS section five has lifted paragraphs from two 
ATOM chapters. The second Chapter XXI is on tracking, and so the sections specific to 
tracking dogs have been incorporated in ATOM.  For the most part the ATOM sections on 
precise tracking tactics have been omitted. It is relatively clear that much of this section has 
been lifted verbatim from the ATOM manual. There are a number of segments where the 
authors of ATOPS have paraphrased and summarised parts of the ATOM manual. The major 
points of interest are the original pieces in this section of the ATOPS manual. 
 
The first point is the kinds of dogs used by the Rhodesian Army. ATOM refers to merely 
Patrol and Tracking dogs. ATOPS on the other hand goes on to list mine detection dogs, 
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guard dogs and dogs for crowd control.
265
 Mines were a pernicious feature of the Rhodesian 
Civil War. Both the guerrilla armies and the security forces made use of anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines. Hence there was a need for dogs trained in mine detection to scout ahead 
of the main body of a unit. The title Mine Detection Dog, would suggest a focus on mines 
however, these dogs could detect all manner of dangerous objects beneath and above the 
ground. Guard dogs feature in the ATOPS section as they were used to improve security at all 
kinds of military and civilian installations. Culturally speaking the Rhodesian Africans had 
inordinate fear of guard dogs and thus were a useful counter measure to guerrilla threats. 
While the ATOPS section refers to Crowd Control Dogs, the type is not expounded upon.
266
 
One surmises that dogs were used for crowd control primarily by the British South Africa 
Police (BSAP) and less so by the Rhodesian Army. The sub section on dog pointing has been 
expanded by several other signs of dog pointing. This is perhaps to make sure that a 
commander has a clear idea of what the behaviour of a trained dog may mean. The subsection 
on dog uses has been expanded to reflect the types of trained dogs used. There is no overt 
mention of the use of dogs in ambushes unlike the ATOM manual.
267
 The sections on the 
factors that adversely affect tracking have be expanded to include bush fires and animal 
scents. Bush fires are typical of the Rhodesian climate and not only choke up the air but can 
destroy the scent on the ground and the scrub.
268
  
 
Point 7 after Operational Employment, advises that the use of dogs for tracking purpose 
must be kept secret from the enemy to keep countermeasures to a minimum.
269
 In the ATOM 
manual there are considerable sections on counter measures used for Malayan CTs that have 
been omitted by ATOPS. Point 8 is not lifted directly from the ATOM manual however, it is 
possible to trace the theory on the use of tracker dogs during night and follow up operations 
outlined there, to the tactical doctrine in the ATOM as regards night and follow up operations 
involving human soldiers. The section on Mine Dogs is an original one at least according to a 
comparison with the ATOM manual. Mines were used by both the nationalist guerrilla armies 
and the Rhodesian Security Forces and featured prominently during the Rhodesian Civil War. 
In the case of the Malayan Emergency, mines were employed by the MRLA on a smaller 
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scale and British Security Forces don’t seem to have used dogs extensively in a mine 
detection role. The Guard Dog section of ATOPS is technically an original section although it 
may have been inspired by excerpts in the ATOM manual on the use of dogs in support of 
sentries.
270
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The use of War Dogs component of the Rhodesian Anti-Terrorist Operations Manual 
reflects how the majority of the manual has been constructed. ATOPS is structured in much 
the same the ATOM manual was. Considerable excerpts have been lifted directly from the 
ATOM manual while there is also evidence that suggests that parts of the ATOM manual have 
been summarised and paraphrased in conjunction with the verbatim quotations. The ATOPS 
manual is not devoid of original content. Doctrine of the jungle campaign can only be 
adapted so far to a Bush context; much of the original content is a result of Rhodesian 
Security force experiences and realities. That being said, there are grounds to compare the 
ATOPS manual with training manuals used by the British Military in Kenya to ascertain if 
any of the original Rhodesian contents has been influenced by military doctrine from the 
Kenya Emergency. To a certain degree South Africa was militarily involved in the Rhodesian 
civil war. It follows that a comparison between the ATOPS manual and South African 
National Defence Force manuals would prove instrumental in investigating the extent to 
which South African experiences of the Rhodesian Civil War influenced their own doctrine 
and the South African Border War (1966-1989) specifically.  
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Chapter 5 
Protected Villages: 
Introduction 
 
Research on the two Rhodesian tours to Malaya has revealed that there is no evidence to 
suggest that either of the Rhodesian units had direct experience of large scale Malayan 
resettlement schemes. However, the Malayan Scouts were involved in the resettlement of the 
Orang Asli on a small scale.  There were also indirect experiences that had significance. 
Malaya’s ‘New Villages’ scheme was the corner-stone of the British counter-insurgency 
strategy and military campaign framework. Hence, the officers of the Rhodesian units would 
have been familiar with strategic resettlement concepts, just as much as they were familiar 
with idea of a Director of Operations and Joint Operations Command,
271
 even though their 
command experience of Malaya would not have been beyond Special Force squadron and 
regimental level. ‘A number of officers who attained key positions within the Rhodesian 
Security Forces had served in Malaya during the Emergency.’272 Not least was the 
commander of the Rhodesian Army Lieut. General Peter Walls who later became of the Chief 
of Combined Operations (COMOPS), and Lieut. Colonel Ron Reid Daley, commanding 
officer of the Selous Scouts. The Rhodesian units in Malaya would have worked within the 
British military campaign framework that was constructed around a resettlement strategy and 
where ‘New Villages’ were a source of actionable intelligence. 
 The Malayan ‘clique’ in the Rhodesian Security Forces during the course of the 
Rhodesian Civil War, became convinced of similarities between their conflict and that of the 
Malayan Emergency.
273
 The Rhodesian government and military conducted ‘studies of the 
British concept of protected villages in Malaya and of Portuguese "Aldeiamentos" in 
Mozambique and Angola.’274 It is likely that the Malaya clique within the Rhodesian Army 
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instigated these studies and supported their findings to the extent that resettlement formed a 
part of the Rhodesian military’s cordon sanitaire defensive strategy. Initially Internal Affairs 
(INTAF) was responsible for Rhodesia’s resettlement scheme and a former British Army 
officer who had served in Malaya was responsible for the training of INTAF security 
personnel. INTAF was overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of Rhodesia’s resettlement 
program and a separate military formation known as Guard Force was raised to provide 
garrisons for Rhodesia’s Protected Villages. The deputy commander was ‘Brigadier W.A. 
Godwin DMM, OBE who had seen service with the British army in Malaya,’275 the Brigadier 
later became the commanding officer of Guard Force. The source quoted is somewhat 
misleading, in that Brigadier Godwin was in fact a company commander of the RAR during 
its Malayan tour 1956-58. Hence his service was as a Federal Rhodesian soldier as opposed 
to a British soldier. 
The following chapters adhere to a comparative analytical methodology. The aim is to 
investigate Britain’s resettlement program in Malaya, and illustrate to what extent it both 
informs and differs from Rhodesia’s Protected Village program. The respective governments 
of Rhodesian and Malaya employed a similar resettlement strategy within remarkably 
different military socio-political and international contexts. It is hoped that a comparison will 
develop further insight into why resettlement was so successful in Malaya and ended in abject 
failure in Rhodesia.  
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The origins of population control and concentration 
 
The concept of transferring Chinese squatters into resettlement areas was by no means a 
novel idea. At the turn of the 20
th
 century “the idea of the concentration camp was invented 
almost simultaneously by the Germans and British in the same region of the colonial world: 
in southern Africa.”276 The French had invented barbed wire in 1865 and subsequently by 
1874 America had begun to mass produce it for bovine agricultural purposes. This “inspired 
the construction of vast, cheap internment camps”277 by the British and Germans in the South 
Africa War (1900-1902) and the Herero War (1904-1907). “In the Second Boer War (1900-
1902), Lord Kitchener led a pitiless ‘scorched earth’ campaign to flush out Boer insurgents – 
burning their farms, slaughtering their livestock, destroying their crops, poisoning wells and 
evicting their families.”278 Kitchener isolated the Boer soldiers from civilian support and 
destroyed their supply stockpiles. “The British herded at least 150,000 refugee women and 
children into hastily improvised internment camps – enclosed by mile upon mile of barbed 
wire.”279 There was an attempt by Kitchener to name these temporary population centres 
‘camps of refuge.’280 However, liberals such C. P. Scott and John Ellis who criticised his 
methods of population control, used the term ‘concentration camp.’281 Despite these historical 
roots, it would be a gross simplification to define like Hale has, a Malayan Protected Village 
as a concentration camp.  
The role of Population in “Peoples War” 
According to Blaufarb, Mao’s precepts on the ‘Peoples War’ can be reduced to six main 
principles. It is clear from the initial three that the local populace of the target state plays a 
pivotal role in such a conflict. “First the doctrine insists on the priority of politics in all 
aspects of insurgency and especially the supremacy of the political organisation over the 
military.”282 Therefore the political objectives take priority over military ones and the 
guerrilla armed forces also act in conjunction with them. “This leads to a second basic 
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precept of the Maoist approach, the view that the conflict is essentially one for the support 
and control of the population. Once gained that support and control does two things: it 
provides many of the essential sinews of war, men, money, food and other supplies and – of 
critical importance – intelligence.”283 Therefore rather than attempting to capture a physical 
objective like a bridge or a piece of territory, Maoist inspired insurgents endeavour to subvert 
the population through a variety of coercive means.  
Winning the population to one’s cause does not only reap the benefits referred to but ‘at 
the same time, it deprives the government side of these same benefits, of which – once again 
– intelligence is critical. Although the government, by virtue of its control of the cities and 
other assets, can maintain an army in the field, it will be for lack of timely information on the 
enemy, a blind army, doomed to thrash about futilely without being able to bring its superior 
firepower to bear on the insurgents.’284 As a result the politicisation and organisation of the 
rural population develops into a priority activity of Maoist schooled insurgents
285
 ‘and one in 
which they may develop formidable skills.’286 So vital are the people to asymmetric conflict 
that Kiss maintains that “according to Mao’s theory of multiphased guerrilla war, thorough 
indoctrination and mobilisation of the people must precede the first combat operations 
(sic).”287 For the belligerents in asymmetric conflict, the “people” are  double edged sword. 
They are both an Achilles heel and a vital part of the route to victory. 
Population control in COIN theory 
‘Population control’ is a response by counter insurgents to Maoist inspired war amongst 
the people in a rural setting. The target population is seen as ‘an ideal source of food, money, 
arms and information’288 for the insurgents. The concentration of rural populations is seen as 
a way of cutting them off from the insurgents physically in order to deprive them of support 
and to facilitate government administration.
289
 The physical isolation is intended not only to 
reduce support but also to restrict the flow of recruits and politically isolate the insurgents 
from the population.
290
 Thompson outlines three goals that have shaped COIN doctrine. ‘The 
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first a prerequisite for the other two, is the protection of the population.’291 ‘The second 
object of strategic hamlets is to unite the people and involve them in positive action on the 
side of the government.’292 The third object of strategic hamlets is this development in the 
social, economic and political fields.’293 Far from being a purely military measure, population 
control forms a part of the hearts and minds approach towards a civilian population. The idea 
being, that once the villagers are protected, provided with amenities and start to be 
economically and politically integrated, they will wholeheartedly assist the government 
against the insurgents. The water that Mao’s fish swim in amongst the reeds will essentially 
be drained until the fish can no longer survive. COIN theory on population control is a 
realisation that an internal war cannot be won solely by purely military methods 
 
Overview of Resettlement in Malaya 
 
The resettlement programme of the British administration in Malaya can be divided into 
two phases. The first phase ran from 1949 to 1952 totalling nineteen operations. Of these 
nineteen, sixteen took place in 1949. These operations entailed the uprooting of 40,000 
squatters. 26,000 were deported while the rest were held in detention camps or transported 
from one place to another. The government’s attempt to deal with the squatters entailed 
repressive legislation and the destruction of squatters’ crops and homes as part of their 
punitive operations.
294
 In January 1950, a government Squatter Committee recommended 
resettlement as a solution to the vast numbers of squatters on the jungle fringes. While the 
Federal government accepted the committees finding, resettlement was left as a state 
responsibility.
295
 20 squatter resettlement schemes were planned or started from 1949 to 
1950. However, Malay State governments did not have the will or the capacity to carry them 
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out successfully. 10 schemes were abandoned while the rest were absorbed into the 2
nd
 phase 
of resettlement.
296
  
The 2
nd
 phase was initiated by Sir Harold Briggs who became Malaya’s first Director of 
Operations in May 1950.
297
 General Briggs made resettlement the cornerstone of his strategy 
to defeat the Malayan Communist guerrillas. Thus, ‘under Briggs the resettlement 
programme became the responsibility of the Federal Government.’298 The programme 
comprised of two processes, relocation and regroupment. ‘Relocation meant the shifting of 
dispersed rural dwellers, whether squatters or legitimate settlers, to prepared fortified sites 
often remote from their existing homes.’299 It is estimated that 573,000 individuals were 
resettled in 480 “New Villages” from 1950 to 1960. ‘Regroupment meant the transfer of 
dispersed labourers and their families and dwellings to some fortified point of concentration 
either on the property of close to it.’300 Approximately 650,000 persons were concentrated in 
this manner. Of these ‘71.5 percent of them were on estates, 21.5 percent on mines and the 
remainder in factories, sawmills and timber Kongsis.’301 
Overview of Resettlement in Rhodesia 
 
The Rhodesian government’s first attempts at resettling rural villages began in 1972 in 
the Zambezi Valley and in the Northern tribal areas. No-go zones were established in the 
valley and along a 300 km stretch of Rhodesia’s Northern Mozambican border. Four 
protected areas were declared in the Zambezi valley, Gudza and Mukumbura TTLs. 8,000 
villagers were transferred. However, these protected areas were not protected villages, and 
they constituted simply the concentration of the rural population ‘around main centres of each 
reserve to facilitate movement for the Security Forces.’302 Initially resettlement was the 
prerogative of the Department of Internal Affairs and the Armed forces were not involved.
303
 
This changed with the commencement of Operations Overload and Overload Two. In 1974 
the army insisted that the Department of Internal Affairs should resettle some 50,000 
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villagers in the Chiweshe TTLs into 21 PVs as part of a military operation. This was followed 
by Operation Overload Two late 1974 where 16500 villagers were moved into 13 PVs.  
 
Rhodesian resettlement followed two forms, Protected Villages (PV) and Consolidated 
Villages. PVs were fenced and guarded, with the intention of providing amenities. 
Consolidated villages were the regrouping of villages in a central location without any 
fencing or substantial resources committed to them. It was a more cost effective version of 
the PV. ‘By early 1976 three strategic areas could be distinguished: the Zambezi valley, the 
tribal areas on the plateau in the north east of Rhodesia, and the remoter tribal areas in the 
north east and east which are farther from the capital and white settlement that the tribal areas 
in the second category.’304 At its height ‘the total population gathered into PVs is estimated at 
around 750,000 African in 200 villages.’305 In 1978, with the advent of the internal 
settlement, the transitional government subsequently insisted on the opening of PVs to induce 
residents to accept the internal settlement. Approximately 100 PVs were opened, until the 
practice was halted abruptly due to an immediate deterioration of the local security situation. 
In the case of every village that was opened, the inhabitants returned to their prior homes and 
land. 
 
Malaya Protected Villages: 
 
Reasons for Resettlement in Malaya 
Brief History of Squatters in Malaya Pre-World War 2 
 
The majority of squatters in Malaya before the Emergency were Chinese and are 
therefore directly linked to Chinese immigration into Malaya. While Chinese formed the 
majority of immigrants, there was also a degree of Indian immigration to provide labour for 
rubber estates. The origins of Chinese immigration to Malaya date back to the 15
th
 Century 
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when Chinese settled in parts of the Malacca Empire. Subsequently over the next 500 years 
or so there were several waves of Chinese who immigrated to the Malayan peninsula from 
Mainland China and other regions of Chinese settlement. With the culmination of the Perak 
war of 1876 and encouraged by the British Authorities in Malaya, a trickle over the years 
interspersed with waves transformed into a flood. Despite the influx of Chinese, Chinese 
squatters were ‘generally rare till the outbreak of the First World War which dislocated trade, 
stopped development projects on newly opened rubber estates, and consequently threw a 
number of persons out of employment.’306 While a considerable number of the newly 
unemployed were sent back to their country of origin namely China, many chose to occupy 
rural land illegally.  
Before the Emergency, it was practically impossible for immigrants to acquire land 
legally. This was due to the fact that ‘all unalienated land was vested in the Malay Rulers and 
land titles in each state were granted only on the authority of the Ruler in Council.’307 Much 
of this unalienated land was reserved for Malays only. The process for immigrants to acquire 
land in a legal manner was long and painstaking. It required about 100 procedures before a 
land title could be granted.
308
 In comparison, immigrants found squatting to be a great deal 
simpler than the legal route to land tenure. According to Sandhu squatting was not only 
simpler but also had other advantages. ‘(a) no rents to pay; (b) no restrictions on crops to be 
grown; (c) no care of land; (d) no governmental procedures to bother with and finally, 
freedom to exploit the land till exhausted, and freedom to move to newer pastures.’309 There 
was a risk of being discovered by the authorities. However, the lack of personnel or 
government policies meant that neither the government nor the private owners took measures 
to prevent squatting. Shortly after World War 1, the economy in Malaya had improved and 
the squatter population may have decreased to a certain degree. However, the advent of the 
great depression from 1929 through the 1930s and the slump in tin prices, led to a massive 
movement of Chinese into the Malayan countryside to try and survive by living off the land. 
The squatter population began to decrease once more as trade started to pick up again. 
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Therefore the squatter problem was not only linked to the mainly Chinese immigration but 
also the economic conditions in Malaya and the world economy.  
 
Effect of World War 2 on the Squatter Population 
 
During the course of the Second World War, the squatter population increased 
dramatically. The Battle for Malaya and the semi-successful scorched earth policy attempted 
by the British forces during their fighting retreat across the peninsula, destroyed much of 
Malaya’s economic infrastructure. The ensuing Japanese Occupation from 1942 to 1945 
fundamentally altered economic patterns that dislocated labour and encouraged mass 
migration from towns into rural areas.
310
 Chinese immigration was on the rise before World 
War 2 even with limits imposed upon male immigration. Conversely, there were no limits on 
female immigration until 1938. ‘Malaya experienced a migrational gain of 190,000 Chinese 
women during the 1934-38 period.’311 While many of these women found agricultural or 
industrial employment, the majority also married squatters, therefore leading to a further 
increase in the squatter population.  
During the Japanese occupation illegal immigration into Malaya became rampant, the 
majority of whom were Chinese. As alluded to earlier, the Japanese Occupation had a 
disastrous effect on living conditions in Malaya. Tin and Rubber production declined to such 
a degree that it led to wide scale unemployment. Many male Chinese were rounded up and 
executed out of hand or pressed into forced labour and sent to work on the Siamese Death 
Railway.
312
 This and the combination of the inflation of food prices and a practically non-
functional Japanese food rationing system resulted in ‘a general exodus from the towns as 
people tried to put as much space between themselves and starvation and the Japanese.’313 As 
part of a ‘grow more food’ policy, the Japanese Occupiers also encouraged the illegal 
occupation of land to take pressure off food supply.
314
 With the surrender of the Japanese in 
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1945 and the return of British rule to Malaya, many squatters returned to the towns. 
Nevertheless many of the squatters from the occupation era found agricultural production 
profitable enough to remain as squatters. As the economy began to revive some even found 
part time work as tin miners or rubber tappers but they still remained squatters.
315
  ‘There 
were more than 300,000 squatters in Malaya in 1948 – more than double the pre-war 
figure.’316  
 
The type of land that squatters inhabited 
 
For the most part squatters illegally settled on vacant state land; such as the Forest 
Reserves, the Malay Reservation Areas, agricultural and mining areas.  They also settled on 
private land held under title, one prime example being land from Rubber Estates. ‘The total 
area occupied by squatters under this head was estimated to be about 70,000 acres in 
1949.’317  
 
Origins of the Whole Scale Resettlement of Squatters 
 
The call by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Brigg, in a plan known as the Briggs plan for 
squatters to be resettled on a major scale was not a new idea. Post World War 2, the illegal 
squatters were considered an administrative problem that should be dealt with at a state level. 
This problem was one that State administration were reluctant to confront comprehensively 
as they were saw the need for the food produced by squatter farmers; despite the damage the 
squatters were inflicting on the environment and the illegal nature of their settlements. As a 
result the problem persisted until it became a security concern as the MCP began a 
communist insurgency against the British Administration in Malaya. A State of Emergency 
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was declared in June 1948 ‘and a military campaign was mounted to eliminate the 
Communist rising.’318 
 The squatters were identified by the Federal government as ‘the principal factor which 
enables armed terrorists in the Federation to retain their numerical strength and mobility is 
the direct and indirect support which they continue to receive or exact from certain sections 
of the population. This support may be in the form of victuals and other supplies, voluntary or 
involuntary recruits to replace casualties in the terrorist gangs, forced subscriptions or 
information about the movement of the Security Forces.’319 Much of this support was coerced 
from many squatters by violence or merely the threat of it. ‘Great numbers of the squatters 
were enrolled in the Min Yuen (“Mass Organisation”), the fifth column of the MCP, to act as 
spies, couriers, money collectors food-suppliers, propagandists and general agents for the 
armed forces in the interior.’320 This fifth column was by no means a minor security issue. 
The Min Yuen were a major obstruction in the path to victory for the Security Forces. ‘They 
reported every move of the Security Forces to the guerrillas thereby frustrating their efforts to 
get to grips with the “enemy”.’321 It was soon realised by the authorities that the squatter 
problem had to be solved. ‘But at this stage the Government had no positive solution. It could 
only pass more repressive legislation, uproot thousands of squatters, destroy their crops, burn 
their homes, transport them hither and thither or herd them into detention camps prior to 
shipping them back to their country of origin.’322  
One example of this repressive legislation was Emergency Regulation 17D passed on 10 
January 1949.
323
 It ‘gave the High Commissioner the right of ordering collective detention; 
and that any person so detained, other than a Federal citizen or British Subject, might be 
ordered by the High Commissioner in Council to leave and remain out of the Federation. The 
grounds for such detention were that the High Commissioner should be satisfied that they 
aided, abetted or consorted with the bandits, suppressed evidence relation to the unlawful 
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possession of arms, persistently failed to give information to the police concerning bandits or 
persistently failed to take steps to prevent their escape.’324 Seven operations at a state level 
were carried out, during which a revolt in the federal administration took root and reached the 
higher levels rapidly. This aversion to detention and deportation operations was due to a 
realisation of the suffering and hardship that these operation resulted in for the squatters 
affected. This led to great deal of criticism within government on humanitarian grounds.  
In the face of attacks from colleagues in the Malayan government administration, ‘the 
Commissioner of Police offered an essentially pragmatic defence. 17 D operations, Gray said, 
were the only single measure devised and used against armed Communist in Malaya which 
had achieved marked and indeed spectacular results in the task of restoring law and order.’325 
At a meeting of high ranking officials of the civil administration, it was decided that 17 D 
operations were to be discontinued with the exception of Pahang though it would remain as a 
last solution in trouble some areas. 17 D was essentially replaced with Emergency Regulation 
17 E. This regulation ‘empowered the Ruler in Council in each state to issue eviction ordered 
requiring all unlawful occupants of land in specified areas to leave those area and proceed to 
specified areas after a minimum of one month’s notice.’326 However, despite the passing of 
Emergency Regulation 17E, 17 D operations continued intermittently and in states other than 
Pahang up until October 1949.
327
 Regulation 17 E was designed to work hand in hand with 
organised resettlement. It was soon followed by Emergency Regulation 17 F. 17 F was used 
to giver squatter removals more flexibility and allowed the administration to move secluded 
squatters to resettlement villages or other administered areas.  
According to Sandhu ‘a total of nineteen operations involving the uprooting or some 
40,000 squatters, including dependents, took place between 1949 and 1952, sixteen of them 
in 1949. Of these some 26,000 people, 24,000 Chinese and 2,000 Indians and Indonesians, 
were deported.’328 Despite the progress made by these squatter removal operations, several 
factors persuaded the civil administration to switch completely to resettlement. The first of 
these factors was the realisation that for the current strategy to succeed, the squatter 
population in its entirety would have to be deported. Secondly and perhaps most importantly 
                                                 
324 A. Short: Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, p. 188. 
325 A. Short: Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, p. 193.  
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid. p.194. 
328 K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics 
and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, (5), (1), 1964, p.154. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 103 
 
was Mao Zedong’s victory of Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war. This effectively 
closed all Chinese ports and brought deportation to a complete standstill. A third factor was a 
degree of debate over whether forced removals and deportation were improving the general 
security situation. A fourth factor to be considered was the findings of the January 1950 
Squatter Committee’s report. This committee was headed by Chief Secretary Sir Alex 
Newboult.  
Sandhu writes that ‘the committee’s report was completed in January 1950. Its principal 
recommendations were: (i) wherever possible squatters should be settled in areas already 
occupied by them; (ii) where this was not possible, they should be resettled in an alternative 
suitable area; (iii) any squatter refusing settlement or resettlement should be repatriated; (iv) 
emergency measures to deal with the security problem of certain areas should be supported 
by administrative measures designed permanently to re-establish the authority of 
Government; and (v) legal means should be introduced to provide for the eviction of squatters 
by summary process.’329 Despite this progress towards large scale resettlement it soon stalled. 
‘These recommendations were accepted by the Federal Government but their implementation 
was left to the State Governments because land was a State matter.’330 The Administration at 
State level lacked the necessary resources to implement resettlement on a grand scale. Hence 
resettlement commenced in the various states piecemeal and at an extremely slow pace. The 
Malay States began 20 resettlement schemes though ten of these were eventually disbanded. 
The rest were overtaken by the events following the arrival of General Briggs in May 1950. 
Sandhu argues that ‘what was needed was not only a comprehensive scheme for the whole 
country and the funds to finance it, but a man to galvanise the administration into 
extraordinary action.’331 Sandhu and other scholars maintain that General Briggs was indeed 
that man. Sir Harold Briggs was the first ‘Director of Operations, charged solely with the 
prosecution of the Emergency and the co-ordination of the work of the Security Forces with 
that of the civil administration.’332 
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Reasons for Resettlement in Rhodesia 
 
Resettlement in Rhodesia was primarily a military solution to what was perceived as a 
military problem. While planning existed for resettlement to involve economic, political and 
social measures; military considerations were prioritised amid alleged budget constraints. In 
the first phase of the war, guerrillas often infiltrated areas that were often sparsely populated 
in large groups. They were usually reported by local tribesman to the authorities or identified 
by patrols and reconnaissance. The networks built up by the BSAP proved instrumental in 
providing intelligence that could be acted upon to neutralise guerrilla groups. However, in the 
second phase of the war, ZANU switched to a Maoist war amongst the people strategy. 
ZANLA forces infiltrated into TTLs on the Mozambican border and began to operate 
amongst the rural villagers.  
The Rhodesian military had a mind-set towards the rural population that differed from 
Thompson’s precepts. They identified that villagers were a source of succour for guerrillas. 
Their attempts to track down guerrillas were frustrated by efforts of villagers to hide 
guerrillas and warn ZANLA cadres of Security Force movements. The RSF were concerned 
by the sudden drying up of intelligence sources in areas infiltrated by ZANLA. The guerrillas 
thus supported by the people and hidden among them had a viable operational capacity. They 
could attack farms, stage ambushes, mine roads and expand their operational zone through 
infiltrating TTLs further. This allowed guerrillas to threaten white commercial farming areas 
and settlements. The fish among the reeds tactic made it extremely difficult for the Security 
Forces to distinguish between guerrillas and civilians. The Rhodesian military was essentially 
caught on the back foot and PVs was seen as a way of reversing the fast deteriorating security 
situation. 
 
 
The British Malayan Administrations Goals for resettlement 
 
The goals of the Malayan Federal Government are outlined in what the press called the 
“Briggs Report.” In his report General Briggs surmised that the only way to end the 
Emergency was to eliminate both the armed wing of the MCP and its’ extensive support 
network, the MRLA and the Min Yuen respectively. In Briggs’ assessment, the Min Yuen 
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were able to exist because the rural Chinese population had no confidence in the government 
to protect them from MRLA guerrillas. However, he emphasised that the chief task here was 
not a military task but the resettlement and closing-in task with the population.
333
 
Resettlement formed the cornerstone of his strategy to defeat the communist insurgency: 
In the long run, security, and with it confidence and information, can only 
be restored and maintained: 
(a) by demonstrating Britain’s firm intention to fulfil her obligations in 
defence of Malaya against both external attack and internal disorder; 
(b) by extending effective administration and control of all populated areas 
which involves 
(i) A large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups, 
(ii) A strengthening of the local administration 
(iii) Provision of road communication in isolated populated areas, 
(iv) Setting up of Police Posts in these areas 
(c) by exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive and 
destructive. 
 
  Broadly, the intention is to clear the country, step by step, from South to 
North, by: 
(a) dominating the populated areas and building up a feeling of complete 
security in them, with the object of obtaining a steady and increasing flow 
of information from all sources; 
(b) breaking up the Min Yuen within the populated areas; 
(c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and information supply 
organisation in the populated areas; 
(d) and finally destroying the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own 
ground.
334
 
 
 Gurney writes that, ‘the enemy in Malaya is Communism, with all its implications, and 
is not merely some 3,000 bandits. Communism is and has been for many years deeper and 
more widespread in Malaya than is generally recognised. It is no just a post-war growth. 
Success against it is, of course, to be measured not entirely by the progress of operations 
designed to destroy it in its militant form, but by the achievement of a political, social and 
administrative programme capable of convincing the vulnerable elements of the positive 
advantages of opposition to Communism.’335 While the Briggs Plan emphasised the role of 
civilian schemes in defeating the insurgency over the role of the military; the security forces 
                                                 
333 NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Federal Government Press Statement, 18 October, 
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were still crucial to his plan’s success. 336 ‘Whatever administrative, social, and protective 
services are provided for a squatter community, they will not feel secure until the bandit is 
actually removed, and the bandit can in fact only be removed by offensive operations on the 
part of the same security forces as are available for protection.’337   
The resettlement programme was aimed at satisfying legitimate Chinese political 
aspirations, with a mind to relaxing the qualification for Federal citizenship.
338
 The Federal 
government had no intention of ‘pampering settlers and aimed to encourage people in the 
settlements to help themselves.’ 339 This invariably involved a degree of forced labour, where 
settlers had to provide labour with no remuneration for projects such as constructing roads 
and other amenities.
340
 Gurney identified that ‘the battle against Communist has also to be 
fought in the schools’341 Subsequently one of the Federal Government’s aims was ‘to bring 
these schools under proper Government assistance and control.’ Therefore resettlement was 
not a priority that was at the periphery of the campaign. Resettlement was far more important 
than military efforts to engage to MRLA.  
 
 
The Rhodesian Military and Government’s goals for resettlement 
 
The Rhodesian objectives regarding resettlement were fundamentally different from 
those of the British administration. For the Rhodesians resettlement was not the basis of an à 
la Malaya Hearts and Minds strategy to bring the war to a close. Resettlement formed part of 
a defensive military strategy to build a cordon sanitaire in Rhodesia’s border regions to curb 
guerrilla infiltration. PVs were merely one among many anti-terrorist measures that the 
Rhodesians introduced.
342
This cordon sanitaire involved large stretches of the border being 
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laid with minefields and the creation of free fire zones for the Security Forces. “Significantly, 
the need for the establishment of these villages was given as arising out of the policy of 
creating ‘no-go’ areas.”343 Free fire zones would give the Rhodesian military  considerable 
latitude to engage terrorists at will.  
  Operations Overload and Overload Two suggest that the Rhodesians considered ‘the 
physical isolation of the local population from the insurgents as an end in itself.’344 The aim 
of this isolation was to deny guerrillas their source of support, in the way of food, supplies 
and information. These two operations functioned as a blue print for ‘the establishment of 
Protected Villages in areas that had already been subverted as an impediment to insurgent 
logistics.”345 This points to how ‘Protected Villages were regarded purely as a means of 
population control rather than as a basis for winning ‘hearts and minds’346 Resettlement 
served military goals in aid of engaging terrorists and undermining their operational capacity. 
The social, economic and political potential or PVs were of secondary concern to the 
Rhodesian government. The government made official statements on how PVs were aimed at 
protecting rural Africans from the depredations of the ‘terrorists.’ 347  
Three reasons are given by the government for the construction of protected and 
consolidated villages: to isolate civilians from the insurgents and so to starve the 
latter into surrender, to protect civilians against guerilla attack, and to create growth 
points for future development. In its public utterances the government normally 
stresses the second and third points, but the first is clearly of prime importance.
348
 
The security of the African villagers was in fact used by the Rhodesian government as 
the principle raison d’être for the creation of PVs.349 In press briefings, the government 
stressed that resettlement was aimed at protecting villages from the predations of 
guerrillas.
350
 The idea was that improved local security would in turn, improve security 
nationwide. While infrastructure like electricity would be used primarily for security 
purposes, it would be made available for domestic use in the PVs.
351
The Rhodesian 
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government saw resettlement as a permanent move and claimed to have long term 
developmental goals for the villages.
352
 There is a clear indication from reports on PVs that 
the Rhodesians focused primary on the military aspects and potential tactical benefits in the 
planning and implementation of resettlement from 1972 to 1978.
353
 Resettlement was in 
effect, a short term COIN strategy forced upon the Rhodesians by a shift toward Maoist 
inspired warfare by ZANLA. 
 
Characteristics of Malayan target population 
 
The individuals marked for resettlement were by no means a homogenous group. While 
it may appear that illegal Chinese squatters were the sole raison être for the resettlement 
program that Briggs proposed and then implemented, there were two kinds of resettlement, 
relocation and regroupment. Relocation affected both illegal squatters and legal land holders. 
While the Chinese were the dominant ethnicity, other racial groups were caught up in this 
vast social engineering project.  ‘A total of 537,000 persons were transferred into New 
Villages between 1950 and 1960. Three hundred thousand of these were squatters, the vast 
majority Chinese. The remaining 273,000 legitimate land occupiers were also largely 
Chinese. Of the total population of the New Villages 86 per cent were Chinese, 9 percent 
Malay, 4 per cent Indian and 1 per cent Others. The “Others” were almost all Siamese, 
Javanese and Orang Asli.’354 
‘The types of people resettled fall into four main categories: (i) Farmers dependent for 
their livelihood on the growing of food, chiefly vegetables and the keeping of pigs and 
poultry; (ii) Persons engaged in tin mining, rubber growing or other crops, who were forced 
to live in the sanctuary of the New Villages; (iii) Wage earners, working in the 
neighbourhood in tin mines, rubber plantations, etc.; and (iv) Shop-keepers.’355 Group one 
and two dominated the new villages, forming approximately three fifths of the population.
 356
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The second type of resettlement was regroupment. ‘A total of 650,000 persons are 
estimated to have been regrouped. About 71.5 percent of them were on estates, 21.5 percent 
on mines and the remainder in factories, sawmills and timber Kongsis. Indians, who formed 
the majority of the estate workers, were the dominant group in the estate regroupments, 
forming 50 per cent of the population. The remainder were made up of 29 per cent Chinese, 
16 per cent Malays and 5 per cent Javanese. This composition was quite dissimilar to the 
structure of the population of the New Villages, where the Chinese were the dominant group 
and Indians the least important numerically. The Chinese were also the dominant group in the 
mining regroupment areas, where they virtually monopolised the labour. 
‘Estate labour regroupment was two types: (a) Internal or domestic regroupment and (b) 
external or extra-estate regroupment. In the former the dispersed labour lines were 
concentrated at one point – the factory site. In the large estates two or more such 
concentrations were not uncommon.’357 This was done to avoid disruption of work. ‘In the 
case of the latter, labourers from some of the Asian medium-holdings and small estates 
without resident managers were regrouped on a large, usually European, estate together with 
its own labour force. The number of medium holdings and the small estates thus affected is 
unknown for the whole of Malaya. Squatters on estates were also resettled in the regroupment 
areas. This generally applied only to squatters who provided the particular estate with casual 
labour.’358 The majority of the Chinese and other ethnic minorities resettled were not full 
citizens of Malaya. 
Characteristics of Rhodesian Target Population 
 
Resettlement was targeted at rural African Rhodesians residing in TTLs adjacent to 
Rhodesia’s borders. The two kinds of resettlement, protected and consolidated villages, 
regrouped Africans from pre-existing rural villages. These villages were administered by a 
patriarchal system of chiefs and elders. A CCPJR report states that, ‘in rural areas African 
people live as family groups and several families live together in a village known as a kraal 
under the leadership of a kraal head. Basically, they live a pastoral life raising food crops and 
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domesticated animals, principally cattle.’359It was a rather traditional and conservative 
society.
 360
 ‘In the past community problems had been discussed by the elders under a tree in 
the village or, in some areas, in a special shelter erected for this purpose.’361  The tribesmen 
that were resettled were considered indigenous and citizens of Rhodesia. Villages were based 
on relation by blood.  
Weinrich writes that the Shona are a kinship based society and the family is the pivot of 
social life. Traditionally a village consisted of the families of a group of brothers. This pattern 
had already been disrupted by the European administration in the 1940s and 1950s, when 
villages were regrouped in order to facilitate the implementation of modern agricultural 
methods. Still, kinsmen continued to constitute the largest percentage of residents in every 
village and ‘strangers’, i.e. unrelated people, were in the minority.362 Shona society had set 
traditional gendered structures. ‘Gendered identities have always played a central role in the 
structuring of Shona society’363 ‘The Shona are used to strict segregation of the sexes in 
home life. Each man has his own hut and so has each of his wives. Grown up boys and girls 
also have huts of their own. The whole kinship ideology of the Shona is based on this respect 
for privacy.’364 While privacy may be a factor, Shona and Ndebele society were patriarchal to 
the extreme that ‘a man’s economic, political, social and legal status was intimately related to 
the size of his area of jurisdiction.’365A man’s status was also affected by the cattle he owned, 
‘Cattle are not to be regarded simply as livestock. They play an important part in ritual – 
birth, marriage and death ceremonies – and they are the yardstick of social status.’366 
Before resettlement, rural Africans on the whole already had access to a degree of 
educational and medical services.
367
 In the case of Chiweshe: ‘In the past the hospital, run by 
the Salvation Army, as well as a small government clinic without doctor in the north of 
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Chiweshe, were reasonably adequate for the needs of the people.’368 The rural Rhodesian 
Africans were not usually alien to education or its worth. ‘Chiweshe, Madziwa, Mrewa, and 
to a lesser degree Mtoko, are areas which had a reasonably well developed system of primary 
education, with some secondary schools. Because of the proximity of the capital, the people 
are well aware that only a higher education can guarantee their children good 
employment.’369 The tribesmen had historic ties to their land that went back generations. ‘The 
graves of the ancestors had never been far away and through this ancestral link with the soil 
the people felt rooted to the land and one with each other.’370 
More remote rural areas notwithstanding, the TTLs were to some extent integrated into 
Rhodesia’s economy.  ‘Chiweshe lies only 40 miles north of Salisbury and its people have for 
many years been closely drawn into the national economy. The educational system in the area 
has been well developed and consequently many men have found skilled and clerical jobs in 
the capital.’371 While some rural villages focused on subsistence farming, others tended 
towards small scale commercial farming like Chiweshe. ‘Chiweshe has become famous as an 
African tobacco producing area; also much more maize has been produced there than could 
be locally consumed, and from the sale of surplus crops many African farmers have been able 
to build themselves modern houses and to buy good furniture. Chiweshe has been one of the 
most progressive African areas in Rhodesia.’372  
There was also a spiritual dimension to African village life. ‘An African’s “musha” 
(home village) is, in the first instance, his spiritual home – the place where his ancestors are 
buried and where the “midzimu” (spirits of his forefathers) reside. A family cannot move 
without first consulting a spirit medium in order to obtain the approval of the spirits and 
taking some soil from the ancestral graces to the new places. To ignore the observances or act 
contrary to the wishes of the spirits is to invite calamity. To move under duress is to generate 
insecurity and fear regarding unforeseeable repercussions.’373 It can be deduced from these 
characteristics that ‘that the social “contentment” of rural African people is completely bound 
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up with their deep need to observe these norms of privacy, relationships, and customary 
structures which make up the everyday pattern of their lives.’374 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Malayan squatter problem predated the Malayan Emergency by some decades and 
before Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the Malayan government had begun planning 
solutions. In the case of Rhodesia, the need for a resettlement scheme stemmed directly from 
the Rhodesian Civil War and only became apparent to the Rhodesian military and 
government several years into the conflict.  In the case of Rhodesia there was no pre-existing 
squatter population in the rural areas as in Malaya. There were also significant differences 
between the land tenure of the respective target populations from the two conflicts. In Malaya 
the resettled Chinese, for the most part, had previously occupied their land with no legal form 
of land tenure. That said, some were issued with temporary land occupancy rights by the 
Malayan government. In the case of Rhodesia, the resettled Rhodesian Africans occupied 
their land under communal land tenure, enshrined in the Rhodesian constitution and Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930. Chinese immigrants were therefore short-term occupants of their 
land. Rhodesian Africans, on the other hand, were long-term occupants with historical, 
cultural and spiritual ties to their land that went back generations. The citizenship status of 
the conflicts respective target populations were completely different. The majority of those 
resettled by the Malayan Federal government were not Federation of Malayan citizens and 
most were recent immigrants that had not been born in Malaya. The African tribesmen were 
distinct in that they were not immigrants and were Rhodesian citizens by birth. The illegal 
Chinese squatters had very few forms of political expression in colonial Malaya, while 
Rhodesian Africans were a part of Rhodesia’s political structures, through a system of Chiefs 
and a qualified franchise.   
The strategic thought behind Malaya’s resettlement program was based on a civil-
military relationship, where the civilian focus dominated. The strategy was designed to bring 
illegal squatters in Malayan government administered areas of control. While the strategy had 
a predominant civil socio-economic political focus, the military aspect was considered crucial 
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to the success of the strategy. The Chinese in Malaya would be given an economic stake in 
the country and drawn into Malaya’s political structure, and protected from the predations of 
the MCP. This would be combined with a sophisticated propaganda campaign that would aim 
to convince them that co-operation with the Malayan government was preferable to siding 
with the MCP. The Rhodesian strategy was primarily a military one which formed a part of 
the Rhodesian military’s cordon sanitaire defensive strategy. This strategy was designed to 
deprive ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas of support within Rhodesia once they had infiltrated. 
The aim was to improve security for resettled Africans, white farming communities and 
population centres. Any civil projects were a secondary concern. While the Malayan strategy 
aimed at creating political and economic benefits where they had been lacking, the Rhodesian 
strategy’s military focus was at the expense of pre-existing economic and political structures. 
The Malayan government’s strategy was long term and aimed at the successful conclusion of 
the Emergency while in contrast, the Rhodesian government’s chief objective was an 
improvement of the short term and immediate military tactical situation in the field. 
Therefore Malayan resettlement had mainly overt civilian objectives while the Rhodesian 
resettlement had mainly overt military objectives. 
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Chapter 6 
Resettlement Removal Process, Planning and execution: 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 essentially contrasts the way the Malayan and Rhodesian governments planned 
their resettlement schemes and proceeded to implement them. The initial and short term 
conditions of Malayan New Villages and Rhodesian Protected Villages shall be investigated 
through a common thematic structure. Examples of these themes are: agricultural conditions, 
village administration and security, education, economic and political structures. This chapter 
shall serve to illustrate the many similarities between the initial stages of the resettlement 
programs of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War. Attention will also be 
drawn to a number of distinctive features such as the different degrees of planning, and the 
material support provided for the resettled populations by their respective governments. Of 
particular significance were the incidents of prolific human rights violations in the Rhodesian 
Protected Villages that far exceeded those of the Malayan New Villages. 
 
Malaya: 
 
In the case of the Malayan government, inordinate of planning was supposed to precede 
the transfer of legal and illegal rural communities to a resettlement village. The first stage of 
this planning involved several vital types of surveys. First an agricultural survey was 
required, so that the official estimate of agricultural land needed by the incoming settlers is 
met in the designated resettlement area. A general map survey is conducted of the area and 
local opinions are taken into consideration. A more detailed geographical survey is made of 
the actual site of the village. In situ ‘administrative, police and technical officers’375 work out: 
‘a) overall suitability of site for settlement. b) layout of house plots. c) position of police 
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station and other building. d) siting of wells. e) roads and bridges required. f) latrines, pigsties 
and refuse disposal. g) position of perimeter wire, etc.’376 The conclusions of these officials 
were used to construct an official site plan that included an estimate of the costs involved. 
This plan and all the surveys and maps were then used to create a draft resettlement scheme. 
The draft would then be sent to the State Resettlement Officer (RO).  The scheme had to be 
‘approved by the State Resettlement Officer, Senior Executive Committee of Technical 
Officers, and State War Committee.’377 Only after this approval would the Resettlement 
Scheme then executed.  
Nevertheless, ‘when detailed plans were drawn up, they were usually ignored because of 
lack of time, trained staff to interpret them, and the urgency of the situation. Putting the 
squatter inside a fence, and quickly, was all that seemed to matter.’378 While it may appear on 
paper that the Malayan government prioritised the resettled villagers, this was not the case. 
‘This task, however, invariably prove frustrating because the resettlement sites were chosen 
for reasons other than that they should be adjacent to plenty of defensible, fertile, agricultural 
land. For the Government, the primary concern was security.’379 Due to the combination of 
urgency and an overriding need to improve the security situation  ‘such factors as the fertility 
of the soil, the possibility of flooding, the ease of irrigation, and access to markets were not 
always fully explored.’ 380 The urgency of the programme also influenced the kind of surveys 
the government was prepared to conduct. ‘The speed with which resettlement took place 
meant that the process of creating the resettlement areas was ‘a hurried one’ that did not 
afford ‘the opportunity for careful sociological and economic surveys and planning which 
would normally precede so abrupt a disturbance of a long established pattern of rural life.’381 
There were two main methods employed in moving the target population to a 
resettlement village. Essentially the first type of movement was without warning. ‘The 
relocation operation was carried out suddenly, usually at dawn, with no previous warning. 
This was to prevent the escape of able-bodied men who, as experience had shown, 
                                                 
376 K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics 
and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, (5), (1), 1964, p. 174. 
377 K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics 
and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, (5), (1), 1964, p.174. 
378 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 103. 
379 Ibid. p. 104. 
380 Ibid. p. 104. 
381 Ibid. p. 103. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 116 
 
disappeared whenever a warning of intended relocation was given. Security Forces 
surrounded the area before sun-rise and officials from various Government departments went 
in and told the inhabitants to take whatever movable possessions they could and get into the 
waiting transport. Compensation for immovable property was calculated on the spot, but paid 
later. As soon as the operation of getting the people out of the area was completed, the 
dwellings, or what was left of them after the removal of walls, doors, etc., were fired and the 
crops destroyed.’ 382 The British government and many accounts assert that this method was 
the exception rather than the rule. Sandhu writes that ‘such ruthlessness was, however, not 
common, the general practice being to give warning of removal. This procedure, described in 
detail in Appendices A and B below, was briefly as follows. After the layout plans of a New 
Village had been finalised, notices of removal were served on the people to be removed. 
After sufficient time had lapsed and the intended relocation had been explained the move was 
effected and the abandoned settlement destroyed. The people were paid a small sum as 
"upheaval allowance" and given assistance, mainly in the form of materials to put up new 
dwellings. This assistance was a loan, which had to be repaid. Each family was allocated a 
surveyed and pegged area for a house and pigsty (in case of Chinese) of about 1/6 of an acre. 
Squatters and legitimate settlers who were farmers and who unable to work their former plots 
were given about 2 acres of agricultural land within a radius of two miles of the New 
Village.’383 
French has challenged and presented a different interpretation. In both cases French 
asserts that ‘resettlement was done at gunpoint, and not just to prevent the insurgents from 
interfering,’ 384 but to ensure complete compliance with the removal. ‘In Malaya, so the 
Federal government claimed, squatters about to be moved were given several days’ notice so 
they could get their affairs in order. Care was to be taken to explain to them why they were to 
be moved, where they were going, and that the government would provide them with land 
and the materials to build new homes.’385 French posits that the more punitive removal 
process was the norm. ‘More usually, however, no such warning was given in case the 
insurgents tried to interfere. Even the official Federal government report admitted coyly that 
‘Where there was a failure to prepare the people, there was some degree of passive 
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resistance.’ Resistance was no more than passive because the authorities mustered an 
overwhelming force of troops and police and carried out each move a military operation. 
Troops surrounded the squatter area at night and policemen went from door to door, telling 
people to gather their movable belongings and then loading them onto army lorries for the 
journey. A British official who organized resettlement near Ipoh remembered that ‘we had to 
use a good deal of forceful persuasion to get some of them to move . . . If you would not 
dismantle your own house and bring it along and rebuild it in the new village we will just pull 
it down, and we did.’386 
Rhodesia: 
 
The government’s first small scale attempts at resettlement involved transferring 
villagers through transit camps before finally placing them in a PV. In the Zambezi valley ‘by 
the end of 1973 some 8,000 people had been moved from the no-go areas and some 6,000 
had passed through a transit camp at Gutsa which soon became notorious for its poor living 
conditions. At one time four to five children were dying daily in the camp from cholera or 
measles. There were only three water taps in Gutsa and two African orderlies for medical 
attendance.’387 It was typical for the first major resettlement schemes in Rhodesia to involve a 
considerable amount of planning. ‘Four weeks of planning preceded the simultaneous 
movement of 49 960 people into 21 Protected Villages in Chiweshe Tribal Land within a 
period of 6 weeks.’388 Like Malaya there were primarily agricultural surveys though there 
tribal classifications were also taken into consideration. ‘Particular emphasis was placed on 
the retention of tribal groupings during the resettlement of the local population into Protected 
Villages. As far as possible, villages were sited near to existing agricultural fields.’389 Some 
Rhodesian Africans moved voluntarily into PVs, while others had to be forced to move. 
Often those most eager to move without being coerced had been terrorised and abused by 
guerrillas.   
Cilliers writes that: ‘the people living in the northern part of Chiweshe TTL had been 
subject to a considerable degree of intimidation by insurgent forces, many moved in 
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Protected Villages voluntarily. This was not the case to the south however, where resistance 
was encountered.’390  Rhodesian Africans’ livestock were treated in several ways. If there 
was a strong guerrilla presence in the TTL and evidence that suggested that villagers were 
supporting the guerrillas, often livestock and specifically cattle were confiscated with no 
compensation as a punitive measure before being forcible resettled. In case where villagers 
were given notice of removal and informed that their cattle could not go with them, members 
of the community would sell their livestock on the market. ‘When the district commissioner 
informed them of the move, he also told them that they could not take their cattle with them. 
On hearing this, some people sold their cattle privately and kept the money.’391 Less fortunate 
villagers who did not do this would end up having their livestock sold through government 
channels. Others sold their livestock at a government sponsored sale. However, they received 
only receipts, no cash, and were told by the district commissioner that government would 
keep their money to buy food for all those who would settle in the keep.’ 392 Irrespective of 
whether the government dispersed the proceeds or used them to offset the costs of providing 
food for the newly resettled villagers, the livestock were sold at a fraction of the market 
value. ‘The people in Mukumbura thought that they had a strong reason for refusing to 
cultivate the land: all their cattle had been taken away from them and sold for a mere $5 or $6 
a head, that is, for a quarter of the price normally paid for African cattle.’ 393 More fortunate 
villagers were able to take their livestock with them to the PV.  
 Resettlement was typically a weapon of last resort, preceded by a variety of stern 
measures. ‘Early in 1973 government officials imposed collective fines on people in 
Chiweshe for not reporting the presence of terrorists, cattle were confiscated, tribesman were 
arrested and beaten; this may have increased the political consciousness of the people and 
many people are believed to have run away to join the guerillas.’394 The Rhodesian 
government began by moving targeted rural communities with very little notice. In the case 
of Operation Overload, ‘21 sites of approximately a hundred acres each had been chosen and 
surrounded by a high chain-linked fence with barbed wire at the top and by strong electric 
flash lights on poles facing outwards. The people were given short notice of the move and on 
the fixed day lorry after lorry drew up at their villages to transport men, women and children, 
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together with whatever belongings they could take, to the fenced-in areas. These were now 
called 'keeps', reminiscent of mediaeval strongholds. No resistance was tolerated.’395 Future 
operations starting with Overload 2 generally gave rural villagers notice before being 
removed.   
In most cases nothing was left behind for the guerrillas. At the start of or post removal, 
what was left of the village after the inhabitants had salvaged what they could was razed to 
the ground. Any crops adjacent to the village were also put to the torch or sprayed with 
defoliants. ‘Before the people of Madziwa were moved to the south, security forces destroyed 
their huts and crops and sold their cattle’396 
When a TTL was selected for resettlement, one of two precedents from Operation 
Overload One and Two would be followed. The first was a simultaneous transfer of the 
population, while the second was gradually in stages. Either method was employed in concert 
with the security forces. In the case of Overload One ‘the resettlement of Chiweshe Tribal 
Trust Land was preceded by a High Density Force operation lasting 4 to 5 days. About 17 
companies of troops were deployed clandestinely through the adjacent white commercial 
farming lands to seal off the Tribal Trust Land.’397 The main aims of this influx of troops 
were to prevent the local guerrilla groups from interfering with the resettlement process and 
from infiltrating the PVs. ‘It was an attempt to saturate Chiweshe with Security Forces, thus 
either eliminating or forcing the flight of all insurgent forces in the area. Following this, 21 
construction teams were moved in to construct the villages. They were followed by 
transportation, intelligence and fencing teams that enable the total resettlement to be executed 
simultaneously. This was concluded on 15 August 1974, according to schedule.’398 
Lessons from Overload One resulted in several changes; the most important a process of 
stages, to create more time to move villagers, and so negate the need for movement en mass. 
‘Based on the experience gained during Operation Overload, Operation Overload Two in 
Madziwa Tribal Trust Land, some weeks later proved to be an improvement in a number of 
respects. Instead of the massed movement of the total population in Protected Villages, the 
movement was extended of several weeks. The operation consisted of four phases. Phase one 
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entailed a High Density Force operation, during which a single contact resulted in the 
elimination of virtually the total insurgent presence (16 insurgent casualties out of a total 
group of about 18). Phase two ensured that the local population could move about freely and 
thus accomplish the resettlement with little insurgent harassment. To this end roads were 
patrolled and cleared of mines. Phase three entailed the provision of rudimentary shelters and 
amenities within the envisaged Protected Villages. Phase four covered the period 9 
September 1974, to 31 October 1974, which was the compulsory moving period.’399 
 
Malaya: the immediate and initial conditions of ‘New Villages’ 
 
The target populations of resettlement were not entirely convinced by the glowing 
picture of the new villages painted by the British Administration. ‘In the best resettlement 
centres, people could take advantage of the supply of clean drinking water, the mobile 
medical units, and the school for the children. Plots of land were made available to those who 
had farmed and the new roads made it much easier to market their fruits, vegetables, pork, 
and chicken. In some centres recreational facilities with a coffee shop were set up, and in one 
case the inhabitants, acting as shareholders, built a cinema.’400 However, these were 
exceptional cases and ‘most of the people who became caught in the resettlement machine 
found that their apprehensions were well founded.’401 Resettled villagers more often found 
themselves mired in rather basic conditions. ‘Just how basic those conditions were was 
described by Moo Kaiw, who with her family was moved to a new village near Kuala 
Lumpur where: 
All that they saw was a piece of cleared rubber estate land with lots drawn out. 
‘The tree stumps were still there and the British soldiers pointed to the lots 
and said Pick you lots and build your houses,’ she recalled. Those who could 
afford it engaged builders but those who could not built their own houses 
using planks and zinc from their old dwellings.
402
 
The resettlement programme initiated a drastic rise in the cost of building materials, one 
that the government failed to curb. ‘Furthermore, the simultaneous resettlement of thousands 
of people naturally created a great demand for all types of building materials: with the 
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Government failing to control supplies, the increased demand forced up prices. For a poor 
rural family, just reconstructing a liveable home entailed the outlay of a considerable sum of 
money.’403  
 
Agricultural Conditions in the New Villages 
 
‘But probably the most important problem facing all who were resettled was that the 
move undermined their livelihood. Most critical was the loss of land. While squatters could 
be classified as farmers or mine labourers or estate labourers and so on, almost every family, 
and most individuals, had more than one source of income and nearly all cultivated a piece of 
land.’404 The government did recognise that the resettled inhabitants of the new villages 
would not be able to provide for themselves until they had begun to harvest crops and secure 
jobs nearby. There was also recognition of the cost of building a new home. To that end ‘each 
family received up to $100 as an allowance to assist in building their new home as well as a 
small subsistence allowance for about 6 months.’ 405 Nonetheless, Stubbs writes that these 
sums by no means compensated for the cost of materials needed or the loss of wages or 
income from their produce that resulted.’406 
A cornerstone of resettlement was that there was an official prioritisation of providing 
arable farm land. ‘The New Villages were usually sited on flat land near a stream or river and 
away from highlands as a safeguard against being overlooked. Theoretically, every site was 
chosen after an examination of the soils, water potential, employment possibilities and 
accessibility. But in practice these preliminaries were generally ignored; speed was the 
driving force and there was neither the time nor the staff for such "niceties". The resettlement 
programme was essentially a security measure and as such the overriding consideration in the 
choice of a New Village site appeared to be defence.’ 407 
Due to the haste of the programme and security concerns ‘many New Villages came to 
be located on sandy lalang, colonies, lopaks, tin tailings and other in hospitable spots. Such 
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were the circumstances of, for example, the poor siting of Batu Rakit/Pulai (Trengganu), 
located on a sandy wasteland, Jemaluang (Johore), sited on lode tin tailings, of Kg. Abdullah 
(Johore), sited in an area which is regularly in undated, of Kg. Paya (Johore), built in a lopak, 
and of Mahsan (Negri Sembilan) in which the settlers were left to scratch for food on a lalang 
waste.’ 408 This nullified the policy whereby ‘areas of limited opportunities for employment 
on nearby estates and mines, the squatters were also to be given three acre farm plots outside 
the village perimeter.’409 William Newell observed that ‘one goes to village after village in 
which the land surrounding the village allegedly for agricultural purposes is bare and 
untended.’410 In many cases, the “waste” land that many New Villages had been situated on 
was quite literally uncultivable.
 411
 
Even in cases where villagers were settled in areas suitable for farming, this did not 
automatically guarantee every villager an agricultural livelihood. During the planning process 
villagers were classified according to their occupation. Only those classified as farmers 
would receive a several acre plot of land. Wage labourers, for example, did not receive land 
beyond their housing plot. This policy did not take into account that most Chinese squatters 
farmed land even if they worked part time on a mine or estate. ‘However, when they were 
resettled, many of these people were simply classified as wage labourers and not always 
assigned land that was equivalent in size to their previous plots.’ 412 Yet being assigned 
several acres of land was no simple panacea to the loss of their former livelihoods. ‘Even 
those who were officially designated as farmers often fared badly: compensation for the crops 
or livestock that were destroyed was paid later that on the spot, and the subsistence allowance 
was on $12 per person per month for five to seven months. During this period the farmers 
were expected to coax their newly acquired land into production.’413 
Medical Conditions in the New Villages 
 
While the government extolled the virtues of the amenities that were to be provided, in 
many villages not even basic ones were provided from the start.  ‘Sanitation and water needs 
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were not always immediately satisfied. In some centres it proved impossible to provide for 
safe water supplies and the proper disposal of sewage. Medical officials were very concerned 
about the increased incidence of malaria, enteric fever, and dysentery, especially given the 
acute shortage of doctors and nurses.’414 The resettlement project was vast and suffered from 
acute shortages of trained personal and resources. Thus ‘important projects such as the 
provision of basic water, drainage, and sewage services in the resettlement centres fell 
seriously behind schedule. In fact, few settlements ever received the planned complement of 
drains and stand pipes. By the end of 1951, only just over 200 of the approximately 360 
centres had schools, and most centres were without medical services.’415 In the short term the 
government was forced to employ traveling medical dispensaries,
416
 and accept the assistance 
‘of the British Red Cross Society, St. John’s, and carious missionary bodies’417 in the 
provision of medical services. It took several years for more substantial medical services to 
develop, and for ‘health measures, for example anti-malarial work, drainage, provision of 
pure water supply, hygiene measures conservancy, and scavenging,’ to be extended to all of 
the new villages.’ 418 
  
Physical Security of the New Villages 
 
It was intended that ‘many of the villages were to be enclosed in wire, and in cases 
where security required it, the perimeter would be lighted at night. A police guard of a size 
determined by security requirements was to be assigned to the defense of each new 
village.’419 Malaya simply did not have the required stocks of barbed wire to construct sturdy 
double perimeter fences in the numbers required. ‘The shortage of barbed-wire meant that the 
perimeter fences themselves were very flimsy and of relatively little value. Of the 350 or so 
centres built by then end of 1951, only fifty-six had double fences, and only twenty-five had 
perimeter lighting as an added form of protection.’420 The decision to extend perimeter 
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lighting to a considerable of new villages required the import of the requisite materials and 
generators.
421 
While Stubbs highlights the barbed wire shortage, the Federal government 
seemed confident it had enough barbed wire for resettlement needs and was more concerned 
about sourcing equipment for perimeter lighting.
422
 While New Villages attracted MRLA 
reprisals, these attacks were considered more of a nuisance.
423
 Timeous reinforcements were 
sent to garrisons in the event of an attack, and as a result attacks would immediately cease.
424
 
‘Reinforcements quickly restored morale among the garrison and squatters.’425 Intelligence 
reports noted that ‘Bandits show no inclination to press home the attacks.’426 It follows that 
while New Villages were targets, the settlers overall security had improved. 
  
The Role of the Home Guard in the provision of security for the New 
Villages 
 
Central to the concept of security for the New Villages was that a home guard would be 
raised to work with a police unit to provide protection for each New Village.
 427
  ‘Police and 
Home Guard units, organised in some 300 new villages, have the primary task of physical 
protection of the inhabitants.’428 The basis of this idea was that communities would be given 
the means of defending themselves from MRLA guerrillas, as opposed to relying solely on 
others to defend them.  It was hoped that the Chinese would ‘become fully responsible for the 
protection of their homes.’429 The role conceptualised for the home guard went far beyond 
settlement security.  ‘Of special significance are the Home Guard units, who represent not 
only an additional force for local defense but also an instrument for the development of ideas 
of civic responsibility. Recruited from among the new village inhabitants, these units assume, 
as far as possible, responsibility for local perimeter defense and patrol, internal defense and 
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other static commitments.’430 One of the reasons that the idea of a Home Guard was attractive 
to General Briggs and his staff was that it would perform the static defence duties expected of 
the police and army. ‘As reliable Home Guard units become trained and equipped for village 
duty, it is expected that they will free the regular police and Security Forces in increasing 
numbers for more active operations against the terrorists in the jungle.’431 While the home 
guard was being trained and formed, the police unit that garrisoned a New Village was 
pivotal in its defence.  The raised Home Guard Units would eventually ‘relieve the Special 
Constable in the role of watching the perimeter.’432 
 
However, these resettlement centres did not ‘afford the squatters the security and 
protection they were seeking. Indeed, the centres became a key target for guerrilla attacks. 
Under such circumstances, actions of the special constables detailed to defend the 
resettlement areas were crucial. Nevertheless, they were especially young, poorly trained, and 
without proper leadership.’433 Combined with being badly trained and not led well, the police 
were mainly Malays and not Chinese. ‘They were Malays and the Chinese squatters were not 
really surprised that they were unwilling to risk their lives to defend Chinese settlers whom 
they did not know and whom they generally distrusted.’434  Combined with this distrust was a 
feeling of resentment that the Malaya special constables were allowed to carry arms while the 
Chinese in the home guard were not. The Chinese also complained that the special constables 
took advantage of guerrilla attacks to fire into houses within the perimeter fence, sometimes 
with fatal results.’435 It was intended that after some development the Home Guards raised in 
each village would ‘relieve the Special Constable in the role of watching the perimeter.’436  
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Education in the New Villages 
 
According to an official government resettlement scheme plan, the organisation of 
schools was considered procedure. Like the Home Guard, the government soon considered 
primary school and adult education to be ‘an important vehicle for development of 
community consciousness and responsibility.’ 437 Resettlement entailed a major expansion of 
education system and the costs were shared between the Federal, State and settlement 
governments with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The MCA was heavily involved 
with education in the New Villages, primarily because the majority of schools were 
Chinese.
438
 The federal funding was intended to last for two years.
439
 This required 
significant funding and the recruitment of teachers. These schools had to be formed from 
scratch and so upon arrival and few provisions were made for education immediately. 
‘Initially, the Malayan Chinese Association donated money to help build new schools, but 
they found it impossible to satisfy the many they received for funding.’440 A combination of 
government funding, local community’s resources and labour were used to provide buildings, 
equipment and teacher’s salaries. School fees were decided by the village school committee 
and the ability of settlers to pay.
441
 ‘Government assistance was gradually increased as 
officials began to appreciate the key role education played in the fight against 
communism.’442  
Malay and English were taught as subjects in the New Village Schools.
443
 This was 
intended to facilitate the integration of the schools into a future Malaysian system of 
education.
444
 With independence in mind, schools were also considered a means by which a 
Malayan national consciousness could be developed in each village.
445
 A legislative paper set 
out several of the methods designed to achieve this. ‘Flags and large scale maps of the 
Federation and of the respective State or Settlement will soon be available for every 
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classroom, and these schools, in common with all others, are encouraged to perform a simple 
ceremony of raising the Federation and State or Settlement flags to start each day.’446 New 
Village settlers were discouraged from giving their respective schools Chinese names and 
were urged ‘to take the name of the village as the name of the school.’447 In terms of the 
Federal Governments propaganda aimed at the villages, children were seen as another avenue 
with which to influence adult settlers.
448
 Effectively the creation of schools gave the Federal 
government control over education in the New Villages, which allowed the government to 
counter communist propaganda and also intercept any propaganda coming from China.
 449
 
A report states that, ‘by the end of February, 1952, 216 schools containing 957 
classrooms had been established. Much remains to be done and several hundred additional 
classrooms are under construction.’450 Providing education in the new villages had its 
challenges. Due to the serious economic disruptions between two thirds and a half of new 
village children were attending school in 1952. The majority of the pupils were boys, as 
many female pupils were kept back by parents to assist in rebuilding their homes.
451
 Sourcing 
the large numbers of teachers required was problematic in the extreme. Teaching in a New 
Village was simply not as attractive as teaching in an older village or town, despite the offer 
of a decent salary.
452
 Due to the high demand for teachers, lower teaching qualifications were 
required in an attempt to bolster numbers. This inevitably affected the standards in the new 
schools.’453 New Village teachers were not free from the possibility of intimidation and 
neither were parents. Many parents refused to send their children to school either out of fear 
of communist informants in the village, or because they thought that the schools provided the 
wrong sort of education for their children.
454
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The Administration of New Villages 
 
The Brigg’s plan required a strengthening of local administration and from the beginning 
of resettlement the new villages were administered and supervised by District Officers (DO) 
at state level
455
 supported by Resettlement Supervisors (RS), Resettlement Officers (RO) and 
Assistant Resettlement Officers (ARO). These government officials operated as Assistant 
District Officers (ADO).
456
 The AROs were predominantly Chinese.
457
 There were two main 
goals, to bring the settlers ‘under effective administration control in new settlements and so 
under State and Settlement administration,’ 458 and the eventual self-government of these new 
settlements. To this end, ‘at the start of the resettlement program, village committees were 
formed in many kampongs and new villages to assist the DOs, although they served solely in 
an advisory capacity and had no legal status or responsibility other than that outlined by the 
DOs.’459 This situation was by no means static and in ‘In July 1952 an ordinance was passed 
which paved the way for popular, direct and personal participation in local government 
throughout Malaya. Under the terms of this Local Councils ordinance, the village committee 
of a new village or kampong may make application to the DO to establish a local council 
whenever it feels the community has reached the point of development.’460 While the path to 
self-governing colonies seemed clear on paper, it was fraught with problems. The task of 
administering the settlement was not made any easier by the failure of the Government to 
provide some of the basic services which were anticipated in the original resettlement 
plans.’461  
The government at both a state and federal level suffered from a shortage of Chinese 
officials and Chinese speaking European officials. This was reflected in the lack of suitable 
recruits to act as Resettlement Supervisors (RS), Resettlement Officers (RO), and Assistant 
Resettlement Officers (ARO). ‘When recruits could speak Chinese and understand the 
Chinese ways and culture, and when they took an active role in developing the amenities of 
the settlement and created a sense of community among the inhabitants, then resettlement 
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worked well and people were generally happy. But this was all too rare.’462 Rare or not, the 
Federal government recognised that it was critical that New Village settlers, who had mostly 
been exposed to Communist pressure, should be protected against Communist physical and 
intellectual attack and helped to become contented communities.’463 The Federal government 
had no intention of abandoning the New Villages, and from the start Briggs outlined that the 
Administration would focus on the “after care” of New Villages after the completion of 
resettlement.
 464 
Food restrictions and other measures 
 
Food restrictions formed part of a wider food denial campaign; because the MCP and 
MRLA had no external supply lines, they were wholly dependent on local Malayans for food 
supplies. Strict food controls increased the number of guerrilla surrenders and was considered 
an efficacious weapon against them.
465
 
 
Resettlement was used as an opportunity by Special Branch (SB) to infiltrate New 
Villages in attempt to break the Min Yuen organisation. The police installed informers who 
report on inhabitants who were aiding the communists.
 466
 ‘The placement of Chinese 
squatters and legal settlers behind barbed wire made it considerably easier for the police to 
screen, detain, and deport suspected communist sympathizers, and for the security forces to 
intimidate them.’467 One of the first restrictions that New Villages were subjected to, was the 
imposition of a curfew from 7.00 pm to 6.00 am.
468
 Combined with this curfew were security 
checks conducted at the village gates that caused considerable delays. These delays served to 
exacerbate the long distances that New Villagers had to travel, to either reach their new 
farming plots, or places of work in the mines or rubber estates.
469
 This served to limit the 
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villagers’ potential income and ‘generated considerable antagonism towards officials.’470 
Curfew orders were also applied to children as they too could have been used as sources of 
supplies and information.
471
 While this may seem extreme, it did prevent children from being 
accidently shot at night by patrols who had to challenge anyone met after dark and shoot if 
there was no response.
472 
 On top of this ‘in June 1951 all existing and future resettlement areas were designated 
‘food restricted centres’. Under this law, all shopkeepers had to limit their stocks or restricted 
goods such as medicines, clothing, high energy foods, salt, pepper, and batteries; they had to 
open all tinned goods when they were sold; and they had to ensure that they sold goods only 
to people with valid identification cards. Settlers could not take food out to their place of 
work, and the movement by road of certain restricted goods was prohibited during curfew 
hours.’473 This did not bode well for the viability of the New Villages because ‘the lack of 
land and the consequent restrictions on the supply of food, prices for pork, chicken, and even 
the most inferior vegetable increased markedly. The general cost of living, a chronic irritant 
in the years since the return of the British, once again became a major source of 
discontent.’474 
The food restrictions were not arbitrary; they formed part of Federal food denial 
operations that ‘began in June 1951. Typically, such operations fell into three phases. In the 
initial phase, which might last for two or three months, the SB built up its knowledge of the 
area and penetrated the Min Yuen. In the second phase, lasting for six months or more, the 
authorities introduced strict controls over all supplies of food and other essential supplies. 
Houses were searched and every ounce of surplus food was confiscated. Rice rations were 
either issued uncooked or families were required to collect a ration of cooked rice that had 
been prepared in a central village kitchen.’475 Serving cooked rice was an important 
regulation as it ‘could not be passed to insurgents outside the village because it was liable to 
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go bad quickly. Food denial forced the insurgents to rely for food on a limited number of 
supporters in the villages.’476 
Not all of the Federation was affected by food restrictions. During the course of the 
Emergency, areas were declared “white” and in them restrictions such as food control were 
relaxed.
477
 Rubber tappers and other labourers were potential sources of food for guerrillas 
and were prevented from taking food out the New Village.
 478
 ‘Labourers found it very 
difficult to keep going from 6.00 am or 6.30 am until mid-afternoon, their normal work day. 
The inconvenience, not to say indignity, of daily searches at the gate, the time lost in the 
mornings, and the problems, of not being able to have a proper midday meal, all contributed 
to a bitterness and resentment within the resettlement centres.’479 
Another restriction employed by the Federal government, was the forced detention of 
entire villages that did not cooperate with the authorities, in cases such as the murder of 
members of the security forces.
480
 New Villages could also have communal fines levied upon 
them as punishments for assisting guerrillas or not assisting the government.
481
 Templer 
introduced the use of secret questionnaires distributed to settlers in an attempt to persuade 
them to divulge information.
482
 While these measures were severe, they were balanced by 
more constructive and progressive measures put in place to improve conditions in New 
Villages. ‘Sir Henry Gurney’s view was that “collective fines are only justifiable as long as 
they are balanced by constructive and progressive measure to assist the people who show any 
signs of willingness to co-operate in restoration of law and order.”483 Food restrictions were 
considered highly successful as guerrilla documents show that it was impossible for them 
even purchase food legally, aside from coercion.
484
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Rhodesia Initial and Short Term Conditions 
Upon Arrival: 
 
The Rhodesian government extolled the virtues of resettlement in the state controlled 
press. They were to become growth centres and facilitate the provisions of services 
previously unknown to the rural Rhodesian Africans. While there were model PVs, the reality 
did not relate to this glowing image. ‘Prior to the regroupment heavy communal fines had 
been imposed on a number of village communities.’485 Pole speakers were put in between 
huts that played recordings and radio music. However, they were used to control information 
by censoring Shona news.
 486
 In the case of Operation Overload in Chiweshe and the majority 
of those that followed, a basic camp structure was prepared. ‘The set-up of all the keeps is 
uniform. The huts are built in lines according to kraal- heads, each family having a space of 
about one eighth of an acre. On this space, it is supposed to stand basic accommodation like a 
kitchen, a bed-room and a granary. If a man had many grown up children who needed 
separate huts and also if he had a big harvest to store, his stand would become crowded.’487  
The camps had several gates and were ringed with a tall fence topped with barbed wire 
and electric lights on poles facing outwards.
488
 No form of habitation was prepared for the 
incoming villagers, just empty plots. ‘The protected villages merely consisted of security 
fencing around an area that had been marked out in smaller plots one per family.’489 The 
administrative staff however, had a small keep constructed for them at the centre of each 
camp. Each of the 21 sites was about one hundred acres. ‘The people were given short notice 
of the move and on the fixed day lorry after lorry drew up at their villages to transport men, 
women and children, together with whatever belongings they could take, to the fenced-in 
areas.’490 These villagers would find themselves assigned a patch of ground with which to 
place themselves and their belongings and subsequently construct a home. The space was 
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about ‘15 by 15 yards. Members of a former village were assigned adjacent spaces and were 
told to start building. In very few cases was building material provided.’491  
There were a number of complaints raised by villagers and the solution was to grant 
permission to use materials from their previous more substantial homes.492 This lack of 
provision for immediate housing and sufficient building materials meant that ‘they too, like 
most resettled Shona, had for some time to sleep in the open.’493  Up to now, the villagers 
have managed to put up small, thin grass-thatched huts, which have no walls – only grass 
from bottom to top.’494 The elderly and in particular widows struggled as no assistance was 
provided in the construction of their homes.495 The need for building materials was 
exacerbated in Chiweshe and similar areas by the lack of forests and a scarcity of bushes, 
insufficient to meet the scales required by resettlement.
 496
 While the difficulties faced by the 
elderly and widows have been noted, many families were faced with a similar problem in that 
most of the men ‘were absent as labour migrants’497 Hut building was traditionally a male 
role as it required a degree of strength. A number of ‘church organizations tried to help.’498 
However, some people, even old widows, refused it saying that such assistance would 
dampen the anger of the people and dull their resistance to government.
499
 ‘Mr. A. is very 
angry and dismayed at having been put in this protected village. He says that convicted 
prisoners are better cared for than he and his people, since prisoners have at least a roof over 
their heads, clean drinking water and toilets. None of these facilities have been provided.’500 
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Medical conditions of Protected Villages 
 
There were no immediate provisions for sanitation.
501
 ‘People were told to dig 
themselves private latrines several feet deep. But before they could do this, they used the 
open adjacent country for defecation.’502 As more people would arrive at a PV, so the space 
inside available for off-loading belongings would decrease. This resulted in the lorries 
dumping these belongings that included foodstuffs like maize and ground nuts, onto the very 
ground that had been defecated upon.503 Each family was ordered to construct a pit ‘of three 
to five feet on each family plot, and most families were provided with 3-feet concrete pipes. 
Some built shelters over these toilets. The people were enraged to have to live and eat in the 
sight of their own defecation. Soon big flies settled down on the refuse and mosquitoes 
started breeding all over the new settlements.’504 
The problem with field latrines is that they eventually fill up. They are traditionally a 
short term waste disposal method, whereby new latrines must be dug as the old ones reach 
their limited capacity. For an army on the march or staying limited periods at a specific 
locations this is considered a suitable method of sanitation. However, PVs were far more long 
term. In the case of Chiweshe, ‘the shallow toilet pits which the people were instructed to dig 
on occupying their keeps became full to ground level. Maggots crawled everywhere and from 
these came the feared big green flies which carry disease. The flies settled on toilet waste 
and, from there, on food because the people lack adequate covers for their cooking utensils. If 
meat is left uncovered for only a few minutes, it can no longer be seen because of the swarms 
of flies that have settled on it. Filth lay everywhere.’505  A better and relatively cheap 
reticulation system and insect proofed toilet doors was apparently designed but did not prove 
to be viable
506
 as the resettled villagers rejected their use on grounds of affordability.
507 
 
It is not surprising that under these conditions, disease ran rampant. ‘The most common 
diseases have been typhoid and diarrhoea. Many patients suffering from these are receiving 
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no medical care.’508 These disease prone conditions were exacerbated by a chronic shortage 
of clinics.
 509
 Before the PV program, medical services in the TTLs were often capable of 
meeting the medical needs of Africans in their former villages. In Chiweshe, for example, 
there was a Salvation Army Mission Hospital and a government run clinic that was sufficient 
before the concentration of population.
510
 Post resettlement ‘however, both hospital and clinic 
are overcrowded with patients, many of whom sleep on the floors of the passages. Those who 
can be taken to the hospital and clinic are fortunate; the others just lie down in their huts and 
wait until they either recover or die.’511  
The death rate in the PVs of Chiweshe was considerably higher than that of the former 
villages. A report stated ‘Old people are dying from starvation. Enteritis is killing children in 
large numbers. The crops have mostly been destroyed by cattle and baboons.’512 The majority 
of deaths are attributed to ‘stomach troubles, diarrhoea and dysentery.’ 513 The age groups 
that were affected the most were the young and the elderly, although deaths among the 
groups in between also occurred. A report went so far as to state that ‘Among the old over 60 
years of age, half are said to have died.’514 Weinrich was unable to verify these statistics. 
According to Weinrich the government ordered villages to slash grass and destroy mosquito 
larvae where possible.
 515
  
Nevertheless, there were few attempts at improving the supply of water, making it 
difficult to control typhoid and water related diseases. In Chiweshe ‘an adequate supply of 
fresh water had been provided in only one or two villages prior to completion of the 
resettlement.’516 In general PVs had three main water supply conditions. Some only received 
contaminated water while other PVs had no water thus forcing people to travel long distances 
to obtain their daily water needs. Even if water was piped to a PV, this was no guarantee of a 
pure water supply. A report on a PV in Chiweshe stated, ‘this water cannot be drunk and a 
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visitor from Salisbury who did drink it vomited strongly.’517 The last condition involved 
villages that had been sited near a source of water. This however, was not a simple panacea to 
water requirements. During the rainy season water would collect in the surrounding lower 
areas and result in the PVs being ‘plagued by dampness and mosquitoes.’518 Reports stated 
that due to the wet ground, ‘mosquitos are found in big numbers in most keeps, they breed 
easily and very quickly in these toilets and in some pools of standing water found anywhere 
in the keeps. As a result diseases like Typhoid, Diarhrea and Malaria have broken in greater 
number of cases.’519 
 The defoliation campaigns of the RFS also had medical ramifications for locals in 
affected in area.‘In the Zambezi Valley. In this Area it is the government policy to destroy all 
vegetation, thus depriving the insurgents of both cover and food.  The defoliant scheme 
carries with it the possibility of some disquieting side effects. Towards the end of 1974 there 
were reports from one border area of a strange illness which caused children to shake 
violently and sometimes to die. The visiting doctor ascribed this to the spraying of vegetation 
from the air with defoliants earlier that year. 520  
 Amid CCJPR papers are reports outlining surges in the prevalence of venereal disease. 
‘During the month of June this year, a government member of Parliament mentioned in the 
House of Assembly that venereal disease was common and was spreading in the T.T.L’s, and 
he blamed this on the guerrillas. For the first time this disease is becoming common in the 
T.T.L’s, particularly in the protected villages, because of the grouping of people. In my last 
report I warned that the disease would become more widespread because of the crowded 
condition in which people were force to live, and the lack of privacy V. D is not carried or 
caused by the guerrillas at all, but by the District Assistants (DA) as well as by the ordinary 
people. This is getting worse and worse all the time. Clinics are even worried about this 
matter.’521 
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Provision of Security for Protected Villages 
 
For all the Rhodesian government’s claims of providing security for resettled villages, 
the most secure part of the camp was the administrative headquarters. The HQ was placed at 
the centre of the camp and usually on top a small hill.
 522
 The security of this enclave was 
more substantial than the perimeter of the camp proper. The HQ was protected ‘by a double 
wire fence’523 and ‘often also by a number of embrasures made of sand bags.’524 The 
residents of the HQ consisted of the commanding European officer and the African assistants. 
It was the most protected part of the camp and revealed that it was the administrative staff 
and armed guards of the camp who were actually protected.
 525
 Chiefs were intimidated by 
guerrillas
526
 and the establishment of PVs often created targets for the guerrillas, mortar 
attacks were one method.
527
 Curfews were enforced but often led to a loss of life as villagers 
did not observe the 6pm to 6 am curfew properly. A report notes that, ‘In May, a chief’s old 
wife was shot for breaking the curfew.’528 Despites incidents like that, villagers have been 
recorded asserting that they felt safer from the RFS and the guerrillas in the keeps.
529
 The 
pole lights were solely a security feature and do not appear to have benefited the villagers. 
‘There are pole lights right around the keep fence. The Lights face outwards. In other words 
they are security lights. The inside where the huts are, is completely dark at night.’530 
Perimeter control was not as tight as the government claimed and the villagers were not 
categorically isolated from the guerrillas.
531
 A report on Mrewa stated that, ‘although the 
main purpose for these confinements is to prevent people from feeding terrorists, it said the 
later continue to order the same people to feed them (sic)’532 
‘ 
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The Administration of Protected Villages 
 
‘In the middle of each keep there is a fenced pit where Internal Affairs staff of several 
district assistants stay. There are Africans and European D. A. who acts as an officer, in 
administering the keeps.’ 533 The white officer’s role was that of the Protecting Authority of 
the camp and fell ‘under the direct control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.’534 For the most 
part these officers were practically fresh out of secondary school. They would be ‘seconded 
to a protected village as an alternative to doing active military service.’535 The African DAs 
were also fairly young men and while responsible for the security of the camp, had received 
minimal training. The training was merely a six week crash course, hardly sufficient for the 
task they were set to. These assistants usually volunteered simply for comparatively higher 
wages. These assistants had to stand guard at the gates of the PVs and control movement in 
and out
536
 ‘and patrol the outer fences at night.’537 The presence of African assistants was 
intended to improve camp security and they were ‘supposed to inform themselves of all that 
goes on in a keep and to pass on any irregularities to the European officer.’538 Patrols of the 
fence during the day were not organised.
539
 
Effect of resettlement on economic structures 
 
Before resettlement, Chiweshe had a robust agricultural based economic structure that 
went beyond subsistence and could sell surplus produce on the market. As a result of 
resettlement the agricultural production of the TTL soon collapsed. There were a number of 
factors that contributed to this collapse. First and foremost was the imposition of curfews that 
made it extremely difficult to cultivate their fields that were quite a distance from the PV.
 540
 
The enactment of food restrictions forbade villagers from taking food with them out to the 
fields, thus forcing them to work for the duration of the day without any form of 
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sustenance.
541
 Agricultural work is extremely physical and requires a considerable intake of 
calories, this restriction greatly reduced productivity.  
Curfews also drastically altered traditional work rhythms. ‘Traditionally people started 
their agricultural tasks early in the morning and returned home in the middle of the day when 
the sun is very hot, and then resumed their field work in the afternoon.’542 Curfews compelled 
villagers to start their work later in the day and thus work through the heat of the day without 
food or rest. They then had to return to the PV well before sunsets, further reducing the 
available working hours. ‘People have not been assigned new fields, but are told to cultivate 
their old fields.’543 This necessitated long journeys to and from their plots. ‘The movement of 
the people means the disruption of their farming system and their way of life; The cattle 
cannot be looked after properly, only a fraction of the grazing land can be used, many areas 
have been ‘burnt’ to help the military operation, not in most cases can land be ploughed or 
looked after.’544 
 
The brunt of this physical hardship was borne by women who were performing the 
majority of the work in these fields.
545
 Even when crops were successfully coaxed out of the 
ground under these conditions that did not guarantee a successful harvest. As the villagers 
were held with in the camp overnight they could not ‘keep watch in their fields during the 
night.’546 As a result the harvest was often destroyed or reduced ‘by stray cattle and wild 
animals.’ 547 In addition to this, it was common for the Security Forces to destroy entire 
harvests just before they ripened ‘for fear lest the guerillas get food from the fields.’ 548 The 
mode of this destruction took the form of defoliants and poisonous chemicals. This went far 
beyond food denial as shown by the following report.
 
Each camp at Mukumbura was given a garden in which we should grow our own 
vegetables. Each village headman was allocated a section from which each family 
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could get a small bundle of vegetables once the rains had started. But now that the 
rains have started, people are suffering from a strange sickness. They started shaking 
and then they die. Children die almost daily and some adults have also died. On 27 
November 1974 the doctor was here and stated that the deaths were caused by 
poisoning: the army had used defoliants in May to clear the no-go area of vegetation. 
By now the rains have washed the chemicals into the soil and plants have absorbed 
the poison.
549
 
 
The food restrictions caused a further break down in traditional social norms. ‘In the past 
families usually shared their food with relatives and friends.’ 550 However, under the new 
restrictions food cannot travel privately between keeps. In theory villagers can apply for 
permission but it is rarely granted.
551
 The official policy was that villagers should sell their 
food to the PV shops and then take the proceeds to friends and relatives in neighbouring 
keeps so that they can the food themselves.
552
 This process is profitable for the middlemen 
but at the expense of the villagers attempting to share according to previous practice. While 
there were roads to and from keeps, the prevalence of landmines and potential ambushes 
often restricted the bus routes which only catered for a fraction of the keeps. Thus villagers 
traveling from one keep to another would generally have to buy food. The restrictions were 
further irksome in that workers in nearby towns could not even bring food back to the keeps 
for their dependents, nor could ‘maize produced in one keep be taken to another for 
grinding.’ 553 
In the Zambezi valley, the government instituted a forced labour agricultural system. ‘In 
December 1974 Government took the garden plots from the people and declared that the land 
would in the future be ploughed for them; they had merely to offer their labour to cultivate it. 
For this work they were to be paid a modest wage: 30 cents a day for adult labour and 15 
cents for child labour. At first the people refused to co-operate, but soon they were forced to 
work on the land.’554 Weinrich asserts that this system of forced labour was confined to the 
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Zambezi valley regions.
 555
 Villagers refused initially as the cattle that they normally used had 
been taken from them with minimal compensation.  
The Rhodesian government attempted to provide some degree of entertainment to the 
resettled villagers. The ‘government installed loudspeakers to pipe music to the people,’556 
however, the speakers were also used to disseminate propaganda though the radio news 
tended to be censored. Film units were sent to PVs as part of the propaganda campaign.
557
 
Another form of ‘entertainment’ that had economic and moral implications was the opening 
of beer halls. The beer halls were supplied by the Rhodesian Breweries and thus prevented 
the development of home brews by local women that could have benefited them. While this 
helped subdue the PVs, the more sensible villagers bitterly resented the existence of beer 
halls as they plundered what remaining money villagers had and contributed to a lowering of 
‘the moral standards in the keeps.’558  
Contrary to the government’s assertions that ‘that protected villages are meant to become 
growth points of future economic development,’ 559 it is clear from the kind of infrastructure 
developed that this was not the case. The basic camp structure did not allow for quality 
housing or other amenities. The much vaunted electricity was only used for security 
purposes. No sources of employment were created within the keeps. The collapse of local 
agriculture made hundreds of thousands of Rhodesian Africans dependent on government and 
non-government food aid.
560
 Plots that were allocated were often too small to support a 
family and helped to precipitate the collapse of farming.
561
 In essence the resettlement 
program in Rhodesia created static settlements that could not under those circumstances grow 
into towns.
562
 
‘Church life has been equally disrupted, and so have many social services. Shops and 
mills owned by the people had to close down. Instead of the small rural entrepreneurs who 
lost their livelihood, some richer men from town have come and set up small shops in the 
keeps. The money spent on goods in these shops comes mainly from the wage earnings of 
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sons, husbands and brothers working in town, for the people in the keeps have no means of 
earning money. The point is that the so-called economic growth points of the future are at 
pre-sent rural slums whose people live off the charity of labour migrants.’563 
Henson notes that, ‘Every family in any Tribal Trust Land depends on the natural 
vegetation for their cooking, for building homes, for making some small furniture, making 
ox-drawn carts as well as for fencing poles and for thatching the roofs of their houses.’564 
Sebsequently areas around villages were cleared of all vegetation that severely damaged the 
local ecology.
565
A CCJPR report stated that, ‘The commission also received and investigated 
allegations of the deliberate bombing by the Rhodesian Air Force of civilian villages after the 
inhabitants had been removed to safety and of the destruction of their houses, property and 
crops. These facts have been clearly established and cannot be denied.’566 This was simply 
one method of destroying villages, their destruction further damaged the local economy. 
 
Assistance from Government 
 
Resettled Africans received very little in the way of assistance from their government. 
Weinrich reported that ‘no compensation has been paid to the people for their loss.’ 567 So for 
their loss of homes, property and crops there was no system of compensation in place. The 
villagers were essentially ‘expected to fend for themselves.’568 Villagers’ cattle were sold off 
to provide a degree of food support to the PVs.
569
 A European District Commissioner was 
quoted stating that ‘the security forces are definitely not here to give them everything.’570 In 
contrast European farmers were compensated handsomely for disruptions, with ‘over four 
million dollars’
571
 paid to them in 1975, according to one report. When infrastructure projects 
were initiated, such as ‘bridge building, irrigation and drainage systems, the installation of 
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protective fencing and the installation of latrines,’572 government would provide resources 
and expertise while villagers were forced to provide labour requirements.
573
 These projects 
were at the behest of the military, and soldiers of the RAR were used to organise this forced 
labour. As the Security Situation deteriorated they were often abandoned because the RAR 
was redeployed on military operations. As a result many of these projects remained half 
finished. Resettled Africans were promised a considerable amount of food assistance by the 
government. One man gave this report. 
‘The people are also very hungry. Village headmen had been promised 15 to 20 bags 
of mealie per month for their villagers, but now they get only nine bags. One bucket 
of mealie is allocated to each adult and half a bucket to each child. Also one bucket of 
beans is given to each family, irrespective of how large the family is. This is far too 
little food and the people are very hungry. They have been promised food every 
month, but they receive it only every third month.
 ‘574 
Food was often not distributed evenly and there was usually a disregard for the numbers 
of children.
575
 As such an array of Church Organisations, NGOs and the Red Cross had to 
step in and provide the support that the government failed to provide.
576 
 
The use of  Guard Force to provide security 
 
Initially the Department of Internal Affairs was responsible for the security of PVs.
577
  In 
the early stages the Department having no military or paramilitary trained elements was 
forced to ‘draw personnel from other areas to assist in manning Protected Villages. In the 
interim the Protected Villages in Chiweshe ‘were in some instances also manned by members 
of the South African Police. The Department of Internal Affairs in order to meet these new 
demands ‘established a new category of officer termed District Security Assistants who were 
distinct from the career DAs that performed normal administrative duties.’578 However, the 
Department could not cope with the training required and so the BSAP and Prison Service 
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were tasked with the first training programmes. These programmes were then taken over by 
the army. ‘The department was allocated a number of National Servicemen for their normal 
18 month period of service.’579 These national servicemen were posted to PVs as 
superintendents in charge. ‘In many cases a vedette was the only official within a Protected 
Village. His major responsibilities entailed the welfare and discipline of his 15 to 20 District 
Security Assistants, and the safety and protection of the Protected Villlage.’580 The call up 
age was raised to 25 to 38 in an attempt to have more mature and experience officers in 
charge of PVs.  
The resettlement programme grew considerable and this put an enormous amount of 
strain on the Department of Internal Affairs whose primary function was administrative as 
opposed to military. As the Police and the Army ‘were loath to perform this function as part 
of their normal normal operations, it was eventually decided to form an autonomous force, 
the Guard Force.’581 Initially ‘a guard force of about a thousand men’ was created using 
mainly ex-service Africans and an influx of Department of Internal Affairs Security 
Assistants. ‘Half of the Department of Internal Affairs National Service allocation and the 
Chikurubi training base was transferred to the Guard Force.’582 To begin with Guard Force 
had only static defence duties involving PVs and other sites in need of security. Guard force 
was trained ‘by a former Rhodesian army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Peart, who fought in 
Malaya and in the Middle East with the British army, and so is thought to have experience of 
protected villages and insurgency operations. He left the Rhodesian army in 1970.’583 
Furthermore the CO of Guard Force, Brigadier Godwin, had served with the RAR during its 
tour to Malaya (1956-58).  
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Education in Protected Villages 
 
The Rhodesian government claimed that it would be a lot easier to provide education to 
rural Africans after they had been concentrated, and that the provision of education that 
would be superior to that available for former villages. Each keep area did include at least 
one school.
584
 Evidence to the contrary suggests that education was heavily disrupted by the 
resettlement programme. Before resettlement areas like ‘Chiweshe, Madziwa, Mrewa, and to 
a lesser degree Mtoko’585 were ‘areas which had a reasonably well developed system of 
primary education, with some secondary schools.’586 The system had developed due several 
factors. The first of which was these areas proximity to the capital. This promoted 
anawareness among African parents that education would ensure their children decent 
employment. Thus they were prepared to plough significant funds into their children’s 
education. This attitude was assisted by the formation of schools that were built up by 
missions and then taken over by local councils.
587
  ‘With resettlement, very many of these 
schools have been closed, thirty in Chiweshe alone. It is only in cases in which the school is 
physically included in the fenced-in area that its buildings can still be used for teaching. Even 
where the schools stand just outside the fence, they had to be abandoned by order of the ad-
ministration.’588 Existing schools only continued operating if they happened to be included in 
the perimeter of a PV.
589
 There were cases where even schools that were outside PVs on the 
perimeter were ‘abandoned by order of the ad-ministration.’590  
 Like the increased pressure on existing medical services, the reduction in the number of 
schools resulted in an excessive degree of pressure on the remaining schools in the PVs. This 
pressure was worsened further by the requirement for children who went to schools outside 
the confinement, to transfer to the keep school.
591
 To deal with overcrowding double 
streaming had to be introduced
592
 and teachers gave ‘morning and afternoon classes to 
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different groups of pupils.’593 Teachers were far from satisfied with the living conditions 
within the keeps and applied for transfers to more salubrious schools. ‘The higher turn-over 
due to unsettled conditions and the severity of counter measures from both insurgents and the 
Security Forces has aggravated the situation.’594This meant the teachers were rotating in and 
then out swiftly and this had a detrimental effect on the standard of teaching and the learning 
capabilities of students as they adjusted to new teachers.
595
 Unlike white state provided 
education the schools available to the resettled villagers required fees. Due to the disruption 
and partial collapse of the local economy, villagers lost the means with which to pay for their 
children’s schooling. As a result there was a ‘tremendous drop in education standards’596 and 
pupils were often held back a year by the initial school closures.
597
 
 
 
Abuse Suffered in Rhodesian Protected Villages 
 
There are a number of reports of cases where district security assistants abused their 
positions of power. While Weinrich notes that the complaints presented to her research 
assistants could not be verified, the frequency of these complaints does suggest that there is 
some truth to them. The circumstances with which the commanding white officer and his 
district security assistants operated can support their plausibility. Weinrich asserts that the 
security assistants were deployed to the keeps without their families and thus they were 
‘forced to lead bachelor lives.’598 The CO was normally quite young and inexperienced and 
the only white officer in the PV. This helped create an environment whereby security 
assistants would use their control of the villagers to sexually harass women and to coerce 
them into intimate relations. In cultural terms this constituted a circumvention of these 
women’s traditional guardians. 599 ‘The state, however, was interested in the behaviour of 
villagers only insofar as it complied with, or transgressed, the PV disciplinary structure. 
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Official disinterest was obvious at every level. The number of 'seductions' by DAs was not 
considered noteworthy. Complaints of sexual harassment were explained as an over-reaction 
to necessary searches and calls for female guards to search women were dismissed as 
impractical.’600 This disinterest included the security assistant’s direct superior the national 
serviceman commanding the PV. One such officer with regard to ‘his men's periodic 
desertion of their barracks to drink, 'womanise' and fight with cuckolded men:’601 
 
We tried to stop it; but 'boys will be boys' ... I accepted what was going on as pretty 
power for the course.
602
 
 
The security assistants exploited the official disinterest in a predatory manner. For 
example men were searched in a rapid and efficient way upon entry or exit of the PV while 
‘the handling of women's bodies was laboured:’ 603 
The soldiers enjoyed the searching, they did it with lustful eyes. They would 
feel the line of beads worn around the tummy for sex appeal.
604
 
They made sure they touched every part ... touching the breasts.
605
 
One method of coercing women to satisfy their sexual and also domestic 
requests was by ‘manipulating the system of punishments’606 
It was a dirty game, he would punish you today; you would have labour. 
The next day he will say; 'I said I loved you but you rejected me, so what do 
you think is better; falling in love with me and forget about these 
punishments, or you continue?'
607
 
Any attempts by menfolk to resist this kind of abuse were put down violently.
608
 More 
often though there cases of men and women speaking out, coping mechanisms developed. 
Men tended to turn to alcohol while targeted women would often succumb to the predations 
of the security assistants.
 609
 Excuses were often made for the shooting of protesting 
husbands. 
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‘Jacob’s father found one of his daughters pregnant. Another was always hanging around 
the gate with the D.A.’s, the hated District Assistants. He knew who was the father of the 
child but he kept his mouth shut. Mathew did not. One day his wife came back from the river 
where she gone to fetch water and told him that one of the D.A.s had pulled her into the 
bushes, threatened her and then raped her.  The angry husband went and complained to the 
District Officer (DO). The next day he was shot because ‘he was outside the fence after six 
o’clock. No one complained after that and, willing or unwilling the D.A.’s had their pick of 
the women.’610 The rampant sexual abuse lead to unwanted pregnancies that were often 
aborted, unsuccessful abortions often killed the mothers.
 611
 
 
Sexual abuse was not the only form of infraction by the security assistants. ‘On 13 
December 1975 the Rhodesia Herald reported that a 22-year-old European DO and four DAs 
had been convicted of assaulting another DA in May 1975 in keep 20 in Chiweshe. The 
European DO was described by the magistrate as sadistic and cruel. The assaulted assistant 
needed ten days in hospital as a result of the injuries he had received. A well-documented 
case which was taken to court, but was suppressed when the government passed the 
Indemnity and Compensation Act, is that of a DA who shot dead two African boys and 
injured a third when these wanted to leave their keep at the check point in order to work in 
the fields. The district commissioner offered the children’s parents some money to cover the 
funeral expenses.’612There are other ‘reports of people being shot for being a few minutes late 
in arriving at the gate, tales of harsh punishments given by the officers ruling the camps.’613 
 
 
Rural African Response to Resettlement 
 
The crowding together of strangers broke down communal controls.
614
 Social life was 
put under a great degree of strain. Elders were worried about the moral implications of 
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consensual and no- consensual interactions between village women and the security 
forces.
615
 Attempts to placate villagers with beer halls upset them, as it prevented earning 
money from home brewed beer and encouraged a moral decline.
616
 Not all PVs were 
prevented from brewing beer.
617
 Reports suggest that there was not a complete cultural break 
down in the PVs; marriage ceremonies still took place,
618
 and kraal-heads still settled minor 
disputes and chiefs held customary civil cases.
619
 Evidence suggests that villagers were 
sceptical of the radio services provided and film screenings, and were well aware that they 
were attempts to disseminate propaganda.
620
 Of the grievances created by resettlement it was 
their children’s hunger that parents resented most.
621
 For all the government’s assertions that 
PVs were there to protect villagers, they did not feel protected, but rather they felt they had 
been imprisoned.
622
 Reports indicate that they hated the wire and the Government for putting 
them there.
623
 Villagers saw the PVs as temporary and yearned to return to their ancestral 
lands, despite the destruction of many of their former homes.
624
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Federation of Malaya government made to considerable efforts in planning their 
resettlement program. The Rhodesian government used a similar planning methodology to 
that of the Malayan government though it was not as comprehensive or thorough. Even so, in 
both cases the resettlement process was rushed on a massive scale and preparatory plans were 
usually abandoned or ignored. Both governments set aside inadequate resources for their 
respective resettlement schemes. However, the Malayan government provided a degree of 
compensation for destroyed property, goods and livestock, and paid resettled villagers a 
temporary subsistence allowance. The Malayan government also aided resettled villagers in 
constructing new homes. While this support was not completely adequate, it eased the 
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hardship of relocation to some degree. In contrast, the Rhodesian government had no system 
of compensation and did not provide a living allowance. Instead of compensating villagers 
for their livestock losses, livestock were often confiscated and sold by the Rhodesian 
government to provide food for the newly resettled inhabitants of Protected Villages.  
Despite the differing levels of compensation, the initial conditions in Malayan New 
Villages were much the same as Rhodesian Protected Villages. Disease and malnutrition 
were prevalent and mortality rates showed a sharp increase. Both resettlement programs had a 
collection of model settlements that were used for propaganda purposes. In both cases, camp 
administration with rigorous and oppressive systems of control was imposed upon the 
resettled villagers. At the start resettled villagers had practically no say in the running of their 
new environment. Hence both schemes did not initially cater for new political structures or 
participation. There was an acute shortage of administrative and medical staff in both 
resettlement programs. In particular, the Malayan government struggled to recruit staff that 
could speak a Chinese dialect. The security situation of resettled villagers did not show any 
improvement and tended to deteriorate in both conflicts, as their respective guerrilla forces 
prioritised attacks on New Villages and Protected Villages. The wider security situation also 
showed no immediate improvement. In the case of Malaya, there was a correlation between 
resettlement and a general increase in MRLA attacks.  
The Malayan government had promised to improve the educational, political and 
economic opportunities for the resettled villagers, yet nothing tangible materialised at the 
outset of their program. The Rhodesian government had also made promises though more on 
better security for villages and the provision of amenities; instead pre-existing economic, 
education, medical and political structures were compromised. It is clear that initially both 
resettlement programs were humanitarian disasters of little benefit to the military aspects of 
the campaign. This begs the question, why was resettlement an effective strategy in the 
Malayan Emergency and an unsuccessful one in the Rhodesian Civil War? 
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Chapter 7  
Local and External Factors that decided the outcome of 
the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 identifies a set of key factors, unique to each conflict, which can be directly 
linked to the success of resettlement in Malaya and its failure in Rhodesia. The prior chapters 
have revealed several vital aspects of the local context in Malaya that facilitated resettlement.  
Chief among them are characteristics of the population targeted by resettlement. Rhodesia’s 
target population was distinct to that of Malaya’s. This chapter will assert how characteristics 
such as culture, citizenship, land tenure and long standing tiers to land, influences the success 
or failure of resettlement. An important difference between the two resettlement programs 
was how the Malayan and Rhodesian governments conceptualised their respective conflicts. 
Their diametrically opposed understanding of their respective internal wars is highly relevant 
to their different approaches to counter-insurgency and in turn, their resettlement programs. 
The Malayan resettlement program had a more civilian focus while the Rhodesian 
resettlement had a more military focus. Of particular significance to the Malayan Emergency 
was an external factor, namely the Korean War (June 25, 1950 – July 27, 1953). This chapter 
will illustrate the Korean War’s significance and posit that that lack of a similar external 
factor, in the case of Rhodesia, proved detrimental to Rhodesia’s resettlement program. 
The Effect of the Korean War on the Malayan Emergency 
and the Resettlement Program 
 
In 1952 a news article stated with a degree of despondency, ‘resettlement has caused 
changes in the country’s economic structure. The acreage under food crops, other than rice, 
has fallen by one-third. The cost of food-stuffs has risen: supplies of fresh vegetables, pigs, 
and poultry have been short, and there has been an increase in vegetable imports from abroad. 
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There are still no schools in 196 out of the 410 new villages. Many of the teachers in the new 
schools have had little training and the medical service is still inadequate.’625 For all the 
Federal government’s policies, resettlement appeared to be floundering. ‘War is a matter not 
so much of arms as of money.’626 A government cannot wage a war, politically or militarily 
without the requisite finances. ‘The Korean War could not have come at a more opportune 
time for the Malayan Government. In May 1950, the High Commissioner had predicted that 
even with a British Government contribution of about $25 million, the Malayan reserves 
would be exhausted by the end of the year.’627  
The Korean War (1950-1953) caused a sharp rise in tin and rubber prices, while nations 
began to build their strategic stockpiles. ‘The price of rubber rose dramatically, doubling 
within a few months and ultimately reading over $2.20 per pound in February 1951, before 
dropping again to an average $1.70 per pound for the year, or over four times the average 
price for 1949. The price of tin rose less quickly, but even so, in early 1951, it was over 
£1,300 per long ton on the London Market – a marked increase over the April 1950 price of 
£590.’628 Tin and rubber prices continued to remain at these high levels for much of 1952.629 
Malaya’s primary exports were tin and rubber and so the profits of mines and plantations 
improved enormously. This in turn gave ‘a great boost to the Government’s revenue. The 
duty collected from the export of rubber rose from $28.1 million in 1949 to $89.3 million in 
1950.’630 In effect the fresh inflow of taxes into the government exchequer saved the Malayan 
government from bankruptcy and austerity measures. This vastly improved the financial 
resources at the government’s disposal and consequently provided funding for the 
resettlement program and aspects of the military campaign.    
The resettlement of labour while enforced on plantations and mines by the government 
was not state funded. Briggs ‘would not concede that the cost of regrouping should be borne 
by Government, and explained that this was a measure of special protection for which in an 
Emergency individuals could reasonably be expected to accept liability.’631 The costs were 
                                                 
625 TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, Improvements to New Villages, news article 
circa June 1952. 
626 Thucydides & R. Crawley (translation): History of the Peloponnesian War, p. 36-37. 
627 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 108. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. p. 109. 
630 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 108. 
631 NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government 
deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 
1951. 
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borne privately by the large mining and plantation companies. The rise in profits restored 
what had been a major decline in those two sectors and gave companies the capacity to meet 
the costs of regroupment without compromising their operations and solvency. If 
regroupment had been forced on the tin and rubber sectors with a continuing decline, those 
industries could very well have collapsed under the additional financial pressure. This in turn 
could have prompted an economic recession. The windfall in profits also facilitated healthy 
managers’ bonuses that steadied morale and hefty spending on plantation and mining 
security. ‘In 1949, for instance, only $4 million had been spent on defence by European 
estates; during 1951, $ 16 million was spent. Dunlop, one of the major rubber plantation 
owners, alone spent well over $4 million on, among other things, seventy armoured cars and 
a number of highly trained European security officers.’632  
Due to the way the larger rubber plantations employed one year forward contracts, it was 
the small holders in the rubber industry that began to benefit first. As soon as those contacts 
expired the larger plantations began reaping the benefits of economic fortune. Operations in 
both the large and small holders were scaled up. ‘In the tin industry, the expansion took place 
towards the end of 1950 with forty-one mines being reopened or started. Seven more were 
opened in 1951, and labour was in demand.’633 With the vociferous demand for labour came 
a massive increase in wages. ‘Moreover, the high wages paid to rubber and tin workers 
forced other industrial and commercial employers, as well as the Government, to grant 
substantial pay raises so as to stop labour deserting them altogether. Hence, despite the 
inflation which always accompanies commodity prices booms, most Malayans experienced 
an increase in their ‘real wage’ and many did very well indeed.’634  
For the people of the New Villages, the Korean War boom, created jobs and economic 
opportunities. The prosperity created by the growing economy, combined with the 
improvements that came with higher resource allocation to the resettlement schemes, helped 
to ‘sugar coat’ the Malayan Authorities repressive law and order regulations and COIN 
operations. A 1953 report stated, ‘additional funds to the extent of $5 million are to be made 
                                                 
632 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 112. 
633 Ibid. p. 110. 
634 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 112. 
634 Ibid. p. 111. 
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available for the purposes of carrying out permanent improvements to new villages during the 
year.’635  
The Federal government recognised that resettlement had led to a sizeable reduction in 
the cultivation of food and of husbandry, for example, poultry, fish and pig farming.
 636
 The 
main challenge facing the government was the provision of suitable arable land near the New 
Villages.
637
 The government assumed that after the Emergency some of the settlers would 
return to their former holdings and hence it focused of meeting mainly the immediate 
cultivation needs of settlers.
 638
 The government surmised there were two main causes, the 
first that ‘squatters’ were usually far removed from their previous holdings and that made it 
difficult to cultivate them. The second being, that ‘the boom conditions existing at the time of 
resettlement reduced the significance of the agricultural aspect of the family economy.’639 
The first cause persuaded the government to ensure that land provided to settlers for 
agriculture, should be as close to the New Villages as practicable.
640
 The cost of purchasing 
arable land in the immediate vicinity of New Villages would be high. Nonetheless, the 
Korean Boom would provide the funds with which to buy such land.
641
 The agricultural 
policy had two main aims: the first would be ‘to increase the amount of food, e.g. vegetables, 
pork, eggs and poultry; the second to provide a stable occupation for those whose skill and 
inclination make them wish to farm.’642  
The government’s intention was to make the New Villages self-sufficient and also 
suppliers of agricultural produce to towns.
 643
 There was an awareness of the mixed-economy 
of the new villages. To that end the policy set out guidelines for the distribution of land  ‘For 
those families whose menfolk are in paid employment half an acre should be sufficient; for 
those families whose menfolk wish to practise full-time farming not less than three acres 
should be allocated and more if extensive animal fodder is to be grown.’644 Tobacco farming 
                                                 
635 TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, Improvements to New Villages, 1953 
636 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953. 
637 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953. 
638 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953. 
639 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages,  letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 
1952. 
640 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages,  letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 
1952. 
641 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages,  letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 
1952. 
642 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952. 
643 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952. 
644 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952. 
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was not encouraged though neither was it prohibited.
645
 Cultivation and in particular 
husbandry was funded through a combination of government grants and loans.
646
 While 
farmers were only issued with temporary licences to start with, if they farmed well, they 
could progress to leasing their land.
647
 Hence while resettlement and the Korean War Boom 
had retarded agricultural, accruing revenue was used by the Malayan government to rectify 
the problem. 
Due to the Korean War ‘boom’, the Federal government had built schools for 411 New 
Villages, comprising of 2,068 classrooms and 1,785 teachers quarters, at a cost of six million 
straits dollars.
648
 By 1955 the Federal government was confident that adequate provisions 
have been made for services such as education and medical care.
 649
 In effect the resettled 
villagers found themselves in an environment where alongside repressive measures, their 
immediate conditions were improving as amenities were put in place, their economic 
mobility had improved considerable and British promises of political inclusion were 
gradually being fulfilled. Contrary to Hack, one posits that the Korean War was a significant 
event that altered the course of the Malayan Emergency.
650
 It can be argued that the ‘British 
Way of War’ in Malaya would not have been mythologised for its Malayan success was it not 
for the vagaries of the global economy. One cannot divorce trade from warfare as the two are 
firmly enmeshed. This is abundantly clear from the Rhodesian Civil War, where Rhodesia 
did not have its own ‘Korean War’ moment. 
The Rhodesian Economy and Resettlement 
 
Hard on the heels of Ian Smith’s UDI came international economic sanctions. First 
applied by Great Britain in 1965 and then followed by United Nations selective sanctions that 
gave way to mandatory sanctions in 1966. However, these sanctions did not bring an end to 
Rhodesia’s rebellion in the weeks and months envisaged by Harold Wilson. The Rhodesians 
managed to develop highly successful sanction busting techniques and significant trading 
                                                 
645 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952. 
646 TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952. 
647 TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, news article circa 1951. 
648 TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955. 
649 TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955. 
650 K. Hack: ‘"Iron Claws on Malaya": The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency,’ Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, (30), (1) (1999), p. 103. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 156 
 
powers like South African continued to do business. Immediately after the war, the consensus 
was that sanctions were a complete failure as they did not succeed in their overt goal of 
bringing down the Rhodesian government. While the Rhodesians were able to circumvent the 
economic strangle hold in part, this was not without cost. The illegality of doing business 
with Rhodesia may not have deterred certain nations and businessmen. Nevertheless there 
was a marked increase in the cost accrued by Rhodesians when undertaking business deals. 
This state of affairs created an inordinate amount of economic friction that that was a 
constant factor for the duration of the war. The Rhodesian economy was forced to become 
more self-sufficient while economic measures and restrictions like fuel rationing were put in 
place. The combination of sanctions and a war that damaged the economy in a myriad of 
ways, contributed to an economic decline, though not a complete collapse. As a result 
insufficient resources were diverted to the Rhodesian government’s resettlement program. 
Unlike Malaya there were no external or internal economic factors that vastly improved the 
flow of revenue into the Rhodesian treasury.  
While certain segments of the resettled rural Africans were more prosperous than others 
(like Chiweshe), resettlement more or less levelled out previous economic differences. It was 
much more than simply transplanting rural poverty behind barbed wire. The resettlement 
scheme was a thorough economic dislocation. Studies and reports have shown that villagers 
lives were not improved by resettlement as asserted by the Rhodesian Front; instead they 
invariably worsened. ‘Otherwise the ‘growth points of prosperity” will turn out to be growth 
points of poverty and misery.’651 Due to the destruction of their livelihoods and a worsening 
of their living conditions, the resettled villagers were forced into a dependency on the 
Rhodesian State. The Rhodesian government was under the delusion that the villagers would 
be able to provide for themselves and did not take the appropriate measures to support them. 
The reports on mortalities alone point to the level of neglect of these PVs. 
Culture was a crucial factor in the success of resettlement in Malaya and its failure in 
Rhodesia. In the case of the Malayan Emergency, the majority of those resettled were 
Chinese. For the most part, they were not yet Malayan citizens, many of them had not legal 
title to the land they had previously occupied and were classified as illegal squatters. A 
commonality between the majority of those who were settled or regrouped was that they were 
either recent or historically immigrants. As immigrants they tended to migrate within Malaya 
                                                 
651 NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiswiti and Kandeya Protected Villages, 27 
November 1975. 
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in search of work and land to provide for themselves. In other word their ties to the land they 
were relocated from did not go back countless generations. Therefore their ties to their land 
could be considered somewhat looser than that of Malay Kampongs where they had legal title 
or not. It could be asserted that as immigrants and economic migrants, the concept of moving 
when required was not completely alien to them. Consequently while highly resentful of 
being coerced to move from their former homes, they would prove somewhat easier to 
convince once their new resettled conditions began to improve.  
The Ndebele and the Shona tribes were completely different in this respect. In 
Zimbabwe’s long history there had been major migrations, though for all intents and purposes 
they were indigenous to Rhodesia. The tribesmen who were resettled had been living in their 
villages for generations, and their ancestors were buried on their land. As agriculturalists they 
had significant ties to their livestock, in particular cattle that transcended a pure monetary 
value. Shona society was patriarchal with a structure of chiefs and elders. Unlike Malaya’s 
illegal squatters, African tribesman held their land legally through communal tenure. They 
had historic rights to the land. However, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 had left the 
Africans with less than half the land in Rhodesia, with much of it arid and not capable of 
supporting the increasing population. In 1965, the Native Areas were converted to TTLs, with 
Tribal Trust Lands Act. In 1969 with the Land Tenure Act, Rhodesia’s land was divided 
roughly in half between Africans and Europeans with a significant number of acres marked as 
national land. This act was amended in 1977 to allow Africans to purchase European 
farmland and land in urban areas. The land grievances of Rhodesian Africans stretched back 
to 1890 and have not yet healed to this day. Resettlement à la Rhodesia could only have 
produced an adverse reaction to this population group.  
There is also the question of Government legitimacy. The British Malayan government 
was seen as legitimate, if temporary as they had promised Malayan independence. The 
Federation of Malaya was internationally recognised as part of the British Empire, and as 
such there were normal diplomatic relations and economic ties. As part of the Empire and 
then Commonwealth, support was forthcoming from the British Empire and the 
Commonwealth, and allies such as the United States. The Rhodesian government, due to 
UDI, was an illegal regime and a pariah state. Internationally Rhodesia was not recognised 
and could not confidently count of support from most quarters. While Rhodesia was a self-
governing colony and part of a greater Federation from 1953 to 1963, it should be 
remembered that the Rhodesia was created by force of arms and deceit. This is hardly 
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conducive to creating the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of Rhodesian Africans, and less 
so when the government has been declared illegal by the international community. The 
question of legitimacy spiked the guns of the Rhodesian Front’s belated attempts at reforms. 
 In Malaya, New Villages were gradually integrated in government administration and 
political structures. Often members of the village councils formed were associated with the 
MCA and this facilitated canvassing for support during federal and state elections. The 
councils allowed New Village to be devolved from government officials and created direct 
forms of liaison with state and federal officials.
652
 They could raise their own taxes and 
embark on projects and provided excellent political experience. New Villages became a 
permanent part of the Malaysian landscape while in Independent Zimbabwe they no longer 
exist. In Malaya, New Villages had opportunities for advancement in political, economic, and 
social spheres. The former micro quasi political structures were not as entrenched or a 
fundamental part of custom as in Rhodesia. PVs in Rhodesia broke down existing village 
structures i.e head man and elders, who in the new dispensation had no power. The 
Rhodesian government replaced that system with a repressive camp structure where young 
men were given power over the elderly; thus replacing them with an alien and abusive system 
with a political dead end. Rhodesian PVs had no economic or social mobility. The villages’ 
micro political system was not replaced with a new kind of political system that would allow 
villagers a political voice or rights. In essence at best the PVs put the resettled Africans in a 
static situation. Though in reality they found themselves was far worse than their previous 
villages. The fabric of their society had been ripped apart and replaced with a repressive 
structure, while being dislocated from the economy. While there were reports of model 
villages, in the balance, they seem to have been Potemkin Villages, a façade to distract the 
public eye from the real conditions of the majority of villages.
653
 
The Resettlement scheme was embarked upon by the Rhodesian government only after 
they became aware of widespread guerrilla infiltration. Many of the villages that were 
resettled had already have reached by ZANU and ZAPU political commissars. The 
Rhodesian resettlement program played into the hands of ZANU politicisation, proving that 
Rhodesian government was not working in the interests of the ‘people’. Resettlement was 
seized upon as a prominent grievance by ZANU and ZAPU, perhaps rightly so. ‘Many of the 
people who spoke distrust the security forces, and many, in fact, look to the guerrillas as their 
                                                 
652 R. Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, p. 215. 
653 UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20,  The Man in the Middle, A report on Protected Villages, 1975. 
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liberators. The immediate effect, which during the last three years the events in Chiweshe, 
have had on the people, is a great intensification of political awareness and this includes 
women as well as men. In fact, a spirit of resistance is discernible in the TTL.’654 
In political terms, resettlement completely alienated Rhodesian Africans from the 
Rhodesian government. One posits that resettlement helped create widespread support for 
ZANU and ZAPU, support that ZANU capitalised upon in the 1980 elections. Certainly there 
is evidence that there was coercion and intimidation of voters in those elections but that this 
was the only reason that ZANU came to power is a complete fallacy.  The Rhodesian Civil 
War, at a fundamental level, was a war for the support of the Rhodesian Africans. The 
Rhodesian Front was a right wing party whose prime focus was the support of its white 
constituents. The Rhodesian Front was therefore ill equipped politically to win the Rhodesian 
Africans confidently to their side. The Rhodesian Government devoted much of the budget 
and effort to the military side of the war. Resettlement served military goals, instead of 
serving as a vehicle for transforming Rhodesia’s political landscape. Even if the government 
had allocated more resources to resettlement and had adopted a more political approach; the 
local context was simply not suited to resettlement. Furthermore, there were no external 
global economic changes that could have created economic conditions conducive to 
resettlement. 
Culminating Thoughts 
 
   Primarily due to the example set by the British counter-insurgency campaign in 
Malaya, there has been a fixation by COIN theorists on the 20 – 80 per cent balance between 
the military and political aspects of such campaigns. This has largely been inspired by the 
works of Thompson and Galula, where case studies of scenarios in which governments have 
been defeated have been analysed to show that a military - political imbalance was a major 
factor in their demise. Conventional historical texts on the Emergency further buttress the 
balance argument by asserting the paradigm of a uniquely British way of waging counter-
insurgency.  Historians such as French have striven to show that this paradigm of British 
military-civil balance and limited war is a myth, and that the British counter-insurgent 
practice was ruthless and coercive. Elsewhere, in his treatment of the Rhodesian Civil War, 
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Moorcraft asserts that the Rhodesian military fulfilled the 20 percent of the military part of 
equation while the political leaders failed to meet the demands of the 80 percent political part.   
   One posits that the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War were both 
political wars in the sense captured by the nineteenth-century theorist Clausewitz, ‘when 
whole communities go to war – whole peoples and especially civilized peoples – the reason 
always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political 
object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.’655  In the case of the Malayan Emergency, both the 
MCP and the British authorities recognised they were fighting a political war, and devised 
stratagems accordingly.  The Rhodesian Civil War differs in that the African Nationalists 
waged the war politically, while the Rhodesian government fought it militarily, and only 
introduced reformist political measures as a last resort.  
   Therefore the crux of the argument is that there was no balance between the military 
and political in either of these two conflicts. The belligerents of both conflicts had political 
goals. That is to say, both the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War, were 
political wars. Clausewitz states: ‘that however, does not imply that the political aim is a 
tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet 
the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, the, will permeate all military 
operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence 
on them.’656  In effect, one affirms that ‘war is not a mere act of policy but a true political 
instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.’657 Therefore, the military 
aspects of a campaign are, invariably, a smaller part of a greater political whole, in that, ‘the 
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and mean can never be considered 
in isolation from their purposes.’658 The British Malayan Government established the political 
nature of its war while the Rhodesian government failed to realise that it was embroiled in a 
political war, to its detriment.
659
  
   This dissertation has sought to demonstrate the significance of historical military link 
between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War. To that end, the Rhodesian 
contribution to the Malayan Emergency has been illuminated beyond the previous extent of 
the historical discourse. The comparative methodology has added fresh insight to the 
                                                 
655 C. Clausewitz: On War, pp. 86-87. 
656 Ibid. p. 87. 
657 Ibid. p. 88. 
658 Ibid. p. 87. 
659 Ibid. p. 88. 
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Resettlement programmes of both conflicts. This thesis has clarified the degree to which the 
Malayan Emergency has informed the way in which the Rhodesian Civil War was fought. On 
that basis, one concludes that this provides grounds for a more extensive comparative study 
of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War.   
   The comparison of two resettlement programs has shown that many factors, military, 
social, economic, medical, political, cultural, and international, decided the success or failure 
of resettlement, and its subsequent influence on the outcome of both conflicts.  This study has 
determined that it is perilous to take COIN techniques based on the historical record of one 
conflict and blindly employ them in a present campaign that has a completely different local 
and international context.   
While it can be argued that ‘strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory and 
that tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat’660, the crucial conclusion that this 
study has reached is that without a compatible context, both military and political tactics and 
strategies are worthless, and may yet reap a bitter harvest of defeat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
660 Attributed to Sun Tzu. 
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Addendum A: A selection of photographs of ‘C’ Squadron 
(Rhodesia) 22nd SAS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 SRFEVU waving farewell at the train station
661
 
                                                 
661 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 11 Scroll presented to the M.V Tegelberg
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662
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 12 Major Peter Walls shakes hands with General Sloane
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663
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 13 The 'ulu'
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664
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 14 Jovial tea break
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665
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 15 Sgt Major Mazamban gets his wings
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666
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 16 Ground paratroop training
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667
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 17 Ground paratroop training
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668
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 18 Less enthusiastic tea break
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669
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 19 Receiving mail
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670
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 20 Sgt Reid Daly with members of 11 Troop
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671
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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Figure 21 'C' Squadron coat of arms.
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672
 NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron,22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs 
from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953. 
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